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Studien zu Interpretationsstilen und Emotionserkennung  
bei Patienten mit einer Körperdysmorphen Störung 
 
Einleitung 
Zielsetzung der vorliegenden Studien ist die Untersuchung kognitiver Prozesse bei 
Patienten mit einer Körperdysmorphen Störung.  Dieses Störungsbild gehört zu den 
Somatoformen Störungen (DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association [APA], 1994). 
Hauptmerkmal dieser Störung ist eine übermäßige Beschäftigung mit einem eingebildeten 
Makel oder Defekt im körperlichen Aussehen. Besteht eine leichte körperliche Anomalie, 
ist die Beschäftigung mit dem Defekt deutlich übertrieben. Die übermäßige Beschäftigung 
mit der vermeintlichen Deformierung muß deutliches Leiden oder Einschränkungen in 
sozialen, beruflichen oder anderen wichtigen Funktionsbereichen verursachen (APA, S. 
532). Weiterhin darf die Symptomatik nicht besser durch eine andere psychische Störung 
(z. B. Anorexia Nervosa) erklärt werden. Am häufigsten beziehen sich die eingebildeten 
Defekte auf Körperregionen des Gesichtes oder des Kopfes wie z.B. ausdünnendes Haar 
oder Falten. Aber auch andere Aspekte wie Form oder Größe von Nase, Augen oder 
Ohren stehen im Mittelpunkt der Besorgnis (APA, S. 532).  Assoziierte Merkamle dieses 
Störungsbildes sind unter anderem eine starke Angst vor negativer Bewertung (Hollander, 
Neville, Frenkel, Josephson & Liebowitz, 1992) sowie paranoide Vorstellungen, dass 
andere Personen negativ über den eingebildeten Makel oder Defekt sprechen (Wilhelm & 
Neziroglu, 2002).  
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In den letzten 20 Jahren wuchs das Interesse Klinischer Psychologen an der 
Erforschung der Rolle kognitiver Faktoren bei der Entstehung und Aufrechterhaltung 
psychischer Störungen. Eine Vielzahl von Studien beschäftigte sich mit der Frage, 
inwiefern hierbei Verzerrungen in der Informationsverarbeitung von Bedeutung sind.  Im 
Speziellen handelt es sich hierbei um systematische Verzerrungen der Art, wie ein 
Individuum Informationen wahrnimmt, speichert und wieder aus dem Gedächtnis abruft 
(Ingram & Kendall, 1986). So konnte gezeigt werden, dass Patienten mit Angststörungen 
und Depressionen ihre Aufmerksamkeit im Vergleich zu gesunden Kontrollpersonen 
selektiv bedrohlichen störungstypischen Stimuli zuwenden und mehrdeutige Situationen 
bevorzugt als negativ oder bedrohlich interpretieren (Überblick bei Williams, Watts, 
MacLeod & Mathews, 1997). 
Eine weitere kognitive Verzerrung bezieht sich auf die Tendenz, mehrdeutige 
Situationen oder Informationen hinsichtlich der eigenen persönlichen Belange zu 
interpretieren. Butler und Mathews (1983) zum Beispiel ließen Patienten mit einer 
Generalisierten Angststörung, ängstliche Depressive sowie gesunde Kontrollpersonen eine 
Reihe mehrdeutiger Szenarien lesen (z. B.: Suppose you wake with a start in the middle of 
the night thinking you heard a noise, but all is quiet.  What do you suppose woke you up?). 
Anschließend wurden die Versuchspersonen instruiert, aus mehreren 
Erklärungsmöglichkeiten diejenige auszuwählen, die ihnen am plausibelsten erschien (z. 
B.: There is a burglar in your house.).  Beide Patientengruppen schätzten die 
Wahrscheinlichkeit einer negativen Interpretation im Vergleich zu neutralen 
Interpretationen und im Vergleich zu gesunden Kontrollpersonen signifikant höher ein.  
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Es ist jedoch nicht eindeutig, ob die Ergebnisse von Studien, in denen Interpretationsstile 
mit Hilfe von Fragebögen erfasst wurden, durch systematische Antworttendenzen 
(“response bias”) verzerrt wurden.  Es könnte zum Beispiel sein, dass ein Patient, 
unabhängig von seiner eigentlichen Interpretation, eine Antwort gibt, die im Einklang mit 
seinem Störungsbild steht.  
MacLeod und Cohen (1993) verwendeten ein experimentelles Paradigma, welches 
das Problem des "response bias" kontrolliert, da die Versuchspersonen in dem Glauben 
gelassen werden, dass ihr Leseverständnis getestet wird und sie nicht wissen, dass die 
eigentliche Zielsetzung dieses Paradigmas die Erfassung von Interpretationsstilen ist.  
Hoch- versus niedrig-ängstliche Studierende lasen auf einem Computerbildschirm 
mehrere Szenarien, die aus einzelnen Sätzen bestanden. Erfasst wurden die Zeiten, die für 
das Lesen eines jeden Satzes gebraucht wurden, indem die Versuchspersonen jedes Mal, 
sobald sie den Sinn des einzelnen Satzes verstanden hatten, die Leertaste drückten.  Jedes 
Szenario bestand aus nur zwei Sätzen, wobei der erste Satz mehrdeutig war: er konnte 
entweder als neutral oder als bedrohlich interpretiert werden (z. B.: They completed the 
service by filling in the hole.). Vom danach dargebotenen zweiten Satz existierten zwei 
verschiedene Versionen, von denen die eine Version im Gegensatz zur anderen Version 
jeweils eine logische Fortsetzung des ersten Satzes darstellt. Das bedeutet, dass den 
Versuchspersonen entweder die zur neutralen Interpretation passende Version dargeboten 
wurde (The repairs finished much sooner than had been expected.) oder die zur 
bedrohlichen Interpretation passende Version (The funeral finished much sooner than had 
been expected.). Weiterhin wurde variiert, welche der beiden möglichen Interpretationen 
des ersten Satzes nahegelegt wurde. Dies geschah durch ein neutrales Hinweiswort 
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(neutrale Bedingung: Renovate) oder bedrohliches Hinweiswort (bedrohliche Bedingung: 
Burial), welches vor dem ersten (mehrdeutigen) Satz dargeboten wurde. 
Sollte der zweite Satz keine logische Fortsetzung des ersten (mehrdeutigen) Satzes 
darstellen, ist grundsätzlich anzunehmen, daß die Versuchsperson mehr Zeit benötigt, um 
den zweiten Satz zu verstehen und somit die Lesezeiten des zweiten Satzes verlängert 
sind.  Die entscheidende Manipulation von MacLeod und Cohen (1993) bestand in der 
Darbietung einer Reihe von Fragezeichen ("no cue"-Bedingung: ?????) anstelle eines 
Hinweiswortes, womit die Interpretation des ersten Satzes absichtlich offengelassen 
wurde. MacLeod und Cohen (1993) vermuteten, daß bei niedrig-ängstlichen 
Versuchspersonen die Lesezeiten des zweiten Satzes unter der “no cue”-Bedingung 
(?????) der neutralen Bedingung (Renovate) entsprechen, bei hoch-ängstlichen Personen 
jedoch der bedrohlichen Bedingung (Burial). Wie erwartet fanden MacLeod und Cohen 
genau dieses Ergebnismuster, was darauf hinweist, daß hoch-ängstliche Personen im 
Gegensatz zu niedrig-ängstlichen Personen bedrohliche gegenüber neutralen Interpretation 
bevorzugen.  
In den letzten Jahren wurde jedoch diskutiert, inwiefern Wörter als Stimuli in 
experimentellen Paradigmen eine ökologische Validität besitzen (Lundh & Öst, 1996). Es 
könnte zum Beispiel sein, dass Wörter nicht in gleicher Weise die persönlichen Ängste 
oder Belange des Patienten repräsentieren wie es “reelle” Stimuli wie z. B. Bilder tun.  So 
vermuteten Lundh und Öst (1996), dass gerade bei Sozialphobikern, die sich durch eine 
starke Angst vor negativer Bewertung auszeichnen, Gesichter (z. B. ein Gesicht mit einem 
ärgerlichen Emotionsausdruck) relevanter sind als Wörter, die ihre Ängste repräsentieren 
(z.B., Kritisiert werden). So konnten sie auch in einer Untersuchung belegen, dass 
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Sozialphobiker, die mit einer Reihe von Gesichtern unterschiedlicher Emotionsausdrücke 
konfrontiert wurden, dazu tendierten, kritische Gesichter im Vergleich zu neutralen 
Gesichtern in einem anschliessenden Wiedererkennungstest häufiger korrekt zu 
identifizieren.  
 
Generelle Zielsetzung 
Generelle Zielsetzung der vorliegenden Dissertation war, Interpretationsstile bei 
Patienten mit einer Körperdysmorphen Störung zu untersuchen.  Bislang gibt es meines 
Wissens keine Untersuchung, die sich mit dieser Fragestellung befasst.  Eine solche 
Untersuchung scheint jedoch wichtig, da klinische Beobachtungen bereits vermuten 
lassen, dass viele Patienten dazu tendieren, Äusserungen anderer bezüglich ihres 
Aussehens in negativer Weise zu interpretieren.  In Studie 1 wurden solche 
Interpretationsstile mit der herkömmlichen Fragebogenmethode untersucht.  In Studie 2 
hingegen wurden diese Interpretationsstile mit dem von MacLeod und Cohen (1993) 
angewendeten Paradigma untersucht, das den Vorteil hat, dass es den “response bias” 
kontrolliert.  In Studie 3 wurde untersucht, inwiefern Patienten mit einer 
Körperdysmorphen Störung Defizite in der Erkennung von Emotionsausdrücken 
aufweisen.  Weiterhin war von Interesse, ob sie sich durch einen negativen 
Interpretationsstil gegenüber Emotionsausdrücken auszeichnen, d.h., ob sie dazu 
tendieren, neutrale oder positive Emotionsausdrücke fälschlicherweise als negativ oder 
bedrohlich zu interpretieren.  
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Weiterhin wurde in allen drei Studien untersucht, inwiefern die Effekte 
störungstypisch für Patienten mit einer Körperdysmorphen Störung oder auch bei anderen 
Störungsbildern wie der Zwangsstörung vorzufinden sind. 
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Studie 1 
 
Interpretationsstile bei Patienten mit einer Körperdysmorphen Störung: eine 
Fragebogenstudie 
 
Zielsetzung der ersten Studie war die Erfassung von Interpretationsstilen mit Hilfe 
der herkömmlichen Fragebogenmethode. Speziell sollte untersuchte werden, ob bei 
Patienten mit einer Körperdysmorphen Störung negative Interpretationsstile nicht nur 
gegenüber körperbezogenen Situationen, sondern ebenso gegenüber allgemein sozialen 
und alltagsbezogenen Situationen vorhanden sind. 
 
Methode 
An der Studie nahmen 19 Patienten mit einer Körperdysmorphen Störung, 20 
Zwangspatienten und 22 gesunde Kontrollpersonen teil. Um die Interpretationsstile zu 
erfassen, wurde ein Interpretationsfragebogen entwickelt, der aus der Beschreibung von 
33 mehrdeutigen Szenarien bestand (11 körperbezogene, 11 allgemein soziale, und 11 
alltagsbezogene). Jedes einzelne Item bestand aus einer Kurzbeschreibung des Szenarios, 
gefolgt von der Frage, welche Gedanken die Versuchspersonen in diesem Szenario haben 
würden.  Weiterhin sollten sie drei mögliche Gedanken (einen bedrohlichen sowie zwei 
nicht bedrohliche) auf einer Skala von 1 (sehr unwahrscheinlich) bis 4 (sehr 
wahrscheinlich) hinsichtlich der Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass dieser Gedanke aufkommen 
würde, einstufen. 
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Ergebnisse und Diskussion 
Die wichtigsten Ergebnisse der vorliegenden Studie lassen sich folgendermaßen 
zusammenfassen: Patienten mit einer Körperdysmorphen Störung stuften die 
Wahrscheinlichkeit einer negativen Interpretation bei den körperbezogenen sowie bei den 
allgemein sozialen Szenarien als signifikant höher ein als Zwangspatienten und 
Kontrollpersonen.  In der Einschätzung der alltagsbezogenen Szenarien hingegen 
unterschieden sich die beiden Patientengruppen nicht bezüglich der Wahrscheinlichkeit 
einer negativen Interpretation. Die Kontrollpersonen dagegen stuften die 
Wahrscheinlichkeit einer negativen Interpretation in den alltagsbezogenen Szenarien 
signifikant niedriger ein.  Demzufolge haben Patienten mit einer Körperdysmorphen 
Störung im Gegensatz zu Zwangspatienten sowie Kontrollpersonen einen negativen 
Interpretationsstil nicht nur gegenüber körperbezogenen sondern gegenüber allen 
Szenarien, während Zwangspatienten einen negativen Interpretationsstil gegenüber 
alltagsbezogenen Szenarien aufweisen.  Obwohl Patienten mit einer Körperdysmorphen 
Störung die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer negativen Interpretation in den körperbezogenen und 
sozialen Situationen höher einstuften als Zwangspatienten und Kontrollpersonen, stuften 
sie jedoch im Gegensatz zu den beiden anderen Gruppen die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer 
neutralen Interpretation nicht niedriger ein als die einer negativen. 
Diese Ergebnisse unterstützen eines der wesentlichen Konzepte kognitiver 
Verhaltenstherapie, dass sich Individuen mit psychischen Störungen durch negative 
Interpretationsstile auszeichnen, welche wiederum mit der Entwicklung oder 
Aufrechterhaltung der störungstypischen Symptome im Zusammenhang stehen. Da 
insbesondere Patienten mit einer Körperdysmorphen Störung negative Interpretationsstile 
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gegenüber mehrdeutigen Situationen jeglicher Art aufweisen, könnte dies im 
Zusammenhang mit Symptomen wie Depressivität und einem geringen Selbstwertgefühl 
(Biby, 1998) stehen, die bei Patienten mit diesem Störungsbild häufig vorzufinden sind. 
Mit anderen Worten: je mehr unterschiedliche Situationen als bedrohlich interpretiert 
werden, desto häufiger empfindet das Individuum Emotionen wie z. B. Angst. Dies 
wiederum könnte in Zusammenhang mit depressiven Symptomen stehen. Es bleibt jedoch 
ungeklärt, ob negative Interpretationsstile zu der Entwicklung einer körperdysmorphen 
Störung führen, oder ob die Entwicklung dieser Störung zu der Entwicklung dieser 
Verzerrungen in der Informationsverarbeitung führen.  
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Studie 2 
 
Interpretationsstile bei Patienten mit einer Körperdysmorphen Störung: eine 
Leseverständnisstudie 
 
Während in der ersten Studie Interpretationsstile mit der herkömmlichen 
Fragebogenmethode untersucht wurden, konzentrierte sich die zweite Studie auf die 
Erfassung dieser Interpretationsstilen anhand der von MacLeod und Cohen (1993) 
verwendeten Methode, welche Antworttendenzen wie den “response bias” kontrolliert. 
 
Method 
Es nahmen jeweils 18 Patienten mit einer Körperdysmorphen Störung, 18 
Zwangspatienten sowie 18 gesunde Kontrollpersonen an der Studie teil. Im speziellen 
wurden die Interpretationsstile mit Hilfe des von MacLeod und Cohen (1993) 
verwendeten Paradigma erfasst, bei dem Versuchspersonen an einem Computer-
bildschirm einzelne Sätze lasen, die entweder körperbezogen, allgemein sozial oder 
alltagsbezogen waren (nähere Erklärung des Paradigmas siehe Einleitung). 
 
Ergebnisse und Diskussion 
Die erfassten Lesezeiten lassen darauf schließen, dass Patienten mit einer 
Körperdysmorphen Störung, im Gegensatz zu den Ergebnissen von Studie 1, nur einen 
negativen Interpretationsstil gegenüber körperbezogenen Szenarien aufweisen, während 
die Zwangspatienten, im Einklang mit den Ergebnissen von Studie 1, einen negativen 
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Interpretationsstil gegenüber alltagsbezogenen Szenarien aufweisen.  Die gesunden 
Kontrollpersonen hingegen weisen im Gegensatz zu den Patientengruppen einen negativen 
Interpretationsstil gegenüber sozialen Szenarien auf, was darauf hindeuten könnte, dass 
sich gesunde Kontrollpersonen von Patientengruppen durch zusätzliche Faktoren wie z. B. 
der subjektiven Wichtigkeit einer negativen Interpretation und nicht der negativen 
Interpretation an sich unterscheiden.  Dies könnte bedeuten, dass jedes Individuum 
gelegentlich eine mehrdeutige soziale Situation negativ bewertet, jedoch im Gegensatz zu 
Patienten mit einer psychischen Störung diesem Gedanken keine weitere Bedeutung 
beimisst.   
 
 
 XIX
Studie 3 
 
Interpretationsstile gegenüber Emotionsausdrücken bei Patienten mit einer 
Körperdysmorphen Störung 
 
Die meisten Studien, in denen Interpretationsstile untersucht wurden, verwendeten 
Wörter als Stimuli im Gegensatz zu “reellen” Stimuli wie z.B. Gesichter.  Ziel dieser 
dritten Studie war es zu untersuchen, ob Patienten mit einer Körperdysmorphen Störung 
sich durch Defizite in der Erkennung von Emotionsausdrücken sowie durch negative 
Interpretationsstile gegenüber Emotionsausdrücken ausweisen.  
 
Methode 
Es nahmen jeweils 20 Patienten mit einer Körperdysmorphen Störung, 20 
Zwangspatienten sowie 20 gesunde Kontrollpersonen an der Studie teil. Den 
Versuchspersonen wurden nacheinander eine Reihe von Fotos gezeigt, auf denen 
Gesichter mit unterschiedlichen Emotionsausdrücken abgebildet waren. Nach der 
Präsentation jedes einzelnen Fotos wurden sie instruiert, auf einem vorgegebenen 
Antwortblatt die jeweilige Emotion (neutral, angewidert, ängstlich, ärgerlich, fröhlich, 
traurig, überrascht) zu markieren, die ihrer Meinung nach die dargebotene Emotion am 
besten beschreibt. Jede einzelne Emotion wurde insgesamt sechs mal von 
unterschiedlichen Darbietern (männlich und weiblich) dargeboten. Anschliessend nahmen 
die Versuchspersonen am Benton Facial Recognition Test (Benton, Hamsher, Varney & 
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Spreen, 1983) teil, mit Hilfe dessen generelle neuropsychologische Defizite in der 
Erkennung von Gesichtern erfasst werden. 
 
Ergebnisse und Diskussion 
Neuropsychologische Defizite. Die drei Gruppen unterschieden sich nicht 
hinsichtlich ihrer Ergebnisse im Benton Facial Recognition Test, was darauf schließen 
lässt, dass alle folgenden Ergebnisse nicht durch generelle neuropsychologische Defizite 
verursacht wurden.  
Emotionserkennung. Die wichtigsten Ergebnisse lassen sich folgendermaßen 
zusammenfassen: Patienten mit einer Körperdysmorphen Störung misinterpretierten im 
Gegensatz zu den anderen Gruppen Emotionsausdrücke als ärgerlich. Weiterhin waren sie 
signifikant schlechter in der Erkennung von Emotionsbildern, in denen Ekel zum 
Ausdruck gebracht wurde, im Vergleich zu Zwangspatienten und Kontrollpersonen.  
Weitere Analysen wiesen darauf hin, dass Patienten mit einer Körperdysmorphen Störung 
im Gegensatz zu den Kontrollpersonen insbesondere solche Emotionsbilder, in denen Ekel 
zum Ausdruck gebracht wurde, als ärgerlich misinterpretieren. Die Zwangspatienten 
unterschieden sich hingegen weder signifikant von den Patienten mit einer 
Körperdysmorphen Störung noch von den Kontrollpersonen. Insgesamt gesehen waren die 
Patienten mit einer Körperdysmorphen Störung jedoch ebenso akurat in der Erkennung 
von Emotionsbildern, in denen Ärger zum Ausdruck gebracht wurde, wie die beiden 
anderen Gruppen. Weiterhin wiesen sie sich im Gegensatz zu den anderen Gruppen 
dadurch aus, andere nicht-ärgerliche Emotionsausdrücke fälschlicherweise als ärgerlich zu 
interpretieren. Diese Ergebnisse sind von Bedeutung, da sie damit im Zusammenhang 
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stehen könnten, warum viele Patienten mit einer Körperdysmorphen Störung unter einer 
starken Angst vor negativer Bewertung durch andere leiden sowie fast schon paranoide 
Vorstellungen entwickeln, dass andere Personen z. B. ihr Äusseres beobachten oder 
negative darüber sprechen. Dies könnten die Patienten mit einer körperdysmorphen 
Störung wiederum als Bestätigung ihrer dysfunktionalen Kognitionen über ihr Körperbild 
bewerten. So könnte es z. B. sein, dass Patienten mit einer körperdysmorphen Störung 
Symptome wie Angst vor negativer Bewertung durch andere oder fast “paranoide” 
Vorstellungen aufweisen, weil sie dazu tendieren, Emotionsausdrücke als ärgerlich 
miszuinterpretieren.  Auf der anderen Seite könnte es sein, dass diese Patienten 
Emotionsausdrücke als ärgerlich misinterpretieren, weil sie Angst vor negativer 
Bewertung durch andere oder fast “paranoide” Vorstellungen aufweisen.  
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Abstract 
The present research examines interpretation in body dysmorphic disorder (BDD) 
and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). In Study 1, I explored how BDD patients, 
compared to OCD patients and healthy controls, interpret ambiguous situations when 
given the opportunity to choose among different interpretations.  In Study 2, I further 
explored interpretive processes using a paradigm that controls for response biases.  In 
Study 3, I examined the ability to accurately recognize emotional expressions and 
interpretive biases towards these expressions. 
 
Interpretive Bias for Ambiguous Information in Body Dysmorphic Disorder: A 
Questionnaire Study 
Clinical observations suggest that emotionally disturbed individuals interpret 
ambiguous information as threatening, especially in favor for disorder-relevant 
interpretations. To my knowledge, there is no study so far that examines interpretation in 
BDD.  To investigate this issue, I tested patients with BDD (n = 19) and healthy controls 
(n = 22).  To examine whether these phenomena were typical for BDD or also characterize 
a broader spectrum such as anxiety disorders, I also tested patients with OCD (n = 20). 
Specifically, I designed an Interpretation Questionnaire which consisted of 33 ambiguous 
scenarios (11 BDD-related, 11 social, and 11 general scenarios).  Each item consisted of a 
short description of the scenario and was followed by the question “What thoughts occur 
to you?”  Moreover, participants were provided with three possible thoughts and were 
asked to rate each thought on a scale from 0 (very unlikely) to 4 (very likely) in terms of 
their likelihood of coming to mind.  Using this Interpretation Questionnaire, I tested 
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whether BDD patients, compared to OCD patients and healthy controls, choose 
threatening interpretations for ambiguous body-related, ambiguous social, and general 
scenarios.  As I hypothesized, BDD participants exhibited a negative interpretive bias for 
body-related scenarios and for social scenarios, whereas the other groups did not.  
Moreover, both clinical groups exhibited a negative interpretive bias for general scenarios. 
These findings support one of the basic concepts underlying cognitive therapy, namely 
that individuals with emotional disorders have interpretive biases that cause or maintain 
anxiety.  That is, BDD patients tend to interpret ambiguous everyday events as 
threatening, which might be related to symptoms such as depression, low self-esteem, and 
distorted beliefs about themselves and their body image.  For example, negative 
interpretations of everyday situation might confirm their negative beliefs.  As a result, this 
might lead to even more emotional vulnerability or anxiety in ambiguous situations.  
However, it remains unclear whether negative interpretive biases lead to the etiology of 
BDD or whether the development of BDD leads to these negative interpretive biases. 
 
Interpretive Bias for Ambiguous Information in Body Dysmorphic Disorder: 
A Text Comprehension Study  
Previous findings suggest that BDD patients are characterized by negative 
interpretive biases.  However, studies on interpretive biases have recently been criticized 
because of methodological limitations. Specifically, it was unclear whether results of 
studies using questionnaires to measure interpretation reflect an interpretive bias or an 
anxiety-linked response-selection bias. It is certainly possible that patients immediately 
disambiguate scenarios as threatening, thereby exhibiting an interpretive bias.  On the 
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other hand, they may initially entertain diverse interpretations, not necessarily threatening 
ones, but then settle on a threatening interpretation as their final answer.  Hence, what 
might appear to be a bias at the early interpretive stage of processing (i.e., automatic 
schema-driven interpretation) might actually reflect a late-stage response-selection bias.   
In the current study, I further investigated interpretive biases in BDD.  Specifically, I 
used a text comprehension paradigm that controls for these response biases.  Given that 
BDD patients share many clinical features with anxious patients, I tested whether BDD 
participants (n = 18), compared to OCD participants (n = 18) and healthy controls (n = 
18), interpret ambiguous social and ambiguous body-related information as threatening.  
As I hypothesized, BDD participants exhibited a negative interpretive bias for body-
related information.  However, they did not exhibit an interpretive bias for social and 
general information.  OCD participants exhibited, in contrast to the other groups, a bias for 
general information.  However, controls exhibited, in contrast to the other groups, a bias 
for social information. Consequently, it might be that healthy individuals differ from 
patients’ groups in terms of additional factors such as subjective costs of a negative 
interpretation.  In other words, everyone might interpret an ambiguous social situation as 
negative once in a while.  However, healthy individuals, compared to patients’ groups, 
may simply not give so much importance to those negative thoughts.  
In sum, these findings suggest that previous studies on interpretation that did not 
control for response biases might indeed be influenced by these biases. The interpretation 
of a situation is directly related to the way a person feels about himself or herself.  For 
example, a BDD patient might interpret somebody looking in his or her direction in a 
negative way (e.g., “that person is staring at me because of my horrible nose”), whereas 
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that person might have looked at the BDD sufferer for diverse reasons.  This negative 
interpretation would cause anxiety and shame.  However, the interpretation “that person is 
looking at me because she is interested in what I have to say” would cause neutral or 
positive emotions.  That is, it is not the situation itself but a person’s interpretation of it 
that causes emotions such as anxiety and shame so often found in BDD.  Consequently, 
interpretive biases should be addressed in clinical settings.  
 
Interpretive Biases for Emotional Expressions in Body Dysmorphic Disorder 
Most studies investigating selective processing of threat used words as stimuli.  
However, there is only little research using “real life” stimuli such as faces.  In the current 
study, I investigated the ability to accurately recognize facial expressions. Given the 
strong fear of negative evaluation and the frequent presence of ideas of reference, 
individuals with BDD might be particularly sensitive to facial expressions.  Therefore, the 
ability to recognize facial expressions may play a role in the maintenance or even etiology 
of disorders that are characterized by a strong fear of negative evaluations such as BDD.   
Based on previous findings in social phobia, I hypothesized that BDD patients 
exhibit an interpretive bias for angry facial expressions.  To investigate this issue, I tested 
patients with BDD (n = 20), patients with OCD (n = 20), and healthy controls (n = 20). 
Specifically, participants were presented with photographs displaying different emotional 
expressions, one at a time, and they were asked to identify the correct emotional 
expression of each photograph. To exclude the possibility that neuropsychological deficits 
in facial feature processing would cause impairment in facial expression recognition, I also 
applied a general facial recognition test that measures visual-spatial processes.   
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First, results of the general facial recognition test indicate that differences in 
identifying emotional expressions were caused by interpretive biases rather than general 
neuropsychological deficits. Moreover, the findings suggest that BDD patients, in contrast 
to OCD patients and healthy controls, exhibit an interpretive bias for angry expressions.  
That is, they tend to misinterpret other emotional expressions as angry.  Furthermore, I 
found that BDD patients were worse in identifying disgusted expressions, compared to 
controls.  OCD patients did not differ from controls in their ability to identify disgusted 
expressions, nor did they differ from BDD patients.   
BDD patients misinterpreted significantly more disgusted expressions as angry, 
whereas there was no difference between OCD patients and controls.  However, the 
difference between BDD patients and OCD patients was also nonsignificant.   
What are the clinical implications of this study?  Overall, BDD patients have more 
difficulties interpreting facial expressions correctly than OCD patients and controls.  
Although BDD patients are as accurate as OCD patients and controls in identifying angry 
expressions, they misinterpret, in contrast to these groups, other facial expressions as 
angry.  Therefore, there might be a relation between symptoms such as fear of negative 
evaluation by others, poor insight and ideas of reference commonly found in BDD and 
interpretive bias for angry facial expressions.  That is, BDD patient might develop 
symptoms such as poor insight and ideas of reference because they are characterized by 
these negative interpretive biases.  On the other hand, they might develop these negative 
interpretive biases because of these symptoms.   
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1. General Introduction 
Anyone may experience some concerns about his or her appearance.  However, 
some individuals become so distressed about their appearance that it interferes with their 
daily life.  Such individuals may qualify for a diagnosis of body dysmorphic disorder 
[BDD; DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association (APA), 1994].  BDD is a psychiatric 
disorder in which the individual is preoccupied with a slight or imagined defect in 
appearance.  Although the “defect” is usually not noticeable to other people, the BDD 
sufferer misperceives the “defect” as hideous and repulsive.  If the individual has a slight 
physical defect, the concern has to be markedly excessive.  Moreover, the preoccupation 
must cause significant distress or impairment in normal functioning.  The concern in 
appearance is not better accounted for by another mental disorder (e.g., anorexia 
nervosa).  Furthermore, the belief in the defect is not delusional, as it is in the delusional 
disorder, somatic type, nor is it attributable to anorexia nervosa or gender identity 
disorder (APA, 1994).  
Individuals with BDD experience significant distress about their imagined defect 
that often compels them to think about it for many hours a day.  Consequently, suffering 
and impairment in normal functioning occur.  Moreover, avoidance of everyday 
activities may lead to substantial social isolation, including being housebound for years 
(e.g., Phillips, McElroy, Keck, Pope, & Hudson, 1993). 
Most commonly, body parts of concern are the face, skin, and hair.  Patients 
worry about “hair thinning, acne, wrinkles, scars, vascular markings, paleness or redness 
of the complexion, swelling, facial asymmetry or disproportion, or excessive facial hair” 
(APA, 1994, p. 466).  Furthermore, common preoccupations include the “shape, size, or 
some other aspect of the nose, eyes, eyelids, eyebrows, ears, mouth, lips, teeth, jaw, chin, 
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cheeks, or head” (p. 466).  Although these concerns are most common, any body part 
may be the focus of concern. 
Associated features are frequent checking in mirrors and other reflecting surfaces 
(e.g., store windows).  This often co-occurs with excessive grooming behaviors (e.g., 
intense hair combing, makeup application, or skin picking).  For example, O’Sullivan 
and colleagues found that one patient picked at the imagined defect so deeply that the 
artery was almost damaged (O’Sullivan, Phillips, Keuthen, & Wilhelm, 1999).  
Some patients, however, avoid mirrors or alternate between episodes of frequent 
mirror checking and mirror avoidance (APA, 1994, p. 466).  Another associated feature 
is the frequent request for reassurance about the imagined defect that, however, produces 
only temporary relief (p. 466).  Furthermore, individuals with BDD frequently compare 
their body parts with others and are often concerned that other people might take special 
notice of their imagined defect.  Camouflaging the “defect” (e.g., wearing a hat to hide 
imagined or slight hair loss) is also very common in BDD.  Moreover, some individuals 
with BDD experience an intense fear that their “ugly” body part is fragile or may 
malfunction. 
Individuals with BDD may also experience ideas of reference related to their 
imagined defect (APA, 1994). That is, they often believe that others take special notice 
of the imagined defect and talk about it or mock it.  In other words, delusional BDD 
patients are convinced about the existence of the defect and are not able to consider that 
the flaw or defect might only exist in their imagination.  Those patients may qualify for a 
diagnosis of delusional disorder, somatic subtype. However, Phillips and colleagues 
suggested that both delusional and nondelusional forms of BDD reflect one single 
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disorder with different degrees of insight (Phillips, McElroy, Keck, Hudson, & Pope, 
1994).   
Although the symptoms of BDD were described more than 100 years ago, only 
recently has the syndrome been studied empirically (e.g., Phillips et al., 1993) and only 
recently included in the psychiatric nomenclature (APA, 1987). 
Furthermore, BDD is often under- or misdiagnosed. One explanation is that 
individuals with BDD often do not seek psychological help, but consult dermatologists, 
plastic surgeons, or dentists (Phillips et al., 1993).  Interestingly, although both men and 
women with BDD equally consult cosmetic surgeons, women were more like to receive 
cosmetic surgeries (Phillips & Diaz, 1997).  
The prevalence of BDD may be higher than one might expect.  In a recent study, 
Otto and colleagues investigated the prevalence of BDD in a community sample and 
found a point prevalence rate of 0.7% in women aged 36-44 (Otto, Wilhelm, Cohen, & 
Harlow, 2001).  Another study on college women suggests higher rates of BDD (5.3%; 
Bohne et al., 2002).  BDD has an equal sex distribution (e.g., Phillips et al., 1993).  
However, Phillips and Diaz (1997) explored gender differences in 188 patients diagnosed 
with BDD and found that women were more likely to be concerned about their skin and 
picked their skin, whereas men were more likely to be concerned about their body build, 
genitals, and thinning hair.  Furthermore, BDD usually begins in adolescence and its 
course tends to be chronic (e.g., Veale et al., 1996).   
The etiology of BDD has received little attention.  Some investigators have 
discussed sociological factors like unrealistic norms of physical beauty that are promoted 
in our culture.  Psychological factors like obsessional or hypochondriacal personality 
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traits have also been discussed (for a review, see Hollander, Cohen, & Simeon, 1993).  
Taken together, little is known about the etiology of BDD. 
BDD is currently classified as a somatoform disorder because of the 
preoccupation with somatic complaints (DSM-IV, APA, 1994).  For example, patients 
with BDD share associated features with patients with hypochondriasis regarding 
exaggerated beliefs about the body, reassurance seeking and body checking (e.g., Rosen, 
1996).  However, the beliefs of BDD patients are about their physical appearance, 
whereas the beliefs of patients with hypochondriasis are about a disease or illness.  
However, some researchers discussed whether BDD should be classified as a 
somatoform disorder or as a mood, psychotic, or anxiety disorder (especially as a 
subtype of obsessive-compulsive disorder [OCD] or social phobia; Phillips et al., 1993).  
Major depressive disorder seems to be one that is most often comorbid with BDD.  
Comorbidity studies provide substantial support for a relationship between BDD and 
major depressive disorder.  For example, Phillips and colleagues found in a series of 130 
BDD patients a current prevalence of 59% and a lifetime prevalence of 83% for major 
depression (Phillips, McElroy, Hudson & Pope, 1995).  Suicide attempts are common in 
BDD.  Phillips and colleagues, for example, found a suicide attempt rate of 17% in BDD 
patients due to their appearance concerns (Phillips et al., 1993).   
Moreover, BDD and social phobia share many features.  BDD has a high 
comorbidity with social phobia, and both disorders have a similar age of onset (Phillips et 
al., 1993).  Investigating the prevalence of BDD in patients with anxiety disorders, 
Wilhelm and colleagues found that social phobia preceded the onset of BDD in all 
patients who suffered from both disorders (Wilhelm, Otto, Zucker, & Pollack, 1997).  
These patients also had a significantly earlier age of onset of social phobia than did social 
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phobic patients who did not suffer from BDD (Wilhelm et al., 1997).  Furthermore, both 
disorders are characterized by a strong fear of negative evaluation in social situations 
(Hollander, Neville, Frenkel, Josephson, & Liebowitz, 1992). 
There is also a link between BDD and OCD.  Like OCD, BDD is characterized by 
recurrent, persistent thoughts that can persist for several hours a day and are difficult to 
control or resist.  Associated features of BDD like frequent checking in mirrors or other 
reflecting surfaces, excessive grooming behavior, compulsive skin picking, and frequent 
requests for reassurance about the appearance are ritualistic features that resemble 
compulsions of OCD (McElroy, Phillips, & Keck, 1994).  Moreover, both disorders have 
a similar age of onset and course, and a high comorbidity (Phillips, Atala, & Albertini., 
1995).  Finally, both BDD and OCD are secret disorders; individuals who suffer from 
them are often too ashamed and embarrassed to seek professional help (McElroy et al., 
1994).  Taken together, major depressive disorder is most comorbid with BDD.  
However, BDD does share many associated features with social phobia and OCD.  
 
1.1. Information-Processing Theories 
Over the last 20 years, researchers started to focus on the role of cognitive factors 
in  psychological disorders for the following reasons.  First, the behaviorist approach 
constrained the generation of explanatory models because it only allowed to focus on 
overt behaviors.  Because many psychologists started to believe that complex mental 
processes might contribute to the development or maintenance of psychological 
disorders, the cognitive approach was expected to provide more explanations of 
psychopathology.  Second, the behaviorist approach constrained the use of acceptable 
methods. That is, only quantitative measures were legitimate, whereas self-report data 
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regarding subjective feelings or beliefs were not.  Therefore, many psychologists wanted 
to break free from these constraints and started to focus on cognitive factors.  
Specifically, information processing refers to the manner in which people 
perceive, attend to, and retrieve information from the environment (Ingram & Kendall, 
1986).  The quantity of all information that individuals are confronted with at a time is 
too much to process at once.  Therefore, information processing has to be selective.  
However, whereas healthy individuals might selectively attend to nonthreatening 
information, research has shown that psychological disorders have one feature in 
common: a preoccupation with information that is related to the patient’s concern.  In 
other words, emotionally disturbed patients are characterized by selective processing of 
concern-related threatening material which may, in turn, contribute to the development or 
maintenance of the disorder (e.g., Beck & Emery, 1985; Williams, Watts, MacLeod & 
Mathews, 1997).  For example, individuals who preferentially remember threatening 
information might have, as a consequence, increased levels of anxiety, compared to 
individuals who do not tend to remember threatening information.  Moreover, selective 
attention to threat or a tendency to interpret ambiguous situations as threatening might 
have the same emotional consequences.  
However, the cognitive approach consists of two different ways to understand 
cognitive biases - the appraisal approach and the experimental information-processing 
approach.  The core assumption of the appraisal approach is that beliefs are important key 
factors to explain psychopathology.  That is, certain beliefs of an OCD patient, for 
example, may lay the foundation of mistaken appraisals of intrusive thoughts (e.g., 
Salkovskis, 1999). According to this approach, psychological disorders can be cured if 
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one changes these dysfunctional beliefs, whereas information-processing biases are only 
side effects of these beliefs.   
The most influential theory incorporating appraisal as an key factor to explain 
psychopathology is Beck’s schema theory (e.g., Beck & Emery, 1985; Beck & Clark, 
1988).  Beck emphasizes the importance of cognitive structures or “schemas” that are 
“functional structures of relatively enduring representations of prior knowledge and 
experience” (Beck & Clark, 1988, p. 24).  These schemas or beliefs affect an individual’s 
perception, encoding, storage, and retrieval of information.   
The main prediction of schema theory is that “stimuli consistent with existing 
schemas are elaborated and encoded, while inconsistent or irrelevant information is 
ignored or forgotten” or distorted until it is consistent with existing schemas (p. 24).  
Because anxious individuals often have beliefs that they might be confronted with danger 
or threat, they are, according to Beck’s theory, characterized by both selective attention to 
and selective retrieval of schema-congruent threatening information. Moreover, these 
negative beliefs lead to a misinterpretation of ambiguous anxiety-related information 
(Beck & Clark, 1988).  
However, the appraisal approach has been strongly critized.  MacLeod (1993), for 
example, critized that this cognitive approach relies on the introspective self-report 
measures to assess the patient’s beliefs. Consequently, it fails to measure cognitive 
processes that lie outside of awareness.  Instead, he emphasized the need for cognitive 
paradigms that control for response biases and allow to examine cognitive processes that 
are outside of awareness (MacLeod, 1993). 
Williams et al. (1988) proposed a more comprehensive information-processing 
model of emotional disorders in order to explain different cognitive biases found in 
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anxiety and depression. For example, whereas memory biases could be found in panic 
patients (e.g., McNally, Foa, & Donnell, 1989), Mogg and colleagues consistently failed 
to replicate these biases in patients with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; e.g., Mogg, 
Mathews, & Weinman, 1987; Mogg & Mathews, 1990).  
The essential assumption of Williams et al.’s (1988) theory is the distinction 
between integration (or priming) and elaboration.  These distinct cognitive processes 
were originally proposed by Graf and Mandler (1984).  According to Williams and 
colleagues, integration is an automatic process in which a stimulus leads to the activation 
of the components involved in the representation of that stimulus.  As a result, its internal 
representation is strengthened and the stimulus is more accessible or ‘primed’.  That is, 
the primed stimulus (e.g., HORSE) will come to mind even when only some of its 
components (e.g., HOR_ _) are presented (Williams et al., 1988).  
Elaboration is a strategic process that involves processing of information by 
actively forming new connections between previously unrelated representations or by 
strengthening previously existing connections between representations.  For example, the 
elaboration of a stimulus (e.g., HORSE) leads to a stronger connection between the 
internal representation of that stimulus and other associated representations (e.g., RIDE).  
As a result, the retrieval of that stimulus (e.g., HORSE) is easier in response to the 
associated stimulus (e.g., RIDE). 
In contrast to Beck’s (e.g., Beck & Emery, 1985; Beck & Clark, 1988) schema 
theory that predicts mood-congruent effects in anxiety and depression that are pervasive 
throughout the cognitive system, Williams and colleagues predict two distinct 
information-processing biases in anxiety and depression and suggest that “anxiety 
preferentially affects the passive, automatic aspect of encoding and retrieval, whereas 
 
 
 9
depression affects the more active, effortful aspects of encoding and retrieval” (Williams 
et al., 1988, pp. 173-174).  In other words, anxious individuals should show an attentional 
bias towards threatening stimuli but not a memory bias towards these stimuli, i.e. they 
should selectively focus their attention to threat-related stimuli but should not 
preferentially remember these stimuli. Depressive individuals, on the other hand, should 
show a memory bias but not an attentional bias for threatening information. 
Williams et al.’s (1988) cognitive model has been of importance in recent 
research on cognitive psychopathology.  Nevertheless, it has several limitations (Eysenck, 
1992).  Although Williams et al. (1988) point out that anxious individuals have an 
attentional bias towards threatening information, other attentional processes associated 
with anxiety are neglected (Eysenck, 1992).  For example, there is some evidence that 
anxiety also affects attentional scanning and distractibility, even when the anxious 
individual is not confronted with threatening information (Eysenck, 1992). 
Furthermore, Williams et al.’s theory implies that all anxiety disorders share the 
same cognitive biases, yet there are inconsistent findings across these syndromes.  
Results of studies on GAD, for example, did not show memory biases for threat (e.g., 
preferential recall of threatening information, compared to nonthreatening information 
and to controls; Mogg et al., 1987), whereas research in panic disorder revealed those 
biases (e.g., McNally et al., 1989; Becker, Rinck, & Margraf, 1994; Cloitre, Shear, 
Cancienne, & Zeitlin, 1994).  Additionally, there is some evidence for memory biases in 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Vrana, Roodman, & Beckham, 1995) and OCD 
(Wilhelm, McNally, Baer, & Florin, 1996).  
Taken together, each of these theories has strongly influenced research in 
cognitive psychopathology.  However, there are essential differences among the theories.  
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Beck and Emery (1985) state that maladaptive schemas should influence every process of 
the cognitive system, that is both attention and memory, whereas Williams et al. (1988) 
point out that anxiety only affects attention, but not memory.  All of these theories have 
generated a considerable volume of research in information processing in emotional 
disorders. 
 
1.2. Information-Processing Research 
During the past decade, there has been increased interest in cognitive biases in 
emotional disorders.  The underlying assumption is that selective processing of threat 
leads to increased anxiety.  Among the cognitive biases most frequently studied are those 
of attention and memory (for reviews, see Eysenck, 1992; Williams, Mathews, & 
MacLeod, 1996), but there has also been an increase of investigation cognitive biases for 
ambiguity (e.g., Butler & Matthews, 1983; Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998). 
 
1.2.1. Attentional Bias 
Emotional disorders differ in many ways.  However, they have one feature in 
common: a higher sensitivity towards personally threatening stimuli caused by selective 
attention towards these stimuli.  These attentional biases are a core feature of many 
information processing theories of psychopathology because selective attention to threat 
leads to increased levels of anxiety (for a review, see Williams et al., 1996). 
Two main methods have been used to investigate selective attention.  The first 
method is to show how selective attention can lead to impaired performance on certain 
tasks.  There are several paradigms to investigate this phenomenon.  The modified Stroop 
(1935) task has been used most frequently to assess selective attention.  In this procedure, 
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participants are shown words that are printed in different colors and that vary in their 
emotional significance, and are instructed to name the color of each word while ignoring 
its meaning.  Attending to the meaning of the word, in spite of the attempt to ignore it, 
leads to delays in color naming (“Stroop interference”).  If patients are characterized by 
an attentional bias towards threat, they should show delays in color naming threat-related 
but not threat-unrelated words.  In fact, Stroop interference effects have been found in 
BDD (Buhlmann, McNally, Wilhelm, & Florin, 2002), GAD (Mathews & MacLeod, 
1985), OCD (e.g., Foa, Ilai, McCarthy, Shoyer, & Murdock, 1993), panic disorder (e.g., 
McNally et al., 1994), PTSD (e.g., Foa, Feske, Murdock, Kozak, & McCarthy, 1991; 
McNally, Kaspi, Riemann, & Zeitlin, 1990), social phobia (e.g., Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, 
& Dombeck, 1990), and specific (spider) phobia (Watts, McKenna, Sharrock, & Trezise, 
1986). 
However, the Stroop paradigm has its limitations because several factors other 
than selective attention to threat might contribute to the color-naming latencies 
(Mathews, 1990).  First, threatening stimuli might lead to emotional distress in general 
which, in turn, leads to color-naming latencies.  Second, these latencies might derive 
because of the patient’s attempt to avoid to process threatening information.  Third, as 
Fox (1993) states, the Stroop paradigm measures selective processing in general rather 
than selective attention because the latter can only be measured if one separates semantic 
and color cues spatially to examine whether attention is selectively shifted to threat cues.  
The second method is to show how selective attention might facilitate 
performance on specific tasks.  For example, Burgess and colleagues used a dichotic 
listening paradigm to explore whether agoraphobic and social phobic patients selectively 
attend to threat words (Burgess, Jones, Robertson, Radcliffe, & Emerson, 1981).  
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Participants were presented two prose passages, one to each ear, and asked to focus their 
attention (i.e., repeat aloud) on one passage while ignoring the other one.  Moreover, they 
were instructed to detect fear-related and neutral words that occurred out of context in 
either passage.  As expected, phobic patients detected more fear-related than neutral 
words in the unattended passage. 
However, MacLeod, Mathews, and Tata (1986) critized that it was unclear 
whether the findings of Burgess et al. (1981) may be due to an attentional bias toward 
threat or whether it may simply be due to a mood-dependent response bias. That is, 
anxious participants might simply have reported guesses that were congruent with their 
current mood. Therefore, they used a different kind of approach to measure selective 
attention. 
Specifically, they used the visual dot-probe paradigm in which both facilitation 
and disruption due to threatening stimuli can be demonstrated. They presented the GAD 
patients and control participants with word pairs (threat and neutral words, respectively) 
that appeared simultaneously either on the top or on the bottom of a computer screen.  
Participants were asked to name the top word aloud. On some of the trials, a small dot 
appeared in the place where the word had been before. In this case, participants had to 
press a button as quickly as possible. On half of the trials on which the dot appeared, it 
replaced the top word, and on the other half it replaced the bottom word. The detection 
latency for the small dot probe is a sensitive measure of visual attention because 
participants ought to reveal longer response times if their attention has been shifted away.  
MacLeod et al. (1986) found different response pattern for anxious participants and 
controls.  Anxious participants responded quicker if the dot probe replaced a threat word 
at the top than if the dot probe replaced a neutral word at the top and the threat word had 
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occurred at the bottom.  However, if the dot probe occurred at the bottom after the threat 
word had occurred at the top, anxious participants were relatively slower in their 
response. These findings suggest that anxious participants orient towards the location at 
which the threatening stimulus has been before.  Controls, however, showed the opposite 
response pattern.  That is, they orient away from the location at which the threatening 
stimulus has been before.   
An important conclusion from MacLeod et al.’s (1986) study was that anxious 
individuals were not more ‘sensitive’ to threatening information at the most peripheral 
level than nonanxious controls because controls responded as quickly as did anxious 
individuals to a threat word. However, both groups had different attentional allocation 
pattern in response to these inputs.  That is, if the threat word occurred at the top, controls 
named the word aloud as quickly as did anxious individuals. 
Most studies on selective attention have shown that the effects were specific for 
the patient’s main concern.  In other words, the more a stimulus reflected the patient’s 
current concern or anxiety, the more likely it was to produce Stroop interference.  For 
example, McNally and colleagues showed that Vietnam veterans with PTSD exhibited 
delayed color naming for combat-related stimuli but not for negative OCD-related stimuli 
(McNally et al., 1990).  
Because interest in information-processing research in emotional disorders has 
been strongly increased in the last several years, attentional biases towards threat were 
explained by their negative valence (e.g., Beck & Emery, 1985).  However, the threat-
relatedness hypothesis was criticized by Martin, Williams, and Clark (1991) argued that 
as long as one does not include both negative and positive stimuli in the experiment, one 
cannot conclude that Stroop interference is specific to threat-related material.  However, 
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a few studies already showed that Stroop interference was specific to threat-related 
words and not to positive words (McNally et al., 1990).  
Nevertheless, they proposed to replace the threat-relatedness hypothesis by the 
emotionality hypothesis.  That is, they argued that attentional biases are not caused by 
threat-related material but by any emotional material in general, regardless whether it is 
of positive or negative valence.  To test their hypothesis, Mathews and Klug (1993) 
examined whether anxious patients showed an attentional bias for anxiety-related and 
anxiety-unrelated positive words, anxiety-related and anxiety-unrelated negative words, 
and emotionally neutral words.  Their results revealed, however, that anxious patients 
did not selectively attend to emotional material in general, but rather to both negative 
and positive anxiety-related material.  As a result, they suggested a third hypothesis to 
explain attentional biases for threatening material: the concern-relatedness hypothesis.  
This hypothesis predicts that anxious patients selectively attend to material which is 
semantically associated with their personal concerns. 
Evidence to support this hypothesis has been reported by Riemann and McNally 
(1995), investigating attentional biases for idiographic information in a nonclinical 
population.  Specifically, they employed idiographically chosen words that varied in 
their degree of relatedness to each participant’s current concerns (high and low)  and in 
valence (positive and negative).  As Riemann and McNally predicted, color-naming 
delays were most increased when the participants were presented with material related 
to high-negative and high-positive current concern than when presented with low-
negative and low-positive and neutral material.  
However, some studies have not confirmed the concern-relatedness 
hypothesis.  Investigating attentional processes in OCD, Lavy, van Oppen, and van 
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den Hout (1994) asked OC checkers, OC washers and healthy control participants to 
color-name OCD-related and OCD-unrelated negative words, OCD-related and OCD-
unrelated positive words, and neutral words.  The results of the study provided 
evidence for the threat-relatedness hypothesis, i.e. OCD participants showed an 
attentional bias towards OCD-related negative but not OCD-related positive stimuli.  
To further explore these hypotheses, we recently used the modified Stroop 
paradigm to investigated attentional processes in BDD (Buhlmann, McNally et al., 2002).  
We presented BDD patients and healthy controls with BDD-related negative, BDD-
related positive, general negative, general positive, and neutral words. The results 
revealed that BDD patients, like other anxiety-disordered patients, exhibited longer color-
naming latencies for emotional information, regardless of its valence.  Unlike most 
anxiety-disordered patients, BDD patients were even slightly more distracted by disorder-
relevant positive information such as beautiful or attractive.  In other words, BDD 
patients may be concerned about both their beauty ideal and their imagined ugliness, 
which may, in turn, explain why BDD patients often ask for reassurance or compare 
themselves with others with respect to their appearance.   
Vulnerability to anxiety is associated with selective attention to threat because 
selective attention to threatening information may increase anxiety.  However, it still 
remains unclear whether selective attention to threat may contribute causally to emotional 
vulnerability.  To investigate this, MacLeod and colleagues applied the visual dot-probe 
paradigm in a nonclinical population (MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & 
Holker, 2002).  Specifically, they experimentally induced attentional biases either 
towards negative information or away from negative information and subsequently had 
participants complete a standardized stress task.  In the training phase, for half of the 
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participants the dot probe always appeared at the location where the neutral word had 
occurred.  Consequently, these participants ought to exhibit an attentional bias away from 
threatening stimuli and toward neutral stimuli after the completion of the training phase.  
For the other half of the participants, the probe always appeared at the location where the 
threat word had occurred.  Those participants were expected to exhibit an attentional bias 
away from neutral stimuli and toward threat after the completion of the training phase. In 
the Anagram Stress Task, participants were told that they would be videotaped while 
completing a series of anagrams on a computerscreen.  Each participant was tested 
individually. After three minutes, they were told that their performance was too poor to 
go on with the task.  Before the experiment and after the completion of the stress task, 
they were asked to complete an analogue mood scale. 
MacLeod et al. (2002) found that those participants who were trained to exhibit an 
attentional bias towards negative information were more emotional distressed after the 
stress task than those participants who were trained to exhibit an attentional bias away 
from negative information.  In other words, the results showed induced attentional biases 
toward threat can indeed modify emotional vulnerability.  
In summary, many studies have investigated attentional biases in emotional 
disorders, and there is strong evidence that individuals with emotional disorders possess a 
selective attentional bias favoring threatening information.  There is also some evidence 
that people selectively attend to any information related to their personal concerns, 
regardless of its emotional valence.  However, unlike most anxiety patients, BDD patients 
exhibit an attentional bias especially for BDD-related positive information.  
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1.2.2. Memory Bias 
Individuals with emotional disorders are often characterized by a memory bias for 
threat.  For example, a depressed individual tends to recall negative aspects of the past 
while ignoring neutral or positive information.  
Memory biases in emotional disorders are predicted by Beck’s schema theory 
(Beck & Emery, 1985). The theory states that anxious individuals selectively attend to 
threat which results in superior encoding and retrieval of these stimuli.  Williams et al.’s 
(1988) also predict memory biases but in contrast to other theories do they only predict 
such as bias in depressed patients but not in anxious patients. 
Memory biases have been well investigated in psychological disorders (e.g., 
Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Radomsky & Rachman, 1999; MacLeod & McLaughlin, 
1995).  According to Williams et al. (1988), memory biases should only be found in 
depression but not anxiety. Nevertheless, findings vary across different psychological 
disorders.  Findings have been most consistent in panic disorder (e.g., McNally et al., 
1989; Becker et al., 1994; Cloitre et al., 1994), whereas findings are inconsistent in GAD 
(e.g., Mogg et al., 1987; Mogg & Mathews, 1990).  
One of the first studies on memory biases for threat in panic disorder was 
conducted by McNally et al. (1989).  They hypothesized that panic patients would exhibit 
a memory bias for threat and that physiological arousal would enhance this bias.  
Specifically, they had panic patients and controls rate anxious words and neutral words in 
terms of how much they would describe themselves (McNally et al., 1989). In one 
condition, participants were given the task after doing step-ups (arousal condition), 
whereas in the other condition, participants were given the task after a relaxation 
procedure (relaxation condition).  They found that panic patients in the arousal condition 
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showed marginally significant more free recall of threat words than did panic patients in 
the relaxation condition, whereas both panic groups recalled significantly more threat 
words than did controls.  Accordingly, McNally et al. (1989) showed that, in contrast to 
Williams et al.’s (1988) predictions, panic patients exhibit a memory bias for anxiety-
related information, especially when under a high arousal condition.  
To explore further whether memory biases were specific for anxious patients or 
whether familiarity with panic-related stimuli per se is sufficient enough to produce these 
biases, Cloitre et al. (1994) tested patients diagnosed with panic disorder, clinicians who 
were expertise in treating panic patients, and controls.  Specifically, they used a cued 
recall paradigm.  In this paradigm, participants are presented with word pairs that are 
either related or unrelated, and either negative, positive, or neutral (e.g., neutral, 
unrelated: cheerful – bureau; negative, related: breathless – suffocate). Participants are 
instructed to read each word pair aloud and rate their degree of relatedness.  After that, 
they are asked to complete each word pair with the word they had been presented earlier 
(e.g., breathless – suf ). Cloitre et al. (1994) found a memory bias for threat in panic 
patients. They found, however, that only panic patients exhibited these memory biases, 
whereas clinicians and controls did not.  
However, it still remained unclear whether panic patients exhibit a general 
memory bias for threat or whether they exhibit a specific panic-related memory bias for 
threat. To address this issue, Becker and colleagues conducted an experiment in which 
participants first had to learn positive, negative and panic-related words (Becker et al., 
1994). Afterwards, participants were given a free recall test.  Furthermore, they 
hypothesized that panic patients would not simply reproduce but also produce more 
panic-related words, caused by strong associations between panic-related concepts.  Thus, 
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panic patients were expected to show an enhanced recall for both correct and incorrect 
(intrusive) panic-related words in a memory test.  To analyze the participants’ intrusions, 
Becker and colleagues also told the participants to include the words they were not sure 
about whether they had seen them before or not.  As hypothesized, panic patients recalled 
more panic-related words than general positive or negative words showing that panic 
patients are characterized by a specific panic-related memory bias for threat rather than a 
general, unspecific memory bias for threat.  However, inconsistent with Becker’s et al. 
(1994) prediction, panic patients did not recall more incorrect panic-related words (i.e., 
intrusions) than did control participants.   
Some studies failed to demonstrate a memory bias for threat in panic patients 
(e.g., Otto, McNally, Pollack, Chen, & Rosenbaum, 1994).  However, Otto et al. (1994), 
for example, used nonself-descriptive threat words such as coronary, whereas McNally et 
al. (1989) used self-descriptive threat words such as fearful.  Therefore, it may be that  
nonself-descriptive threat words lead to less recall of threat words than did self-descrptive 
threat words that, in turn, lead to enhanced recall of threat words.  
However, findings of memory biases in anxiety disorder are inconsistent.  
Investigating memory biases in GAD, Mathews and MacLeod (1985) used the modified 
Stroop task and asked GAD patients and healthy controls to color-name words that were 
either threatening or nonthreatening. Immediately after the Stroop task, participants’ 
recognition memory was tested.  However, Mathews and MacLeod found no memory 
differences for threatening words between the groups.  Furthermore, Mogg and collegues 
reported a failure to demonstrate memory biases for threat in GAD in several experiments 
(e.g., Mogg et al., 1987; Mogg & Mathews, 1990).  
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Taken together, research on memory biases in anxiety disorders reveal 
inconsistent results.  Thus, it might be that different anxiety patient populations not only 
view different stimuli as threatening  but also differ in their reactions to these stimuli.  
Consequently, different memory biases might be found in the spectrum of anxiety 
disorders.  Further investigations are required to examine memory biases and its 
underlying mechanisms. 
 
1.2.3. Interpretive Bias 
Everyday situations are often somewhat ambiguous. Whether an individual 
interprets a situation as threatening or not, is associated with experiencing positive or 
negative emotional states (for a review, see Mathews & MacLeod, 1994).  For example, a 
socially anxious individual who interprets somebody laughing behind him in a negative 
way (I must have said something foolish) may feel confirmed in his negative self-image 
and consequently have increased levels of anxiety, compared to a nonanxious individual 
who interprets this situation in a neutral way (They must be in a funny mood).  
Previous research has shown that anxious individuals indeed tend to impose 
threatening interpretations on ambiguous stimuli (e.g., Butler & Mathews, 1983; 
Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, & Mathews, 1991; Hope et al., 1990; Mathews, Richard, 
& Eysenck, 1989; McNally & Foa 1987).  Butler and Mathews (1983), for example, had 
both anxious and depressed patients read a series of ambiguous scenarios (e.g., Suppose 
you wake with a start in the middle of the night thinking you heard a noise, but all is 
quiet. What do you suppose woke you up?).  First, Butler and Mathews (1983) provided 
an open-ended response, followed by several possible explanations which the participants 
had to rank in terms of their likelihood to come to mind. The patients’ groups ranked 
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threatening explanations (e.g., There is a burglar in your house) as more likely than did 
controls. 
Investigating interpretive biases in panic disorder, McNally and Foa (1987) 
modified Butler and Mathews’s interpretation questionnaire and examined interpretive 
biases before and after cognitive behavioral therapy. They found that these biases were 
absent in those patients who had responded well to cognitive behavioral therapy.  This 
suggests that interpretive biases might indeed be related to the maintenance or even 
etiology of psychological disorders.  Moreover, consistent with these findings, Westing 
and Öst (1995) found a relationship between clinical improvement and the extent to 
which these biases changed.  In other words, panic disorder patients that were panic-free, 
in contrast to patients who were not panic-free after cognitive-behavioral treatment, did 
not exhibit negative interpretive biases.   
Research on social phobia, for example, has shown that socially anxious 
individuals tend to draw negative conclusions about ambiguous social events, which 
might lead to increased anxiety and consequently to avoidance of those anxiety-
provoking events (Amir et al., 1998).  Specifically, Amir and colleagues showed that 
social phobic patients, compared to OCD patients and controls, interpreted ambiguous 
social situations as threatening, even when the participants could choose between a 
threatening, neutral, and positive interpretation (Amir et al., 1998).  Moreover, this 
interpretive bias was specific to self-relevant situations (i.e., imagining oneself being in 
that situation), and did not occur in non-self-relevant situations (i.e., imagining a good 
friend being in that situation).   
However, studies using questionnaires to examine interpretive biases have 
methodological limitations because they do not control for response biases.  For example, 
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a patient may provide interpretations that they believe are consistent with their 
experimenter’s expectations rather than their real interpretations of the ambiguous 
scenarios.  
The first study that addressed this methodological problem was conducted by 
Mathews et al. (1989).  GAD patients, recovered GAD patients, and controls were 
instructed to listen to a series of homophones that could be disambiguated in either a 
threatening (e.g., die) or a nonthreatening (e.g., dye) way.  After listening to each 
homophone, they had to write down the word they heard.  If GAD patients are 
characterized with an interpretive bias for threat, they ought to write down more 
threatening spellings than nonthreatening ones, compared to controls.  Mathews et al. 
(1989) indeed found that GAD patients produced more threatening spellings, relative to 
controls, suggesting that they exhibit an interpretive bias for threat, whereas recovered 
GAD patients produced less threatening spellings, relative to GAD patients.   
However, because whole sentences have a higher ecological validity than single 
homophones, Eysenck and colleagues further investigated interpretive biases in GAD  
using ambiguous sentences as stimuli instead of single homophones (Eysenck et al., 
1991).  Specifically, they tested GAD patients, recovered GAD patients, and controls 
using a recognition memory test.  First, participants heard a series of ambiguous 
sentences (e.g., The doctor examined little Emma’s growth).  After that, they were 
presented with both threatening or nonthreatening disambiguations of the previously 
heard ambiguous sentences.  As a result, they found that GAD patients endorsed 
relatively more of the threatening disambiguations (e.g., The doctor looked at little 
Emma’s cancer) than did recovered GAD patients and controls, consisting with the 
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hypothesis that anxious patients interpreted the previously presented ambiguous 
sentences as threatening.  
Nevertheless, results of studies using ambiguous homophones and sentences 
might still be biased by response biases.  Specifically, it remains unclear whether results 
of the previously mentioned studies reflect an interpretive bias or an anxiety-linked 
response-selection bias.  It is certainly possible that patients immediately disambiguate 
scenarios as threatening, thereby exhibiting an interpretive bias.  On the other hand, they 
may initially entertain diverse interpretations, not necessarily threatening ones, but then 
settle on a threatening interpretation as their final answer.  Hence, what might appear to 
be a bias at the early interpretive stage of processing (i.e., automatic schema-driven 
interpretation) might actually reflect a late-stage response-selection bias.   
MacLeod and Cohen (1993) used the Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (RSVP; 
Williams & Tarr, 1998) paradigm to distinguish interpretive from response biases in 
high- and low-trait anxious individuals.  The advantage of this paradigm is that it enables 
researchers to determine the participants’ initial interpretive response to ambiguous 
lexical input.  On each trial, the participant views and reads two successive sentences.  
The first sentence of each pair is ambiguous (They completed the service by filling in the 
hole), and the second sentence is either a plausible continuation for a threatening meaning 
(threat continuation condition, e.g., The funeral finished much sooner than had been 
expected) or a nonthreatening meaning (nonthreat continuation condition, e.g., The 
repairs finished much sooner than had been expected) of the initial ambiguous sentence.  
Participants begin a trial by pressing the space bar which presents the first (ambiguous) 
sentence.   After reading it, they press the space bar again to view the second 
(continuation) sentence which is either a nonthreatening or threatening continuation of 
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the first sentence.  When the participants press the space bar for the third time, they see a 
single question (Did the service take less time than anticipated?) which they answer with 
either Yes or No by pressing one of two other keys.  The dependent measure is the time 
between the second pressing of the space bar (which presents the continuation sentence) 
and the following key press that ends the display of the continuation sentence and 
replaces it with the question.  Accordingly, on each trial the software provides an index of 
the comprehension latency for each continuation sentence. 
Using this procedure, MacLeod and Cohen (1993) compared the relative 
comprehension latencies for the two types of continuation sentences across three 
experimental conditions, in which (1) the initial sentence was ambiguous, (2) the initial 
sentence was unambiguously threatening, or (3) the initial sentence was unambiguously 
nonthreatening.  That is, they subtracted, for each experimental condition, the 
comprehension latencies for the threat continuation sentences from the nonthreat 
continuation sentences.  If the participants consistently interpret the initial sentence as 
threatening when it is ambiguous, they ought to exhibit the same relative comprehension 
latencies for the two types of continuation sentences: when the initial sentence is 
ambiguous and when the initial sentence is unambiguously threatening. But they ought to 
have disproportionately long comprehension latencies for threat continuations in the third 
condition (in which the initial sentence is unambiguously nonthreatening).  In other 
words, they should respond to ambiguous input as if it were threatening.  In contrast, if 
the participants impose the less threatening meaning on the initial sentence when it is 
ambiguous, they ought to show the same relative comprehension latencies for the two 
types of continuation sentence in the first condition (in which the initial sentence is 
ambiguous) and in the third condition (in which the initial sentence is unambiguously 
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nonthreatening), but should exhibit disproportionately long comprehension latencies for 
nonthreat continuations under the second condition (in which the initial sentence is 
unambiguously threatening).  Therefore, the initial sentence was presented under three 
“cue” conditions.  That is, each sentence pair was proceeded by a single word (cue), 
which was used to either orient the participant to the meaning of the sentence (Burial: 
threat cue; Renovate: nonthreat cue) or to leave it completely ambiguous (?????).  
Participants were told that this cue would provide a hint about the topic of the following 
passage, and they were instructed to use this hint to develop an anticipation of the 
sentence’s theme.   
Testing these hypotheses with high-and low-trait anxious individuals, MacLeod 
and Cohen (1993) found that the high-trait anxious individuals selectively imposed the 
threatening interpretations on unconstrained ambiguous sentences.  In contrast, the low-
trait anxious individuals selectively imposed the nonthreatening interpretations on the 
ambiguous sentences.   
Taken together, given the ambiguity in social situations, interpretation seems to be 
an important factor of whether a situation is perceived as threatening, and recent studies 
have shown that anxious individuals tend to impose the more threatening meaning on 
ambiguous information. Consequently, these biases might be self-reinforcing in the 
development or maintainance of anxiety.  To my knowledge, there is no study 
investigating interpretive biases in BDD.  
 
1.2.4. Information-Processing Biases for Facial Stimuli 
Most studies investigating cognitive processes in psychological disorders used 
words as stimuli, and there is little research investigating “real life” stimuli such as faces.  
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However, recently, researchers discussed whether more ecologically valid stimuli such as 
faces would be more appropriate to investigate information-processing abnormalities 
(e.g., Lundh & Öst, 1996).  That is, nonvisual or abstract stimuli such as words may not 
represent the patient’s personal concerns such as pictorial stimuli may do, especially for 
those individuals whose personal concerns are tied to visual cues (e.g., behavioral cues 
such as approving or disapproving facial expressions in social situations).  
Therefore, researchers have started to investigate information-processing biases 
using pictorial stimuli.  Investigating attentional biases in spider phobia, Lavy and Van 
den Hout (1993), for example, used the modified Stroop paradigm and found that patients 
with spider phobia, in contrast to controls, exhibit color-naming latencies when presented 
with pictures of spiders.  Furthermore, Constantine and colleagues investigated 
attentional biases in spider phobic patients and snake phobic patients using pictorial cues 
(Constantine, McNally, & Hornig, 2001).  They also found that phobic patients, in 
contrast to controls, selectively attended to emotional pictorial cues.  
Studying recognition memory for faces in social phobia, Lundh and Öst (1996), 
for example, argued that facial stimuli may be very relevant for social phobic patients 
because the patients are especially afraid of negative evaluations by others.  That is, facial 
expressions are an important mean to express negative or positive evaluations, and 
information-processing biases for these expressions may be a key factor in the 
maintenance or even etiology of psychological disorders that are characterized by a 
strong fear of negative evaluations. In their experiment, Lundh and Öst (1996) presented 
social phobic patients and controls with faces varying in their emotional valence (positive 
and negative). They found that social phobics, when presented with critical and accepting 
faces, recognized significantly more of the former than of the latter in a subsequent 
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memory task for these faces.  Consequently, enhanced recognition memory for critical 
faces may contribute to anxiety, especially to fear of negative evaluation. However, it is 
unclear whether the results of Lundh and Öst’s study were caused by a response bias or 
by a memory bias for critical faces.   
To further address this issue, Foa and colleagues also studied the ability to 
recognize facial expressions in social phobia (Foa, Gilboa-Schechtman, Amir, & 
Freshman, 2000). They found that social phobics are better in recognizing negative 
emotions (e.g., anger, disgust), compared to non-negative emotions (e.g., neutral, happy) 
and compared  to nonanxious controls.  To examine whether the enhanced memory of 
social phobics for negative expressions was a result of a response bias, Foa et al. (2000) 
submitted the data to a signal detection analysis and found that the enhanced recognition 
of negative expressions was caused by a memory bias rather than by a response bias. 
Moreover, selective attention to negative facial expressions was also found in 
studies (e.g., Bradley et al., 1997; Mansell, Clark, Ehlers, & Chen, 1999; Yuen, 1994).   
Using the visual dot probe paradigm, Bradley and colleagues, for example, investigated 
attentional biases for negative facial expressions in a nonclinical population (Bradley et 
al., 1997).  Specifically, they presented high and low socially anxious participants with 
neutral-happy and neutral-angry face pairs. Although they did not find a social anxiety-
related attentional bias, post hoc correlational analyses indicated that nondysphoric 
participants avoided angry facial expressions less than did dysphoric participants. Yuen 
(1994) also used the visual dot probe paradigm in a nonclinical population and found a 
significant relation between social anxiety and an attentional bias away from negative 
faces. Specifically, social anxiety was induced by telling participants that they would 
have to give a public presentation immediately after the completion of the dot probe task.  
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To further clarify this, Mansell and colleagues used the dot probe paradigm and presented 
high and low socially anxious participants with face pairs (Mansell et al., 1999).  
Moreover, half of the participants performed the task under social-evaluative threat (by 
telling participants that their skills to give a speech would be evaluated after the 
completion of the task) and half of the participants performed the task under no threat.  
The main finding of Mansell et al.’s (1999) study was that high socially anxious 
participants exhibited an attentional biases away from both positive and negative 
emotional faces.  However, this effect was only observed under the condition of social-
evaluative threat.  In the no threat condition, high and low socially anxious participants 
did not differ in their attention to facial expressions.  The latter result is consistent with 
Bradley et al.’s (1997) study which did not include a social-evaluative threat condition 
and also found no differences in attention between high and low socially anxious 
participants.  However, findings of recent studies using words to investigate selective 
attention in social anxiety showed that high socially anxious participants show an 
attentional bias towards socially threatening words if they were tested under a no threat 
condition (Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990; Mattia, Heimberg, & Hope, 
1993), whereas this effect is not observed under conditions of social-evaluative threat 
(Amir et al., 1996). These findings are inconsistent with the recent findings of studies in 
which faces were used instead of verbal stimuli (e.g., Mansell et al., 1999).  
Consequently, results of studies obtained with emotionally valenced words do not 
necessarily generalize to “real-life” stimuli such as faces. 
Why do spider phobic patients exhibit an attentional bias towards the threatening 
stimuli, whereas socially anxious individuals who are under social-evaluative threat 
exhibit an attentional bias away from pictures of other people’s emotional expression?  In 
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contrast to individuals with social anxiety, a spider phobic’s anxiety will not decrease if 
he or she avoids to look at the threatening stimulus.  Instead, the anxiety may increase 
because if the spider phobic avoids to look at the spider, he or she will not be able to see 
if the spider moves closer.  On the other hand, avoiding to look at other people’s faces 
and avoiding eye contact may reduce the anxiety of a high socially anxious individual 
because it makes it more difficult for other people to engage the anxious individual in a 
conversation (Mansell et al., 1999).  Consistent with this hypothesis, Thorpe and 
Salkovskis (1998) found that spider phobics that were presented with a spider in a room 
showed greater attention to the spider if the spider was near the exit door than if the 
spider was more far away from the exit door.  
Researchers have also investigated the ability to recognize facial expressions in 
individuals with psychological disorders.  So far, these phenomena have been mostly 
studied in schizophrenia (e.g., Addington & Addington, 1998; Mueser et al., 1996, Kerr 
& Neale, 1993).  Kerr and Neale (1993), for example, presented schizophrenic patients 
and healthy controls with faces varying in emotional expressions and found that 
schizophrenics, in contrast to controls, exhibited a generalized performance deficit to 
recognize emotions.   
Studying the relation between emotion recognition and social competence in 
schizophrenia, Mueser and colleagues also found that schizophrenic patients, unlike 
controls, exhibited a generalized deficit to recognize emotional expressions (Mueser et 
al., 1996).  Moreover, they found that the ability to recognize emotions was related to 
social competence and concluded that deficits in emotion recognition might affect the 
ability to behave in social situations in an appropriate way. Further support for the 
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hypothesis that schizophrenic patients exhibit a generalized emotion recognition deficit 
was found by Addington and Addington (1998) and Salem, Kring, and Kerr (1996).  
Investigating recognition of facial expressions in mania, Lembke and Ketter 
(2002) found that manic patients, in contrast to euthymic patients with bipolar I or bipolar 
II and to controls, showed worse overall recognition of facial expressions, especially of 
fear and disgust.  The authors concluded that impaired perception of facial expressions 
may contribute to behaviors associated with mania such as inappropriate approach when 
withdrawal would be more adaptive.   
Given the strong fear of negative evaluation and the frequent presence of ideas of 
reference, individuals with BDD, like social phobics and delusional patients, might be 
particularly sensitive to facial expressions.  For example, they might interpret a person’s 
facial expression as negative although that person might have a neutral facial expression 
instead.  Therefore, the ability to recognize facial expressions may play a role in the 
maintenance or even etiology of disorders that are characterized by a strong fear of 
negative evaluations such as social phobia and BDD.  For example, studying recognition 
of facial expressions in children with social phobia, Simonian and colleagues found that 
clinically socially anxious children had significantly poorer facial expression recognition 
skills than had children with no psychiatric disorder (Simonian, Beidel, Turner, Berkes, 
& Long, 2001). Especially, socially anxious children performed poorer when presented 
with happy, sad and disgusted facial expressions.  However, Simonian et al. (2001) failed 
to report the emotions to which the socially anxious children incorrectly misclassified the 
happy, sad, and disgusted facial expressions.  
Taken together, information-processing biases for threatening facial expressions 
might play an important role why clinically anxious patients, especially those with an 
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excessive fear of negative evaluation such as social phobics and BDD patients, develop 
or maintain these fears and consequently tend to avoid social situations. 
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2. General Aims of Study 1, Study 2, and Study 3 
I intended to examine whether BDD patients are characterized by a tendency to 
interpret ambiguous information as threatening.  To the extent that BDD shares core 
phenomenological features with social phobia and OCD, it may also resemble these 
anxiety disorders in terms of information-processing biases. 
In Study 1, I explored whether BDD patients are characterized by a negative 
BDD-related interpretive bias.  Given the similarity of BDD and social phobia, I further 
examined whether BDD patients are not only characterized by a negative BDD-related 
interpretive bias, but also by a negative bias for social information – a bias one would 
expect in social phobic patients.  To address these hypotheses, I applied an Interpretation 
Questionnaire which was modeled after Butler and Mathews (1983).   
In Study 2, I further examined interpretive biases in BDD using the RSVP 
paradigm (Williams & Tarr, 1998).  The purpose of this study was to directly compare 
the results of Study 1 and Study 2 to examine whether interpretive biases would still be 
found if one controls for response biases such as the experimenter demand effect.  
In Study 3, I examined the ability to recognize facial expressions in BDD.  Given 
the strong fear of negative evaluation and the frequent presence of ideas of reference, 
individuals with BDD might be particularly sensitive to facial expressions.  Based on 
previous findings in social phobia, I hypothesized that BDD patients exhibit an 
interpretive bias for angry facial expressions. 
Furthermore, I explored in all studies whether these phenomena are typical for 
BDD or characterize a broader spectrum of psychological disorders such as OCD as well.  
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3.1. Abstract 
Anxiety-disordered patients and high trait anxious individuals tend to interpret 
ambiguous information as threatening.  The purpose of this study was to investigate 
whether interpretive biases would also occur in body dysmorphic disorder (BDD). BDD 
is characterized by a preoccupation with imagined defects in one's appearance.  We tested 
whether BDD participants, compared to OCD participants and healthy controls, choose 
threatening interpretations for ambiguous body-related, ambiguous social, and general 
scenarios.  As we hypothesized, BDD participants exhibited a negative interpretive bias 
for body-related scenarios and for social scenarios, whereas the other groups did not.  
Moreover, both clinical groups exhibited a negative interpretive bias for general 
scenarios. 
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3.2. Introduction  
 Individuals with body dysmorphic disorder (BDD) are preoccupied with an 
imagined or slight defect in appearance (e.g., that the nose is too big).  If the individual 
has a slight physical defect, the concern has to be extreme to qualify for a diagnosis of 
BDD.   
Although currently classified as a somatoform disorder (American Psychiatric 
Association [APA], 1994), BDD shares many features with anxiety disorders. For 
example, both individuals with BDD and social phobia are characterized by a fear of 
negative evaluation in social situations (Hollander, Neville, Frenkel, Josephson, & 
Liebowitz, 1992).  However, unlike BDD patients, concerns of individuals with social 
phobia are unrelated to their appearance.  
There is also a link between BDD and OCD. Like OCD, BDD is characterized 
by intrusive thoughts that are difficult to control or resist.  In addition, about 90% of 
individuals with BDD suffer from ritualistic, repetitive behaviors (Neziroglu, 
Anderson, & Yaryura-Tobias, 1999), including checking one’s appearance in mirrors, 
skin picking, or frequent asking for reassurance.  Moreover, both disorders have a 
similar age of onset and course, and a high comorbidity (Phillips, Atala, & Albertini, 
1995). 
Anxiety-disordered patients and individuals with high trait anxiety tend to 
selectively process threatening information, a bias that might contribute to the 
development or maintenance of emotional disorders (e.g., Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & 
Mathews, 1997).  Investigating attentional processes in BDD, we found that individuals 
with BDD, in contrast to healthy controls, selectively attended especially to appearance-
related information, and also to emotional appearance-unrelated information (Buhlmann, 
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McNally, Wilhelm, & Florin, 2002).  Selective attention to appearance-related 
information, for example, might partly explain why individuals with BDD have to think 
about their imagined defect over and over again. 
Another cognitive bias refers to the manner individuals interpret ambiguous 
information.  Previous research has shown that anxious individuals tend to impose 
threatening interpretations on ambiguous stimuli (e.g., Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998; 
McNally & Foa, 1987).  Research on social phobia, for example, has shown that socially 
anxious individuals tend to draw negative conclusions about ambiguous social events, 
which might lead to increased anxiety and consequently to avoidance of those anxiety-
provoking events (Amir et al., 1998).  Specifically, Amir and colleagues showed that 
social phobic patients, compared to OCD patients and healthy controls, interpreted 
ambiguous social situations as threatening, even when the participants could choose 
between a threatening, neutral, and positive interpretation (Amir et al., 1998).  Moreover, 
this interpretive bias was specific to self-relevant situations (i.e., imagining oneself being 
in that situation), and did not occur in non-self-relevant situations (i.e., imagining a good 
friend being in that situation).  Furthermore, McNally and Foa tested whether 
agoraphobic patients, compared to recovered agoraphobics and healthy controls, are 
characterized by a negative interpretive bias when presented with ambiguous information 
that was related to their specific concerns (McNally & Foa, 1987).  The results revealed 
that agoraphobic patients tended to interpret ambiguous scenarios that were related to 
their agoraphobic concerns in a more threatening way than did recovered agoraphobic 
patients and controls.  Taken together, given the ambiguity in many situations, 
interpretation seems to be an important factor of whether a situation is perceived as 
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threatening.  Consequently, negative interpretive biases may be a high risk factor for the 
development or maintenance of emotional disorders. 
The purpose of the current study was to test whether BDD patients, like anxious 
patients, are characterized by a tendency to interpret ambiguous information as 
threatening.  Specifically, given the close relation to social phobia, we explored whether 
BDD patients are not only characterized by a negative BDD-related interpretive bias, but 
also by a negative bias for social information.  We also investigated whether these 
phenomena are specific to BDD or characterize a broader spectrum of psychiatric 
disorders such as OCD. 
 
3.3. Method 
3.3.1. Participants 
The BDD group comprised 19 outpatients (14 women) who met DSM-IV (APA, 
1994) criteria for BDD.  The following comorbid diagnoses were present in the BDD 
group: major depression (n = 7), agoraphobia without panic disorder (n = 1), specific 
phobia (n = 1), trichotillomania (n = 1), and kleptomania (n = 1). Six BDD participants 
were unmedicated at the time of testing.  The remaining 13 participants were currently on 
the following psychotropic medications: fluoxetine (n = 7), paroxetine (n = 2), 
fluvoxamine (n = 3), and clomipramine (n = 1).  Fourteen BDD participants were 
unmarried (73.7%), 2 BDD participants were married (10.5%), and 3 BDD participants 
were divorced at the time of testing (15.8%). 
The OCD group comprised 20 outpatients (9 women) who met DSM-IV (APA, 
1994) criteria for OCD.  The following comorbid diagnoses were present in the OCD 
group: alcohol abuse (n = 1), panic disorder without agoraphobia (n = 1), and chronic 
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motor tic (n = 1).  Eight OCD participants were unmedicated at the time of testing.  The 
remaining 12 participants were currently on the following psychotropic medications: 
fluoxetine (n = 4), paroxetine (n = 3), sertraline (n = 3), clonazepam (n = 1), and 
fluvoxamine (n = 1).  Fourteen OCD participants were unmarried (70%),  5 OCD 
participants were married (25%), and 1 OCD participant was separated (5%).  
Diagnoses in the patients’ groups were determined by structured clinical 
interviews (Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV – Outpatient Version [SCID]; 
First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1995).  
The healthy control group consisted of 22 participants (15 women). SCID 
interviews confirmed the absence of current or past psychiatric disorders.  Fifteen control 
participants were unmarried (68.2%), and 7 control participants were married (31.8%). 
As evident from Table 1, the healthy control group was matched with the BDD 
group and OCD group with respect to age, F (2, 57) = 0.09, p = .92, education, F(2, 57) = 
0.05, p = .95, verbal IQ, F(2, 57) = 1.45, p = .24, and gender, χ² (2, 0.95) = 3.92, p = .14. 
All participants were native English speakers. 
 
3.3.2. Material 
Interpretation Questionnaire. To investigate interpretive biases, we designed an 
Interpretation Questionnaire modeled on the one developed by Butler and Mathews 
(1983).  It consisted of 33 ambiguous scenarios (11 BDD-related, 11 social, and 11 
general scenarios; see Figure 1).  Each scenario consisted of a short description of the 
scenario and was followed by the question What thoughts occur to you?.  Moreover, 
participants were provided with three possible thoughts and were asked to rate each 
thought on a scale from 0 (very unlikely) to 4 (very likely) in terms of their likelihood of 
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coming to mind.  The following scenario is an example of an ambiguous BDD-related 
situation: Your blind date says, “You’re certainly not what I expected”.  What thoughts 
occur to you? a)  I get nervous about having made such a bad impression, b) I feel 
confident that I impressed him/her, c) Whatever it meant, I don’t take this comment 
serious.  The following scenario is an example of an ambiguous social situation: You are 
having a conversation with some friends. You say something and the conversation stops. 
What thoughts occur to you? a)  They are thinking about what I just said, b) There was 
nothing more to say on this topic, c) I must have said something foolish or insulting. The 
following scenario is an example of a general ambiguous situation: You turn on the key 
but your car doesn’t start. What thoughts occur to you? a)  The engine is still cold, b) I 
have to give it more gas, c) The starter is broken.  Experienced clinicians rated the 
scenarios in terms of the appropriateness for each category, and we included only 
scenarios that were rated as highly appropriate to represent the particular concerns.  
Furthermore, Cronbach’s coefficient alpha values were calculated for each of the 
categories.  Reliability analyses yielded alpha values ranging from 0.74 to 0.93, with only 
two values falling below 0.80 (see Table 2). 
Psychometrics. Participants completed a form that asked about demographic 
information such as age, gender, education, and marital status.  Furthermore, they 
completed the following questionnaires: the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck & 
Steer, 1987), the Body Dysmorphic Disorder Modification of the YBOCS (BDD-
YBOCS; Phillips et al., 1997), the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE; Watson & 
Friend, 1969), and the Shipley Institute of Living Scale (Zachary, 1991). 
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) is a 21-item inventory that examines the 
severity of depression.  Each item describes a manifestation of depression.  Specifically, 
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each item has a series of four self-evaluative statements that indicate the severity of a 
particular symptom.  Statements are rated from 0 (no symptom) to 3 (most severe 
symptom).  The total score can range from 0 to 63.  It has a good test-retest reliability for 
one to three month (.74; Rehm, 1988).  Tests of internal consistency produce alpha 
coefficients of .76 to .95 (Rehm, 1988).  Moreover, the BDI has a high correlation with 
the Hamilton Rating Scale (r = .82; Hamilton, 1960). 
The Body Dysmorphic Disorder Modification of the YBOCS (BDD-YBOCS; 
Phillips et al., 1997; see General Appendix A) is a modified version of the Yale-Brown 
Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (Goodman et al., 1989).  It consists of 12 items that 
measure the severity of BDD symptoms during the past week.  Each item assesses a 
particular symptom of BDD and is rated from 0 (no symptom) to 4 (extreme symptom).  
The total score varies from 0 to 48.  Intraclass correlation coefficients reveal that the 
interrater reliabilities both for the total score and for the individual item score are very 
high (rr = .79 - 1.00; Phillips et al., 1997). 
The Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE) examines the expectation and fear 
of negative evaluation.  The original version consists of 30 items which are rated by the 
participants as true or false. The short version (Leary, 1983) consists of 12 items.  Each 
item assesses a particular symptom of social phobia and is rated on a Likert-type scale 
from 1 (“Not at all characteristic of me”) to 5 (“Extremely characteristic of me”).  We 
used the short version because the correlation between the original and the short version 
is very high (r = .96).  Both the original and the short version have also very high 
interitem reliabilities (alpha = .92 and .94).  The test-retest reliability for one month is 
satisfactory (r = .78; Leary, 1983). 
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The Shipley Institute of Living Scale examines general intelligence.  It consists of 
a vocabulary test and an abstract thinking test.  The vocabulary test consists of 40 items.  
For each item, participants are instructed to choose which of four words describes the 
target word best.  The abstract thinking test consists of 20 items. Participants are given a 
logical sequence and are required to complete the numbers or letters that best complete it.  
The Shipley Institute of Living Scale yields a measure of general intellectual functioning 
that correlates .74 with the Full Scale IQ as measured by the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale - Revised (Wechsler, 1981). We only used the vocabulary test.  Mean scores and 
standard deviations are presented in Table 1. 
 
3.3.3. Design 
A 3 (Group: BDD, OCD, Healthy Control) X 6 (Category: BDD-related 
threatening, BDD-related nonthreatening, Social anxiety-related threatening, Social 
anxiety-related nonthreatening, general threatening, general nonthreatening) factorial 
design was used.  The first variable was measured between-subjects, whereas the last 
variable was measured within subjects. 
 
3.3.4. Procedure 
Participants first completed the Interpretation questionnaire in which they were 
presented with the following instructions: 
 
This questionnaire describes a variety of every day situations. These 
situations might mean different things to different people. Please try to 
imagine yourself in each situation and think about the thoughts the 
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specific situation would evoke in you. After this, please indicate EACH 
of the three thoughts connected to the situation how likely it is that it 
would come to your mind under similar circumstances. Rank each 
thought from 0 to 4 where 0 means “very unlikely” and 4 means “very 
likely”. 
 
Some situations might not be very typical for you. Please try to picture 
yourself in them anyway and indicate the probability that each of the 
three thoughts would come to your mind. There are no right or wrong 
answers. Please do not think too long about the rating before you decide 
on it. Your first impression is important to us. 
 
After that, they completed the BDI, BDD-YBOCS, FNE, and Shipley Institute of 
Living Scale.  They were then paid and debriefed about the purpose of the study.  
 
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. Psychometric data 
The mean scores for the questionnaires at the time of experimental testing are 
presented in Table 1. Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) confirmed differences among 
groups on the BDD-YBOCS, F(2, 56) = 80.80, p < .001, the BDI, F(2, 56) = 28.45, p < 
.001, and the FNE, F(2, 56) = 27.64, p < .001. However, data of one participant were 
missing. Post hoc Bonferroni-corrected t-tests indicated the following differences 
between the groups (see Table 1). 
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3.4.2. Interpretation Questionnaire 
We predicted that BDD participants, compared to OCD participants and healthy 
controls, are characterized by a BDD-related and social anxiety-related negative 
interpretive biases.  Furthermore, we hypothesized that both patient groups show a 
general negative interpretive bias, whereas control participants ought not show this bias.  
We first submitted the data to a 3 (Group: BDD, OCD, Healthy Control) X 6 (Category: 
BDD-related threatening, BDD-related nonthreatening, social anxiety-related threatening, 
social anxiety-related nonthreatening, general threatening, general nonthreatening) 
ANOVA with repeated measurements on the second variable.  This analysis yielded a 
significant main effects for Group, F(2, 58) = 3.61, p = .03, and Category, F(5, 290) = 
46.81, p < .001.  Moreover, it yielded a significant Category X Group interaction, F(10, 
290) = 16.63, p < .001.  As evident from Figures 2 and 3, post hoc Tukey multiple 
comparisons and paired t-tests revealed the following effects:  
BDD-related Scenarios.  When presented with BDD-related scenarios, BDD 
participants rated the likelihood of threatening thoughts as significantly higher, compared 
to control participants, p < .001, effect size r = .71, and to OCD participants, p < .001, 
effect size r = .72.  Moreover, they rated the likelihood of nonthreatening thoughts as 
significantly lower, compared to control participants, p < .001, effect size r = .56, and to 
OCD participants, p = .002, effect size r = .48.  However, paired t-tests within the BDD 
group indicated that BDD participants did not rate the likelihood of threatening thoughts 
as higher than that of nonthreatening thoughts, t(18) = .65, p = .53, effect size r = .13.   
OCD participants and controls did not differ with respect to the ratings for threatening 
thoughts, p = .54, effect size r = .17, and nonthreatening thoughts, p = 84, effect size r = 
.10.  Moreover, significant differences were obtained for the ratings of the likelihood of 
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threatening and nonthreatening thoughts in the OCD group, t(19) = 10.89, p < .001, effect 
size r = .87, and in the control group, t(21) = 8.92, p < .001, effect size r = .85.  That is, 
both OCD participants and controls rated the likelihood of nonthreatening thoughts as 
significantly higher than the likelihood of threatening thoughts.  
Social Scenarios.  In the social anxiety category, a similar pattern occurred. BDD 
participants rated the likelihood of threatening thoughts as significantly higher, compared 
to control participants, p < .001, effect size r = .53, and to OCD participants, p = .002, 
effect size r = .46.  BDD participants also rated the likelihood for nonthreatening thoughts 
as significantly lower, compared to controls, p = .002, effect size r = .50, and to the OCD 
group, p = .009, effect size r = .38.  Paired t-tests within the BDD group, however, 
indicated that BDD participants did not rate the likelihood of threatening thoughts as 
higher, compared to the likelihood of nonthreatening thoughts, t(18) = .88, p = .39, effect 
size r = .18.   Again, no significant differences occurred between the OCD participants 
and the controls with respect to the ratings for threatening thoughts, p = .50, effect size r 
= .17, and for nonthreatening thoughts, p = .67, effect size r = .13. Moreover, paired t-
tests obtained significant differences for the ratings of the likelihood of threatening and 
nonthreatening thoughts in the OCD group, t(19) = 5.34, p < .001, effect size r = .64, and 
in the control group, t(21) = 5.93 p < .001, effect size r = .71.  That is, both OCD 
participants and controls rated the likelihood of nonthreatening thoughts as significantly 
higher than the likelihood of threatening thoughts.  
General Scenarios.  In the general category, BDD participants rated the likelihood 
for threatening thoughts as significantly higher, compared to controls, p = .04, effect size 
r = .37.  As we predicted, there was no difference between the BDD group and OCD 
group in their rating of the likelihood for threatening thoughts in general scenarios, p = 
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.88, effect size r = .09.  Furthermore, OCD participants rated the likelihood for 
threatening thoughts significantly higher than did controls, p = .01, effect size r = .41.  
With respect to nonthreatening thoughts, BDD participants rated them as less likely than 
did controls.  However, this difference was only marginally significant, p = .06, effect 
size r = .37.  However, paired t-tests within the BDD group indicated that BDD 
participants did not rate the likelihood of threatening thoughts as higher than that of 
nonthreatening thoughts, t(18) = 1.39, p = .18, effect size r = .26.   As we predicted, no 
difference was obtained between the BDD group and OCD group, p = .39, effect size r = 
.19.  The difference between the OCD group and the controls was also nonsignificant, p = 
.61, effect size r = .15.  Moreover, paired t-tests indicated that OCD participants rated the 
likelihood of threatening thoughts higher than the likelihood of nonthreatening thoughts.  
However, this difference fell short of significance, t(19) = 2.04, p = .06, effect size r = 
.31.  Controls, in contrast to the other groups, rated the likelihood of nonthreatening 
thoughts as significantly higher than they rated the likelihood of threatening thoughts, 
t(21) = 6.19, p < .001, effect size r = .72. 
 
3.4.3. Comorbidity of Depression  
To estimate whether depression had a significant effect on the likelihood ratings, 
we conducted Mann Whitney U tests between the BDD participants who met criteria for 
comorbid depression and those who were not depressed.  As evident from Table 3, no 
differences between the groups were obtained (ps > .05).  Furthermore, we calculated 
effect size correlation r between those groups.  As evident from Table 3, effect sizes 
between the groups were low indicating that it is unlikely that depression had an 
significant influence on the results.  Furthermore, we conducted Wilcoxon Signed Ranks 
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Tests within each group (depressed versus nondepressed BDD participants).  Within the 
depressed BDD group, we found no significant differences between the ratings of 
threatening and nonthreatening thoughts in the BDD-related scenarios, Z = 1.18, p = .24, 
in the social anxiety-related scenarios, Z = 1.27, p = .20, and in the general scenarios, Z = 
.14, p = .89.  Within the nondepressed BDD group, we also found no significant 
differences between the ratings of threatening and nonthreatening thoughts in the BDD-
related scenarios, Z = .314, p = .75, in the social anxiety-related scenarios, Z = .94, p = 
.35, and in the general scenarios, Z = 1.58, p = .11.   
 
In summary, both BDD participants and OCD participants rated threatening 
thoughts in general scenarios as significantly more likely and nonthreatening thoughts as 
significantly less likely, compared to control participants.  Furthermore, BDD 
participants rated threatening thoughts in BDD-related scenarios as significantly more 
likely and nonthreatening thoughts as significantly less likely than OCD participants and 
controls.  The same effect was found in social anxiety-related scenarios indicating that 
BDD participants show a negative interpretive bias for BDD-related and social anxiety-
related information, whereas this effect was not found in the OCD group and the control 
group.  Paired t-tests within each group, however, indicated that BDD participants did not 
rate nonthreatening thoughts as less likely than threatening thoughts in all scenario types, 
whereas the opposite patterns occured in the OCD and control groups. That is, both OCD 
participants and controls rated nonthreatening thoughts as more likely than threatening 
thoughts in all scenario types.  However, in the OCD group, the difference in the general 
scenarios fell short of significance.  Moreover, further analyses suggest that comorbid 
depression had no significant influence on the likelihood ratings of the thoughts.  
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3.5. Discussion 
Both BDD participants and OCD participants exhibited a negative interpretive 
bias in general situations which may indicate a general not disorder-specific vulnerability.  
In other words, patients might be characterized by a general tendency to interpret 
ambiguous situations in a negative way, no matter what kind of psychiatric diagnosis they 
have. One explanation might be that those individuals who exhibit a negative interpretive 
bias for general ambiguous situations are more prone to develop a psychiatric disorder 
when confronted with life stressors than other individuals are.   On the other hand, it 
might be that patients with psychological disorders, once they developed their negative 
interpretive biases, overgeneralize these information-processing errors to ambiguous 
general situations.   
Consistent with previous research in anxiety-disordered and depressive patients, 
BDD participants revealed a disorder-specific negative interpretive bias.  In other words, 
they rated the likelihood that they would experience negative body-related interpretations 
as significantly higher than did participants without BDD.  For example, an individual 
with BDD is more likely to interpret somebody laughing behind him as a negative 
response to his or her appearance than people who do not have BDD.  
Furthermore, just like the social phobic participants in the study by Amir et al. 
(1998), our BDD participants were characterized by a negative interpretive bias for social 
information.  This effect was also specific for the BDD group and could not be found in 
the OCD group and control group.  This result is very interesting especially because none 
of the BDD participants met criteria for comorbid social phobia.  Thus, BDD patients do 
not only seem to have similar clinical features with social phobic patients such as a strong 
 
 
 48
fear of negative evaluation, but also seem to have similar information-processing biases, 
supporting the hypothesis that BDD might indeed be related to social phobia.  
What are the clinical implications of this study?  BDD patients tend to interpret 
ambiguous everyday events as threatening, which might, in turn, confirm distorted beliefs 
about themselves and their body image.  As a result, this might lead to even more 
emotional vulnerability for ambiguous situations.  Given that the meaning of a situation is 
not always obvious, the way individuals interpret it is an important factor of whether a 
situation is anxiety-provoking or not.  For example, an individual with BDD might 
interpret somebody looking at him or her in a threatening way (e.g., “that person was 
staring at me because I look so hideous”), whereas that person might simply have looked 
at the BDD sufferer for entirely unrelated reasons.   
However, although BDD patients interpret ambiguous scenarios as threatening, 
compared to the other groups, they do not differ in their likelihood ratings of threatening 
and nonthreatening thoughts.  In other words, although BDD patients interpret ambiguous 
scenarios as more threatening as OCD patients and controls, they might, nevertheless, be 
more open for all different kinds of threatening and nonthreatening interpretations.  For 
example, even if BDD patients rate the likelihood of a threatening thought (e.g., That 
person is staring at me because of my horrible nose) higher than the other groups, they do 
not rate the likelihood of a nonthreatening thought (e.g., The person might know me from 
seeing) lower than the likelihood of the threatening thought.   
OCD patients and controls, however, may be characterized by a “nonthreatening 
interpretive bias”.  That is, they rate – unlike BDD patients - the likelihood of a 
nonthreatening thought higher than the likelihood of a threatening thought.  
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This study has a number of limitations.  Unsurprisingly, seven participants in the 
BDD group met criteria for comorbid depression.  Separate analyses between depressed 
and nondepressed BDD participants indicated that there were no differences between the 
two groups with respect to their likelihood ratings. Moreover, analyses of effect sizes of 
depressed and nondepressed BDD participants indicated that it is unlikely that depression 
had a significant influence on the results.  However, given the small sample size, this 
finding needs to be replicated with a bigger sample size.  Furthermore, 13 BDD 
participants and 12 OCD participants were medicated at the time of testing which might 
have influenced their test performance. However, comparing neuropsychological 
performance in medicated and unmedicated OCD patients treated with serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors (SRIs), Mataix-Cols and colleagues recently found that SRI-medicated and 
unmedicated OCD patients performed equally on cognitive domains such as attention, 
visuo-spatial skills, verbal and non-verbal memory, and executive functioning (Mataix-
Cols, Alonso, Pifarre, Menchon, & Vallejo, 2002).  These findings are consistent with 
previous findings comparing neuropsychological performance in medicated versus 
unmedicated OCD patients (Purcell, Maruff, Kyrios, & Pantelis, 1998; Savage et al., 
2000).  Therefore, it seems unlikely that the results of the current study would have been 
different if we had only tested unmedicated patients.  It might even be that we had found 
stronger effects if we had tested only unmedicated patients.  Another limitation is that we 
did not include an OCD-related scenario type to directly compare possible negative 
interpretive biases between BDD and OCD patients.  Furthermore, it is possible that BDD 
patients exhibited a negative interpretive bias for both BDD-related and social scenarios 
because of an overlap of the stimulusmaterial.  That is, the stimuli used BDD-related 
scenarios and in the social scenarios were too similar.  However, all scenarios were rated 
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by experienced clinicians in terms of their appropriateness to represent the social phobic 
patients’ concerns and to represent the specific BDD patients’ concerns. 
Our findings support one of the basic concepts underlying cognitive therapy, 
namely that individuals with emotional disorders have interpretive biases that cause or 
maintain anxiety.  Indeed, cognitive models that guide BDD treatments have just been 
developed in recent years (e.g., Wilhelm & Neziroglu, 2002) and propose that individuals 
interpret normal visual input (such as minor flaws) and normal situations in a distorted 
way which leads to further cognitive, emotional and behavioral consequences.  
If negative interpretive biases might contribute to anxiety, the crucial question is 
whether they can be modified or changed. Evidence for this has been found by McNally 
and Foa (1987) who found that these biases are absent in those patients who have 
responded well to cognitive behavioral therapy. Future research in BDD is needed to 
examine these biases before and after cognitive behavioral therapy. This investigation of 
the role and nature of interpretive biases in BDD will be beneficial for diagnostic 
assessments and the development of cognitive-behavioral treatments which focus directly 
on the modification of maladaptive interpretations.  For example, the findings of this 
study might help to develop specific inventories for BDD which directly assess 
dysfunctional thoughts such as the patients’ interpretations during the course of 
treatment.  
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3.6. Appendix 
Table 1 
Psychometric Data 
 
 
Variable 
 
BDD Group 
 
OCD Group 
 
Control Group 
 M SD M SD M SD 
       
BDD-YBOCS 
BDI 
25.42a 
17.00a 
6.26 
8.39 
5.83b 
8.22b 
7.24 
6.62 
4.14b 
2.55c 
3.75 
2.30 
FNE 
Age 
Education 
49.84a 
30.68a 
16.58a  
7.59 
10.18 
2.55 
41.67b 
31.37a 
16.68a 
9.84 
10.37 
2.06 
29.45c 
32.09a 
16.45a  
9.02 
11.66 
2.15 
Verbal IQ 
 
60.53a 4.83 60.37a  3.44 62.32a  3.96 
 
Notes. BDD-YBOCS = Body Dysmorphic Disorder Modification of the YBOCS; BDI = 
Beck Depression Inventory; FNE = Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale; Age in years; 
Education = Years of Education; Verbal IQ = Shipley Institute of Living Scale t-scores; 
Means sharing subscripts do not differ (p > .05, Bonferroni-corrected). 
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Table 2 
Cronbach’s Coefficient Alpha for the Interpretation Questionnaire 
 
 
Category/Subscale 
 
Cronbach’s Coefficient Alpha 
 
  
BDD- threatening 0.93 
BDD- nonthreatening 0.89 
Social anxiety- threatening 0.89 
Social anxiety- nonthreatening 0.87 
General threatening 0.79 
General nonthreatening 0.74 
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Table 3 
Effects of Depression on Interpretation in the BDD Group 
  
 Depressed Group Nondepressed Group  
Category M SD M SD   p  r 
 
BDD-threatening 2.48 0.78   2.20 0.73   .38 .18 
BDD-nonthreatening 2.03 0.39   2.20 0.58 .48 .17 
Social anxiety-threatening 2.51 0.81   2.09 0.65   .14 .27 
Social anxiety-nonthreatening 1.88 0.40   2.11 0.56   .23 .23 
General-threatening 2.01 0.59   1.90 0.39   .90 .11 
General-nonthreatening 2.14 0.33 2.22 0.52   .97 .09 
 
Notes. BDD-threatening= likelihood of threatening thoughts in BDD-related scenarios; 
BDD-nonthreatening = likelihood of nonthreatening thoughts in BDD-related scenarios; 
Social anxiety-threatening = likelihood of threatening thoughts in social anxiety-related 
scenarios; Social anxiety-nonthreatening = likelihood of nonthreatening thoughts in social 
anxiety-related scenarios; General-threatening = likelihood of threatening thoughts in 
general scenarios; General-nonthreatening = likelihood of nonthreatening thoughts in 
general scenarios; r = effect size correlation; p =  statistical significances were computed 
using Mann Whitney U tests 
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Figure 1 
Examples of BDD-related, Social anxiety-related, and General Scenarios 
 
BDD-related scenario 
While talking to some colleagues, you notice that some people take special notice of you. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) I am sure they are judging the way I look. 
b) They probably agree with my opinion. 
c) They are interested in our conversation. 
 
Social anxiety-related scenario 
You are having a conversation with some friends. You say something and the 
conversation stops. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) They are thinking about what I just said. 
b) There was nothing more to say about this topic. 
c) I must have said something foolish or insulting. 
 
General scenario 
A letter marked “URGENT” arrives. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) It is probably an ad designed to attract my attention. 
b) Maybe I forgot to pay a bill. 
c) Somebody must have died or is seriously ill. 
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Figure 2 
Likelihood of Threatening Interpretation of Ambiguous BDD-related, Social anxiety-
related, and General Scenarios 
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Figure 3 
Likelihood of Nonthreatening Interpretation of Ambiguous BDD-related, Social anxiety-
related, and General Scenarios 
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4.1. Abstract 
Anxiety patients and high trait anxious individuals interpret ambiguous stimuli as 
threatening.  In the current study, we investigated interpretive biases in body dysmorphic 
disorder (BDD) whose hallmark is a preoccupation with imagined defects in one's 
appearance.  Specifically, we used a text comprehension paradigm that controls for 
response bias.  We tested whether BDD participants, compared to OCD participants and 
healthy controls, interpret ambiguous social and ambiguous body-related information as 
threatening.  As we hypothesized, BDD participants exhibited a negative interpretive bias 
for body-related information.  However, they did not exhibit an interpretive bias for 
social and general information.  As predicted, OCD participants exhibited a bias for 
general information, whereas controls, in contrast to the other groups, exhibited a bias for 
social information.   
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4.2. Introduction 
Body dysmorphic disorder (BDD) is a chronic, debilitating syndrome 
characterized by distress about imagined defects in one’s appearance (American 
Psychiatric Association [APA], 1994).  Individuals with BDD are preoccupied about 
defects in their skin, hair, nose, ears, and so forth that are either completely imaginary or, 
if there is a slight physical defect, their concern is very excessive.  Furthermore, BDD is 
characterized by repetitive behaviors (e.g., excessive grooming, mirror checking, skin 
picking) and avoidance behaviors (e.g., avoidance of social situations, mirrors; Phillips, 
McElroy, Keck, Pope, & Hudson, 1993).  Instead of seeking psychiatric help, many BDD 
patients repeatedly undergo plastic surgeries which produce only temporary relief (e.g., 
Phillips et al., 1993; Hollander, Cohen, & Simeon, 1993).  Although classified among the 
somatoform disorders, BDD shares many features with anxiety disorders such as social 
phobia and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD).  Like social phobia patients, BDD 
patients exhibit fear and avoidance of situations in which they may be exposed to scrutiny 
and negative evaluation (about their appearance).  Like OCD, BDD is characterized by 
recurrent, intrusive thoughts about one’s “ugliness” that are difficult to resist and that 
prompt checking (e.g., glancing in mirrors) and excessive grooming. 
There has been increased interest in information-processing biases in emotional 
disorders.  This research has shown that emotionally disturbed patients preferentially 
process information having personal emotional significance.  Among the biases most 
frequently studied are those of attention and memory (for a review, see Williams, Watts, 
MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997), but also interpretation of ambiguous information (e.g., 
Butler & Mathews, 1983; McNally & Foa, 1987; Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998).  Selective 
processing of emotional information may contribute to emotional disturbance.  For 
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example, selective attention to threatening information and negative interpretive biases 
should increase anxiety.  Specifically, investigating selective attention, MacLeod and 
colleagues experimentally induced attentional biases either towards negative information 
or away from negative information and subsequently had participants complete a 
standardized stress task (MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002).  
They found that those participants who were trained to attend toward negative 
information were those most emotional vulnerable to a subsequent stressor.  Furthermore, 
research on social phobia, for example, has shown that socially anxious individuals tend 
to draw negative conclusions about ambiguous social events, which might lead to 
increased anxiety and to avoidance of those anxiety-provoking events (Amir et al., 1998).  
Specifically, Amir and colleagues have shown that social phobia patients, compared to 
OCD patients and controls, interpreted ambiguous social situations as threatening, even 
when the participants could choose between a threatening, neutral, and positive 
interpretation.  Moreover, this interpretive bias was specific to self-relevant situations 
(i.e., imagining oneself being in that situation), and did not occur in non-self-relevant 
situations (i.e., imagining a good friend being in that situation).   
To the extent that BDD shares core phenomenological features with social phobia 
and OCD, it may also resemble these anxiety disorders in terms of information-
processing biases.  However, there is not much research on BDD, and only two studies on 
cognitive biases in BDD.  Examining selective attention in BDD, we recently found that 
BDD patients, unlike most anxiety patients, exhibit attentional biases especially for 
concern-related positive information (e.g., beautiful, attractive) and not, like most anxiety 
patients, for concern-related negative information (e.g., disfigured, ugly; Buhlmann, 
McNally, Wilhelm, & Florin, 2002).  In the other study, we asked BDD patients, OCD 
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patients, and healthy controls to rate ambiguous body-related, ambiguous social, and 
general scenarios (Buhlmann, Wilhelm et al., 2002).  As we hypothesized, BDD patients, 
compared to the other groups, exhibited a negative interpretive bias for body-related 
scenarios and for social scenarios, whereas the other groups did not.  Moreover, both 
clinical groups exhibited a negative interpretive bias for general scenarios. 
But as MacLeod and Cohen (1993) observed, most studies on interpretive biases 
have methodological limitations.  Specifically, it was unclear whether our results 
reflected an interpretive bias or an anxiety-linked response-selection bias.  It is certainly 
possible that patients immediately disambiguated these scenarios as threatening, thereby 
exhibiting an interpretive bias.  On the other hand, they may have initially entertained 
diverse interpretations, not necessarily threatening ones, but then settled on a threatening 
interpretation as their final answer.  Hence, what might appear to be a bias at the early 
interpretive stage of processing might actually reflect a late-stage response-selection bias.  
In other words, it is unclear whether in our first interpretation study (Buhlmann, Wilhelm, 
et al., 2002) the results were caused by a response bias.   
MacLeod and Cohen (1993) used the Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (RSVP; 
Williams & Tarr, 1998) paradigm to distinguish interpretive from response biases in 
high- and low-trait anxious individuals.  The advantage of this paradigm is that it enables 
researchers to determine the participants’ initial interpretive response to ambiguous 
lexical input.  On each trial, the participant views and reads two successive sentences.  
The first sentence of each pair is ambiguous (They completed the service by filling in the 
hole), and the second sentence is either a plausible continuation for a threatening meaning 
(threat continuation condition, e.g., The funeral finished much sooner than had been 
expected) or a nonthreatening meaning (nonthreat continuation condition, e.g., The 
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repairs finished much sooner than had been expected) of the initial ambiguous sentence.  
Participants begin a trial by pressing the space bar which presents the first (ambiguous) 
sentence.   After reading it, they press the space bar again to view the second 
(continuation) sentence which is either a nonthreatening or threatening continuation of 
the first sentence.  When the participants press the space bar for the third time, they see a 
single question (Did the service take less time than anticipated?) which they answer with 
either Yes or No by pressing one of two other keys.  The dependent measure is the time 
between the second pressing of the space bar (which presents the continuation sentence) 
and the following key press that ends the display of the continuation sentence and 
replaces it with the question.  Accordingly, on each trial the software provides an index of 
the comprehension latency for each continuation sentence.  However, participants believe 
that the answer of the subsequent question is the variable of interest.  
Using this procedure, MacLeod and Cohen (1993) compared the relative 
comprehension latencies for the two types of continuation sentences across three 
experimental conditions, in which (1) the initial sentence was ambiguous, (2) the initial 
sentence was unambiguously threatening, or (3) the initial sentence was unambiguously 
nonthreatening.  That is, they subtracted, for each experimental condition, the 
comprehension latencies for the threat continuation sentences from the nonthreat 
continuation sentences.  If the participants consistently interpret the initial sentence as 
threatening when it is ambiguous, they ought to exhibit the same relative comprehension 
latencies for the two types of continuation sentences: when the initial sentence is 
ambiguous and when the initial sentence is unambiguously threatening. But they ought to 
have disproportionately long comprehension latencies for threat continuations in the third 
condition (in which the initial sentence is unambiguously nonthreatening).  In other 
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words, they should respond to ambiguous input as if it were threatening.  In contrast, if 
the participants impose the less threatening meaning on the initial sentence when it is 
ambiguous, they ought to show the same relative comprehension latencies for the two 
types of continuation sentence in the first condition (in which the initial sentence is 
ambiguous) and in the third condition (in which the initial sentence is unambiguously 
nonthreatening), but should exhibit disproportionately long comprehension latencies for 
nonthreat continuations under the second condition (in which the initial sentence is 
unambiguously threatening).  Therefore, the initial sentence was presented under three 
“cue” conditions.  That is, each sentence pair was proceeded by a single word (cue), 
which was used to either orient the participant to the meaning of the sentence (Burial: 
threat cue; Renovate: nonthreat cue) or to leave it completely ambiguous (?????).  
Participants were told that this cue would provide a hint about the topic of the following 
passage, and they were instructed to use this hint to develop an anticipation of the 
sentence’s theme.   
Testing these hypotheses with high-and low-trait anxious individuals, MacLeod 
and Cohen (1993) found that the high-trait anxious individuals selectively imposed the 
threatening interpretations on unconstrained ambiguous sentences.  In contrast, the low-
trait anxious individuals selectively imposed the nonthreatening interpretations on the 
ambiguous sentences.   
The purpose of the present study was to test whether BDD patients, like other 
depressed and anxious patients, are characterized by a tendency to interpret ambiguous 
information as threatening.  By using the RSVP paradigm, we investigated whether these 
phenomena are specific to BDD or characterize OCD as well.  Based on previous 
findings (Buhlmann, Wilhelm et al., 2002), we hypothesized that BDD patients are not 
 
 
 65
only characterized by a negative interpretive bias for ambiguous BDD-related scenarios, 
but also for ambiguous social scenarios and for general ambiguous scenarios.  Moreover, 
based on these findings, we expected that OCD patients would exhibit a negative 
interpretive bias only for general ambiguous scenarios, whereas no biases for threat were 
exprected in the control group. 
 
4.3. Method 
4.3.1. Participants 
The BDD group comprised 18 outpatients (5 men) who met DSM-IV (APA, 
1994) criteria for BDD as determined by structured clinical interviews (SCID; First, 
Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1995).  BDD patients had the following comorbid 
diagnoses: major depression (n = 7), agoraphobia without panic disorder (n = 1), and 
social phobia (n = 1). Five BDD participants were unmedicated at the time of testing.  
The remaining 13 participants were currently on the following psychotropic medications: 
fluoxetine (n = 7), fluvoxamine (n = 3), paroxetine (n = 2), and clomipramine (n = 1).  
Furthermore, fifteen BDD participants were single at the time of testing (83.3%), 1 BDD 
participant was married (5.6%), and 2 BDD participants were divorced at the time of 
testing (11.1%). 
The OCD group comprised 18 outpatients (5 men) who met DSM-IV (APA, 
1994) criteria for OCD as determined by the SCID (First et al., 1995).  Only one OCD 
patient had a comorbid diagnosis (major depression). Five OCD participants were 
unmedicated at the time of testing.  The remaining 13 participants were currently on the 
following psychotropic medications: fluoxetine (n = 4), fluvoxamine (n = 1), paroxetine 
(n = 3), sertraline (n = 3), clomipramine (n = 1), and clonazepam (n = 1).  Eleven  OCD 
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participants were single at the time of testing (61%), 5 OCD participants were married 
(27.8%),  1 OCD participant was separated (5.6%), and 1 OCD participant was divorced 
at the time of testing (5.6%). 
The control group consisted of 18 participants (5 men).  SCID interviews 
confirmed the absence of any psychiatric history.  Fourteen control participants were 
single at the time of testing (77.8%), and 4 of the control participants were married at the 
time of testing (22.2%). 
As evident from Table 1, the control group did not differ from the BDD group and 
OCD group with respect to age, F(2, 53) = .32, p = .73, education, F(2, 53) = .14, p = .87, 
verbal IQ, F(2, 53) = 1.67, p = .20, and gender, χ² (2, 0.95) = 1.14, p = .57.  All 
participants were native English speakers.  
 
4.3.2. Material 
Stimulus sentence set.  The experimental material comprised 54 sentence sets (18 
BDD-related, 18 social phobia-related, and 18 general sentence sets; see General 
Appendix B).  The general sentence sets were adapted from MacLeod and Cohen (1993).  
The social sentence sets were adapted from A. Hähnel who had already used these 
sentences in a previous study (personal communication, January 20, 2000).  BDD-related 
sentence sets were created by experienced clinicians.  All sentence sets were again rated 
by experienced clinicians, and we included only those sentences that represented the 
patients’ specific concerns. Each set consisted of an ambiguous first sentence (e.g., Bob 
was watching Susan from a distance.) that had one threatening meaning and one 
nonthreatening meaning.  Moreover, each sentence set contained two versions of a 
second sentence, each representing a plausible continuation of the first sentence (e.g., He 
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had never liked the way she looked [threatening continuation]; He had always liked the 
way she looked [nonthreatening continuation]).  Three different cue words were also 
included in each sentence set: one threat cue word (e.g., repulsion), one nonthreat cue 
word (e.g., attraction), and no cue (?????).  Finally, each sentence set contained a single 
question for which the answer was either yes or no.  Furthermore, each question was 
composed in a way that it could be answered regardless of the previous continuation 
sentence (threatening vs. nonthreatening continuation).  For example, Was Bob indifferent 
towards Susan? 
Experimental hardware.  A Macintosh Powercomputing Powerbase 180 computer 
presented the stimuli.  In addition, the computer measured the participants’ reading times 
-- that is, comprehension latencies -- (in milliseconds).  Three buttons were used.  
Participants pushed the space bar to advance to the next sentence and to the next trial.  
Two other buttons (on the left and right side of the space bar), labeled with Y for ‘Yes’ 
and N for ‘No’, were used by the participants to register their response to the questions.   
Experimental software.  We used the RSVP software (Williams & Tarr, 1998) 
which presented the participants with 54 experimental trials.  Each trial consisted of one 
stimulus sentence set, presented with black letters on a white background.  Participants 
read the following instructions: 
 
During this part of the study we will present 57 short scenarios to you.  
Each scenario consists of a headline followed by two sentences.  Based on 
the headline, we want you to form a clear anticipation of the passage topic.  
In some of the scenarios there won't be a headline. Instead, you will see a 
string of question marks.  In this case, we don't expect you to form any 
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anticipations.  After reading the headline and anticipating the upcoming 
scene, please press the long space bar on the computer keyboard.  After 
you press the space bar, you will see the first sentence of the scenario.  
Read this sentence carefully until you understand the meaning.  After you 
understand the meaning, press the space bar again.  Then the second 
sentence will appear on the computer screen in front of you.  
 
Again, read the sentence until you fully understand the meaning and press 
the space bar.  Read carefully but at normal speed. We don't want you to 
try to memorize each sentence.  After each pair of sentences there will be 
a simple question regarding the information you just read.  To answer the 
question, simply press one of the keys marked with either a 'Y' or an 'N'.  
'Y' stands for 'Yes, this is correct' and 'N' stands for 'No, this is not correct'.  
The computer will indicate a wrong answer with a warning tone. In 
addition, the computer will count your mistakes.  Please answer the 
questions as quickly and as accurately as possible.  We are interested in 
how the headline might affect your ability to answer these questions. 
 
We will practice this procedure now with two exercise scenarios.  Please 
report any difficulties or questions you have during the practice task to the 
experimenter.  Do you have any remaining questions?  If not, press the 
space bar of the keyboard and read the first practice scenario. 
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Before the actual experiment, participants completed three practice trials.  
Although they were told that the first two trials were for practice, the first three trials 
were not scored as experimental data.  To start a trial, the participants pressed the space 
bar for the first time.  Each trial began with the presentation of the cue (no cue, threat cue, 
or nonthreat cue) in the upper left corner of the computer screen.  The participants were 
then presented with the first (ambiguous) sentence.  After having read this sentence, they 
pressed the space bar again to see the second (continuation) sentence which was either a 
nonthreatening or a threatening continuation of the first sentence.  When the participants 
pressed the space bar for the third time, they were presented with a single question which 
they answered with either Yes or No.  
The dependent measure was the time between the second pressing of the space bar 
(which presented the continuation sentence) and the following button press that ended the 
display of the continuation sentence and replaced it with the question.  That is, the 
dependent measure was the comprehension latency for each continuation sentence. 
For each participant, one-third of the trials were presented in the no cue condition, 
one-third of the trials were presented in the threat cue and nonthreat cue condition, 
respectively.  In any of the cue conditions, half of the trials were presented in the threat 
continuation condition and half in the nonthreat continuation condition.  Each 
experimental condition was assigned to the 54 sentence sets in a fully balanced way.  
Consequently, across each group of participants, each sentence set was assigned an equal 
number of times to each experimental condition at the completion of testing. 
Psychometrics.  Participants completed the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; 
Beck & Steer, 1987), the Body Dysmorphic Disorder Modification of the Yale-Brown 
Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (BDD-YBOCS; Phillips et al., 1997; see General Appendix 
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A), the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE; Watson & Friend, 1969), and the verbal 
part of the Shipley Institute of Living Scale (Zachary, 1991).  Mean scores and standard 
deviations are presented in Table 1. 
 
4.3.3. Design  
 A 3 (Group: BDD, OCD, Healthy Control) X 3 (Scenario Type: BDD-related, 
Social anxiety-related, General) X 3 (Cue: Threat, Nonthreat, No Cue) X 2 (Continuation: 
Threat, Nonthreat) factorial design was used.  The first variable was measured between-
subjects, whereas the last variables were measured within-subjects. 
 
4.3.4. Procedure 
All participants were tested individually.  Upon arrival, participants read and 
signed a consent form prior to receiving a SCID interview.  Before the actual experiment, 
participants were told that the purpose of the study was to increase knowledge about 
cognitive processes, such as reading comprehension, in BDD.  Before the experimental 
trials, a short practice session was given.  Each trial consisted of a cue that was followed 
by an ambiguous sentence, followed by the continuation sentence and a single question.  
The participants were told to complete each trial at their individual pace.  Moreover, they 
were told that we were interested in how a cue word might affect their ability to answer 
the subsequent question.  However, we were mainly interested in the participants’ 
comprehension latencies rather in their ability to answer the questions.  After the 
completion of the experiment, the participants filled out the remaining questionnaires 
assessing BDD-symptoms, social anxiety, and depression.  Finally, participants were paid 
and debriefed about the purpose of the research. 
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4.4. Results 
4.4.1. Psychometric Data 
Mean scores for the questionnaires at the time of experimental testing are 
presented in Table 1.  It also indicates significant differences, as calculated by analyses of 
variance (ANOVAs) and follow-up Bonferroni-corrected t-tests.  
 
4.4.2. Comprehension Latencies 
The computer measured the comprehension latency, for each trial, by 
recording the time between the key press, which showed the second sentence, and the 
subsequent key press.  Therefore, this dependent variable measured how long it took 
for the participant to read and understand the disambiguating sentence.  The mean 
comprehension latencies are presented in Tables 2 and 3.  
We first examined the sensitivity of the paradigm by submitting the data to an 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with one between-subjects variable (BDD vs. OCD 
vs. Control) and three repeated measures variables.  The repeated measures variables 
were scenario type (BDD-related, Social anxiety-related, General), cue condition 
(Threat vs. Nonthreat vs. No cue) and continuation condition (Threat vs. Nonthreat 
Continuation).  We found, as expected, a significant Cue X Continuation interaction, 
F(2, 51)  = 11.30, p < .001.  Therefore, this manipulation check confirmed that the 
relative comprehension latencies across the two continuation conditions were 
influenced by the participants’ interpretations of the initial sentence.  For example, 
when participants saw the cue “ugly” followed by the sentence “When Nicole walked 
down the street, everybody was staring at her”, they were faster in pushing the button 
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when the continuation sentence was “She felt upset since she was disfigured”, 
compared to when the initial cue was nonthreatening such as “model”. 
Moreover, as expected, the analysis yielded main effects for Scenario type, 
F(2, 51)  = 20.60, p < .001, and for Continuation, F(1, 51)  = 19.37, p < .001, and a 
significant Scenario type by Continuation interaction, F(2, 51)  = 7.60, p < .002.  
However, the main effect for Group was nonsignificant, F(2, 51)  = 0.6, p = .55.  
Furthermore, the analysis yielded, as expected, neither a main effect for Cue, F(2, 51)  
= 0.97, p = .38, nor a Cue by Group interaction, F(4, 51)  = 0.33, p = .86, but a 
significant Cue by Scenario type interaction, F(4, 51)  = 3.47, p < .01.  However, our 
predicted four-way interaction, namely that the three groups would differ in their 
preferred interpretations of ambiguity depending on the scenario types, fell short of 
significance, F(8, 51)  = 1.69, p = .10.  All other effects were nonsignificant, ps > .05.   
Furthermore, we calculated, separately for each cue type, difference scores 
between the comprehension latencies for the threat continuation sentences and for the 
nonthreat continuation sentences by subtracting the threat continuations from the 
nonthreat ones (see Figures 1, 2, and 3).  For example, we subtracted the comprehension  
latencies for the threat continuation “She felt upset since she was disfigured” from the 
comprehension latencies for the nonthreat continuation “She was confident of her 
perfect body.”  Because we had specific hypotheses to test, we calculated one-tailed 
contrasts corresponding to each prediction1.  Focused contrasts are more powerful in 
testing specific predictions than unfocused ANOVAs (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991). 
Specifically, in those cases in which we expected to find a negative interpretive bias, 
we used contrast weights of +1 in the threat cue and no cue conditions, respectively, 
                                                          
1 Results of the contrasts analyses were also confirmed by two-tailed paired t tests.  
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and a contrast weight of –2 in the nonthreat cue condition.  In those cases in which we 
did not expect to find a negative interpretive bias, we used contrast weights of -1 in 
the nonthreat cue and no cue conditions, respectively, and a contrast weight of +2 in 
the threat cue condition.   
Based on the findings of the first interpretation study, we expected that BDD 
participants ought to impose a threatening interpretation on ambiguous stimuli, 
irrespective of scenario types (BDD-related, social, and general), whereas OCD 
participants should impose a threatening interpretation only on ambiguous stimuli for 
general scenarios.  That is, their comprehension latencies should be just as fast in the no 
cue condition (?????) as in the threat cue condition, and both should be faster than in the 
nonthreat cue condition2.  That is, BDD participants should exhibit faster comprehension 
latencies in the threat cue condition (e.g., ugly) than in the nonthreat cue condition (e.g., 
model), regardless of scenario type.  However, OCD participants should exhibit faster 
comprehension latencies in the threat cue condition than in the nonthreat cue condition, 
but only for general scenarios.  No biases for threat, of course, were expected in the 
control group.   
BDD scenarios.  As evident from Figure 1, and consistent with our hypothesis, the 
BDD group did not differ in their comprehension latencies for the threat cue and no cue 
conditions, t(17) = 1.27, p = .22, two-tailed, effect size r = .30, whereas their 
comprehension latencies for threat cue and no cue conditions combined were faster than 
for the nonthreat cue condition, t(17) = 2.19, p < .025, one-tailed, effect size r = .46.  In 
other words, consistent with our hypothesis, BDD participants imposed a threatening 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
2 The term “Comprehension latencies” used in this context refers to relative comprehension latencies (difference scores 
between comprehension latencies shown on threat continuations and on nonthreat continuations). 
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interpretation on the ambiguous sentence when its meaning was unconstrained (i.e., in the 
no cue condition).  OCD participants did not differ in their comprehension latencies for 
the nonthreat and no cue conditions, t(17) = .92, p = .37, two-tailed, effect size r = .21, 
whereas their comprehension latencies for nonthreat cue and no cue  conditions combined 
were slower than for the threat cue condition, t(17) = 1.83, p < .05, one-tailed, effect size 
r = .73.  That is, OCD participants imposed a nonthreatening interpretation on the 
ambiguous sentence when its meaning was unconstrained.  Inconsistent with our 
hypothesis, the control group showed significantly faster comprehension latencies for the 
nonthreat than for the no cue conditions, t(17) = 2.43, p = .03, two-tailed, effect size r = 
.51.  However, most importantly, their comprehension latencies for nonthreat cue and no 
cue conditions combined were slower than for the threat cue condition, t(17) = 4.03, p < 
.0005, one-tailed, effect size r = .70, suggesting that they selectively imposed the 
nonthreatening interpretations on the ambiguous sentences. 
Social scenarios.  As evident from Figure 2, the BDD group did not differ in their 
comprehension latencies for the threat cue and no cue conditions, t(17) = .96, two-tailed, 
p = .35, effect size r = .05.  Inconsistent with our hypothesis, their comprehension 
latencies for threat cue and no cue conditions combined were not slower than for the 
nonthreat cue condition, t(17) = 1.26, one-tailed, p > .10, effect size r = .37.  OCD 
participants, as expected, did not differ in their comprehension latencies for nonthreat and 
no cue conditions, t(17) = .42, two-tailed, p = .68, effect size r = .04, whereas their 
comprehension latencies for the nonthreat cue and no cue conditions combined, 
inconsistent with our hypothesis, were not slower than for the threat cue condition, t(17) 
= 1.33, p = .10, one-tailed, effect size r = .41.  However, the effect size suggests that this 
comparison fell short of significance due to a lack of power.  The control group showed, 
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inconsistent with our hypothesis, significant differences between the nonthreat cue and no 
cue condition t(17) = 2.27, p = .04, one-tailed, effect size r = .23.  However, their 
comprehension latencies for nonthreat cue and no cue conditions combined were slower 
than for the threat cue condition, t(17) = 1.76, one-tailed, p < .05, effect size r = .69, 
suggesting that controls selectively imposed the threatening interpretation on the 
ambiguous sentence, when its meaning was unconstrained (i.e., in the no cue condition).   
General scenarios.  As evident from Figure 3, the BDD group did not differ in 
their comprehension latencies for threat cue and no cue conditions, t(17) = .42, p = .68, 
two-tailed, effect size r = .04, whereas their comprehension latencies for threat cue and no 
cue conditions combined were not faster than for the nonthreat cue condition, t(17) = 
1.21, one-tailed, p > .10, effect size r = .34.  Therefore, inconsistent with our hypothesis, 
the BDD participants did not selectively impose the threatening interpretation on the 
ambiguous sentence, when its meaning was unconstrained.  The OCD participants, as we 
expected, did not differ in their comprehension latencies for threat cue and no cue 
conditions, t(17) = .03, p = .98, two-tailed, effect size r = .23, whereas their 
comprehension latencies for threat cue and no cue conditions combined were faster than 
for the nonthreat cue condition, t(17) = 2.20, p < .025, one-tailed, effect size r = .47.  
Therefore, as we expected, OCD participants imposed a threatening interpretation on the 
ambiguous sentence when its meaning was unconstrained.  The control participants, as 
we expected, did not differ in their comprehension latencies for the nonthreat cue and no 
cue conditions, t(17) = .24, p = .82, two-tailed, effect size r = .01, whereas their 
comprehension latencies for nonthreat cue and no cue conditions combined were slower 
than for the threat cue condition, t(17) = 1.94, one-tailed, p < .05, effect size r = .82, 
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suggesting that controls selectively imposed the nonthreatening interpretations on the 
ambiguous sentences. 
 
4.4.3. Comorbidity of Depression 
To estimate the effects of depression on interpretation in the BDD group, we 
conducted Mann Whitney U tests between the means of the comprehension latencies for 
BDD participants who met criteria for comorbid depression and those who were not 
depressed.  Moreover, to examine the magnitude of these effects, we computed effect 
sizes  r.  As evident from Tables 4 and 5, no significant differences were obtained 
between the groups. Effect sizes r also indicated that there are no differences between the 
groups. 
 
4.5. Discussion 
The aim of this study was to investigate interpretive biases for ambiguous 
information in BDD using a paradigm that controls for response biases.  Furthermore, 
we examined whether these biases are typical for BDD or whether they occur in OCD 
as well. 
In contrast to previous findings (Buhlmann, Wilhelm et al., 2002), the results of 
the current study suggest that BDD patients exhibit a negative interpretive bias only for 
BDD-related, but not for social and general scenarios.  Moreover, we found a different 
pattern in the control group, suggesting that the controls did not exhibit these biases for 
BDD-related and general scenarios.  Consistent with previous findings (Buhlmann, 
Wilhelm et al., 2002), OCD patients, unlike BDD patients and controls, tended to 
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interpret general ambiguous scenarios as threatening, whereas they did not exhibit a 
negative interpretive bias for BDD-related and social information.   
Moreover, in contrast to previous findings (Buhlmann, Wilhelm et al., 2002), 
controls exhibited a negative interpretive bias in ambiguous social situations.  This 
finding is inconsistent with previous findings showing that nonanxious individuals, in 
contrast to anxiety patients, tend to draw positive inferences when presented with an 
ambiguous situation (e.g., Constans, Penn, Ihen, & Hope, 1999).  It seems unclear 
whether positive interpretive biases in nonanxious individuals occur because of response 
biases, and to our knowledge the current study is the first study using a paradigm that 
controls for these biases.  What are possible explanations for this negative interpretive 
bias for ambiguous social situations in the control group? A possible explanation might 
be that the control group of this study was unrepresentative of most healthy participants.  
However, this seems unlikely because the results of the questionnaires indicate that 
controls were significantly less socially anxious than were the clinical groups.  Another 
possible explanation might be that a nonanxious individual, although initially imposing 
the more threatening meaning on an ambiguous social situation (e.g., The teacher is 
looking at me because I said something insufficient), might nevertheless not give so much 
importance to his or her interpretation, compared to clinical groups (e.g., She might have 
a bad day).   
The current study has several limitations.  First, due to problems with recruitment, 
we failed to include a social phobia control group to test for information-processing 
similarities among BDD, OCD and social phobia patients.  Second, unsurprisingly, seven 
out of 18 BDD patients had comorbid depression. Therefore, results in the BDD group 
might be partly due to comorbid depression.  However, since the BDD group only 
 
 
 78
revealed a negative interpretive bias for BDD-related scenarios and not for general 
scenarios - as one would expect in depressed patients - , it seems unlikely that the results 
would have been different if there had been no comorbidity with depression in the BDD 
group.  Additional analyses comparing the comprehension latency means for depressed 
and nondepressed BDD patients obtained no significant differences.  Moreover, low 
effect sizes further suggest no significant differences between the depressed and 
nondepressed BDD patients.  Third, 13 BDD participants and 13 OCD participants were 
currently receiving psychotropic medications. However, recent findings investigating the 
impact of psychotropic medication on neuropsychological performance in OCD suggest 
that medicated and unmedicated OCD patients performed equally on various cognitive 
domains such as attention, visuo-spatial skills, verbal and non-verbal memory, and 
executive functioning (Mataix-Cols, Alonso, Pifarre, Menchon, & Vallejo, 2002; Purcell, 
Maruff, Kyrios, & Pantelis, 1998; Savage et al., 2000). Thus, it seems unlikely that the 
results of the current study would have been different if we had only tested unmedicated 
patients.  It might even be that we had got even stronger results if we had tested an 
unmedicated clinical sample.  Fourth, it is possible that the sentences used in this study 
did not appropriately reflect the patients’ concerns and that this might have biased the 
results, especially because the results of this study are partly inconsistent with the results 
of our previous study (Buhlmann, Wilhelm, et al., 2002).  However, the sentences used in 
the current study had either been used in earlier studies (MacLeod & Cohen, 1993) or had 
been rated by experienced clinicians in terms of their appropriateness to reflect the 
patients’ concerns.  Fifth, unfortunately, we had a small sample size.  Hence, the results 
of this study are preliminary and must be interpreted with some caution.  Consequently, 
future research is needed to replicate our findings with larger sample sizes and to further 
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investigate why our control group in this study exhibited a negative interpretive bias for 
social situations.  
What are the clinical implications of this study?  BDD patients tend to interpret 
body-related ambiguous scenarios in a negative way, which might, in turn, confirm 
distorted beliefs about themselves and their body image.  The interpretation of a situation 
is directly related to the way a person feels about himself or herself.  For example, a BDD 
patient might interpret somebody looking in his or her direction in a negative way (e.g., 
“that person is staring at me because of my horrible nose”), whereas that person might 
have looked at the BDD sufferer for diverse reasons.  This negative interpretation would 
cause anxiety and shame.  However, the interpretation “that person is looking at me 
because she is interested in what I have to say” would cause neutral or positive emotions.  
That is, it is not the situation itself but a person’s interpretation of it that causes emotions 
such as anxiety and shame so often found in BDD.  Consequently, interpretive biases 
should be addressed in clinical settings.  
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4.6. Appendix 
Table 1 
Psychometric Data 
 
 
Variable 
 
BDD Group 
 
OCD Group 
 
Control Group 
 M SD M SD M SD 
       
BDD-YBOCS 
BDI 
26.4a 
17.2a 
7.2 
8.7 
6.2b 
9.6b 
7.7 
8.5 
3.8 b  
3.0c 
3.6 
3.6 
FNE 
Age 
Education 
49.5a 
30.5a 
16.4a 
7.8 
10.1 
2.8 
 43.3a 
 32.8a 
 16.7a 
 10.5 
 12.1 
2.1 
28.5b 
33.2a 
17.1a 
8.0 
11.1 
2.0 
Verbal IQ 
 
60.1a 6.2  60.1a 3.4 62.5a 4.2 
 
Notes. BDD-YBOCS = Body Dysmorphic Disorder Modification of the YBOCS; 
BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; FNE = Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale; Age in 
years; Education = years of education; Verbal IQ = Shipley Institute of Living Scale t-
scores.  Means sharing subscripts do not differ (p > .05, Bonferroni-corrected).
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Table 2 
Mean Comprehension Latency: Threat Consistent Continuation 
  
 BDD Group OCD Group Control Group 
Condition    M   SD    M   SD    M   SD 
BDD scenarios 
Threat cue 2335   718 2480   964 2452 1239 
Nonthreat cue 2487   928 2747   932 2269   918 
No cue 2212   661 2721 1071 2629   788 
Social scenarios 
Threat cue 2357   637 3075 1132 2334   835 
Nonthreat cue 2479   761 2750   839 2684   854 
No cue 2456   979 2705   920 2290   742 
General scenarios 
Threat cue 2621   732 2814   984 2568 1209 
Nonthreat cue 3056   876 3277 1032 3038 1072 
No cue 2851   996 2761 1105 2810   837 
 
Notes. Data are in milliseconds. 
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Table 3 
Mean Comprehension Latency: Nonthreat Consistent Continuation 
  
 BDD Group OCD Group Control Group 
Condition    M   SD    M   SD    M   SD 
BDD scenarios 
Threat cue 2884 1089 3031 1502 3262 1361 
Nonthreat cue 2515   640 2636   899 2558   973 
No cue 2845 1056 2929 1117 2474   980 
Social scenarios 
Threat cue 2706   878 2864 1036 2808   807 
Nonthreat cue 2467   850 2811   976 2518 1041 
No cue 2559   908 2897   928 2664   921 
General scenarios 
Threat cue 2609   967 3134 1254 3035   809 
Nonthreat cue 2651 1133 2977 1287 3010 1249 
No cue 2567   808 3074 1088 2733   692 
 
Notes. Data are in milliseconds. 
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Table 4 
Mean Comprehension Latency: Threat Consistent Continuation for Depressed versus 
Nondepressed BDD Participants 
  
 Depressed Group Nondepressed Group  
Condition    M   SD    M   SD   p   r 
 
BDD scenarios 
Threat cue 2407   849 2290   661   .86 .08 
Nonthreat cue 2416   698 2532 1079   .72 .06   
No cue 2187   650 2227   699 .99 .03 
Social scenarios 
Threat cue 2419   821 2317   531 .86 .07   
Nonthreat cue 2389   998   2537   614   .33 .09   
No cue 2411 1246   2484   833 .48 .03   
General scenarios 
Threat cue 2714   916   2562   630   .93 .10 
Nonthreat cue 2915   948   3147   862 .66 .13 
No cue 2741   912 2921 1083 .86 .09   
 
Notes. Data are in milliseconds; p = statistical significances were computed using Mann 
Whitney U tests; r = effect size correlation 
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Table 5 
Mean Comprehension Latency: Nonthreat Consistent Continuation for Depressed versus 
Nondepressed BDD Participants 
  
 Depressed Group Nondepressed Group  
Condition    M   SD    M   SD   p    r 
 
BDD scenarios 
Threat cue 2557   854   3093 1206   .38 .25 
Nonthreat cue 2436   696   2565   631 .66 .10 
No cue 2716 1131   2927 1053   .60 .10 
Social scenarios 
Threat cue 2676 1014   2726   831   .54 .03 
Nonthreat cue 2458   927 2472   845   .79 .01 
No cue 2499   951  2597   925   .79 .05 
General scenarios 
Threat cue 2692 1116 2557   913 .79 .07 
Nonthreat cue 2546   925   2718 1287 .93 .08 
No cue 2222   595   2786   872 .18 .35 
 
Notes. Data are in milliseconds; p = statistical significances were computed using Mann 
Whitney U tests; r = effect size correlation 
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Figure 1 
Relative Speeding on Threat Continuations across Cue Conditions for BDD Scenarios 
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Notes.  Relative speeding on threat continuations across cue conditions.  Higher values 
indicate a shorter latency for threat continuation sentences compared to nonthreat 
continuation sentences. 
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Figure 2 
Relative Speeding on Threat Continuations across Cue Conditions for Social Scenarios 
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Notes.  Relative speeding on threat continuations across cue conditions.  Higher values 
indicate a shorter latency for threat continuation sentences compared to nonthreat 
continuation sentences. 
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Figure 3 
Relative Speeding on Threat Continuations across Cue Conditions for General Scenarios 
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Notes.  Relative speeding on threat continuations across cue conditions.  Higher values 
indicate a shorter latency for threat continuation sentences compared to nonthreat 
continuation sentences. 
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5.1. Abstract 
Body dysmorphic disorder (BDD) is a syndrome characterized by distress about 
imagined defects in one's appearance and by a strong fear of negative evaluation (about 
one’s appearance). Moreover, many BDD sufferers are convinced that other people make 
fun of their imagined defect.  Given this fear of negative evaluation and the frequent 
presence of ideas of reference, BDD patients might be particularly sensitive to facial 
emotional expressions.  Therefore, the ability to recognize these facial expressions may 
play a role in the maintenance or etiology of BDD.  The purpose of the current study was 
to examine whether BDD patients, compared to OCD patients and healthy controls, tend 
to misinterpret neutral and other emotional expressions as angry.  Participants were 
presented with facial photographs, one at a time, and were asked to identify the 
corresponding emotion.  Findings suggest that BDD patients, in contrast to the other 
groups, indeed misclassify other emotional expressions as angry.  This might partly 
explain the poor insight and ideas of reference often found in BDD patients.  
Furthermore, this might confirm distorted beliefs about themselves and their body image. 
 
 
 91
5.2. Introduction  
Body Dysmorphic Disorder (BDD) is marked by debilitating distress about 
imagined defects in one’s appearance (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 1994).  
Most individuals with BDD are preoccupied about imagined flaws in their skin, hair, 
nose, ears, etc.  Moreover, BDD is characterized by self-criticism, low self-esteem and 
depression, repetitive behaviors (e.g., mirror checking, excessive grooming or 
reassurance seeking), and avoidance of social situation (Hollander, Cohen, & Simeon, 
1993; Phillips, McElroy, Keck, Pope, & Hudson, 1993). It causes significant distress and 
impairment in functioning including hospitalization and being housebound for years (e.g., 
Phillips et al., 1993).   
Previous research has shown that selective processing of threat might play an 
important role in the etiology or maintenance of emotional disorders (for a review, see 
Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997).  One cognitive bias is that anxious 
individuals tend to interpret ambiguous situations as threatening (e.g., Butler & Mathews, 
1983).  For example, previous research has shown that BDD patients, compared to OCD 
patients and healthy controls, interpret ambiguous BDD-related situations as threatening 
(e.g., Buhlmann, Wilhelm, et al., 2002) which might lead to increased anxiety in 
ambiguous situations, and BDD patients might, as a result, avoid these situations.  
However, most researchers investigating information-processing biases for 
negative information used words as stimuli, and there is scant research investigating “real 
life” stimuli such as faces.  However, the advantage of using more ecologically valid 
stimuli to investigate information-processing abnormalities has been discussed (e.g., 
Lundh & Öst, 1996).   
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Studying recognition memory for faces in social phobia, Lundh and Öst (1996), 
for example, argued that facial stimuli may be very relevant for social phobic patients 
because the patients are especially afraid of negative evaluations by others.  That is, facial 
expressions are an important means to express negative or positive evaluations, and 
information-processing biases for these expressions may be a key factor in the 
maintenance or even etiology of psychological disorders that are characterized by a 
strong fear of negative evaluations. In their experiment, Lundh and Öst (1996) presented 
social phobic patients and controls with faces varying in their emotional valence (positive 
or negative). They found that social phobics, when presented with critical and accepting 
faces, recognized significantly more of the former than of the latter in a subsequent 
memory task for these faces.  Consequently, enhanced recognition memory for critical 
faces may contribute to anxiety, especially to fear of negative evaluation. However, it is 
unclear whether the results of Lundh and Öst’s study were caused by a response bias or 
by a memory bias for critical faces.   
To further address this issue, Foa and colleagues also studied the ability to 
recognize facial expressions in social phobia (Foa, Gilboa-Schechtman, Amir, & 
Freshman, 2000). They found that social phobics are better at recognizing negative 
emotions (e.g., anger, disgust), compared to non-negative emotions (e.g., neutral, happy) 
and compared  to nonanxious controls.  To examine whether the enhanced memory of 
social phobics for negative expressions was a result of a response bias, Foa et al. (2000) 
submitted the data to a signal detection analysis and found that the enhanced recognition 
of negative expressions was caused by a memory bias rather than by a response bias. 
Researchers also started to investigate the ability to recognize facial expressions 
in individuals with psychological disorders.  So far, these phenomena have been mostly 
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studied in schizophrenia (e.g., Addington & Addington, 1998; Mueser et al., 1996; Kerr 
& Neale, 1993).  Kerr and Neale (1993), for example, presented schizophrenic patients 
and healthy controls with faces varying in emotional expressions and found that 
schizophrenics, in contrast to controls, exhibited a generalized performance deficit to 
recognize emotions.   
Studying the relation between emotion recognition and social competence in 
schizophrenia, Mueser and colleagues also found that schizophrenic patients, unlike 
controls, exhibited a generalized deficit to recognize emotional expressions (Mueser et 
al., 1996).  Moreover, they found that the ability to recognize emotions was related to 
social competence and concluded that deficits in emotion recognition might affect the 
ability to behave in social situations in an appropriate way. Further support for the 
hypothesis that schizophrenic patients exhibit a generalized emotion recognition deficit 
was found by Addington and Addington (1998) and Salem, Kring, and Kerr (1996).  
Investigating recognition of facial expressions in mania, Lembke and Ketter 
(2002) found that manic patients, in contrast to euthymic patients with bipolar I or bipolar 
II and to controls, showed worse overall recognition of facial expressions, especially of 
fear and disgust.  The authors concluded that impaired perception of facial expressions 
may contribute to behaviors associated with mania such as inappropriate approach when 
withdrawal would be more adaptive.   
Given the strong fear of negative evaluation and the frequent presence of ideas of 
reference, individuals with BDD, like social phobics and delusional patients, might be 
particularly sensitive to facial expressions.  For example, they might interpret a person’s 
facial expression as negative although that person might have a neutral facial expression 
instead.  Therefore, the ability to recognize facial expressions may play a role in the 
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maintenance or even etiology of disorders that are characterized by a strong fear of 
negative evaluations such as social phobia and BDD.  For example, studying recognition 
of facial expressions in children with social phobia, Simonian and colleagues found that 
clinically socially anxious children had significantly poorer facial expression recognition 
skills than had children with no psychiatric disorder (Simonian, Beidel, Turner, Berkes, 
& Long, 2001). Especially, socially anxious children performed poorer when presented 
with happy, sad, and disgusted facial expressions.  However, Simonian et al. (2001) 
failed to report the emotions to which the socially anxious children incorrectly 
misclassified the happy, sad, and disgusted facial expressions.  
Taken together, information-processing biases for threatening facial expressions 
might play an important role why clinically anxious patients, especially those with an 
excessive fear of negative evaluation such as social phobics and BDD patients, develop 
or maintain these fears and consequently tend to avoid social situations. 
 
5.3. Method 
5.3.1. Participants 
The BDD group comprised 20 outpatients (7 men) who met DSM-IV (APA, 
1994) criteria for BDD, as determined by structured clinical interviews (SCID; First, 
Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1995).  BDD patients had the following comorbid 
diagnoses: major depression (n = 9), agoraphobia without panic disorder (n = 1), specific 
phobia (n = 1), trichotillomania (n = 1), kleptomania (n = 1), and social phobia (n = 3). 
Seven BDD participants were unmedicated at the time of testing.  The remaining 13 
participants were currently on the following psychotropic medications: fluoxetine (n = 7), 
fluvoxamine (n = 2), paroxetine (n = 2), clomipramine (n = 1), and sertraline (n = 1).  
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Fourteen BDD participants were unmarried (70%),  1 BDD participant was married (5%), 
1 BDD participant was separated (5%), and 4 BDD participants were divorced at the time 
of testing (20%).  
The OCD group comprised 20 outpatients (8 men) who met DSM-IV (APA, 
1994) criteria for OCD as determined by the SCID (First et al., 1995).  OCD patients had 
the following comorbid diagnoses: major depression (n = 2), alcohol abuse (n = 1), panic 
disorder without agoraphobia (n = 1), and chronic motor tic (n = 1). Nine OCD 
participants were unmedicated at the time of testing.  The remaining 11 participants were 
currently on the following psychotropic medications: fluoxetine (n = 4), paroxetine (n = 
3), sertraline (n = 3), and fluvoxamine (n = 1).  Fourteen OCD participants were 
unmarried (70%), 4 OCD participants were married (20%), 1 OCD participant was 
separated (5%), and 1 OCD participant was divorced at the time of testing (5%).  
The control group consisted of 20 participants (7 men).  SCID interviews 
confirmed the absence of any psychiatric history.  Fourteen control participants were 
unmarried (70%), and 6 control participants were married at the time of testing (30%). 
As evident from Table 1, the control group did not differ from the BDD group and 
OCD group with respect to age, F(2, 59) = .17, p = .85, education, F(2, 59) = .08, p = .92, 
verbal IQ, F(2, 59) = 1.96, p = .15, and gender, χ² (2, 0.95) = .14, p = .93.  All 
participants were native English speakers.  
 
5.3.2. Material 
General Facial Recognition Stimuli.  To determine whether impairments in 
recognition of facial emotions were caused by emotion recognition impairment rather 
than general deficits in facial feature processing, we included the Benton Facial 
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Recognition Test (BFRT; Benton, Hamsher, Varney, & Spreen, 1983). It is a 
neuropsychological test that measures visualspatial processes.  Specifically, the test 
required matching a target face with up to three pictures of the same person in a six-
stimuli array of faces.  Thirteen faces were presented in black and white; none was 
expressing emotion.  For the first six items, only one face matched the target face.  For 
the last seven items, three faces matched the target face.  Scores could range from 0 to 27 
correct responses. 
Emotional Expression Stimuli. The experimental material comprised 42 
photographs showing facial expressions. Each photograph showed one of the six basic 
emotions or no emotion (neutral condition). The photographs were drawn from the 
Ekman and Friesen (1975, 1976) series. Each emotion was presented by 6 different 
models (3 females and 3 males), and each condition (angry, disgusted, happy, neutral, 
sad, scared, surprised) was presented 6 times. For each photograph, participants circled 
on an answer sheet the corresponding expression (angry, disgusted, happy, neutral, sad, 
scared, surprised).  The total score could range from 0 to 42, whereas for each emotion 
subcategory, the score could range from 0 to 6.  One set of photographs including each 
emotional expression and the neutral expression was used as a practice trial.  
Psychometrics.  Participants completed the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; 
Beck & Steer, 1987), the Body Dysmorphic Disorder Modification of the Yale-Brown 
Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (BDD-YBOCS; Phillips et al., 1997; see General Appendix 
A), the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE; Watson & Friend, 1969), and the verbal 
part of the Shipley Institute of Living Scale (Zachary, 1991).  Mean scores and standard 
deviations are presented in Table 1. 
 
 
 97
5.3.3. Design 
A 3 (Group: BDD, OCD, Healthy Control) X 7 (Emotion: angry, disgusted, 
happy, neutral, sad, scared, surprised) factorial design was used. The first variable was 
measured between-subjects, whereas the second variable was measured within subjects. 
 
5.3.4. Procedure 
All participants were tested individually.  Upon arrival, participants read and 
signed a consent form prior to receiving a SCID interview.  Before the experimental 
trials, a short practice session was given. During the practice trial, participants were 
presented with seven photographs varying in the emotional expression, one at a time. 
During the experimental phase, participants were presented with 42 photographs, one at a 
time. Each photograph was presented for 15 seconds.  Participants were asked to circle on 
an answer sheet for each photograph the corresponding expression (angry, disgusted, 
happy, neutral, sad, scared, surprised). The experimenter presented the photographs in 
random order to the participant.  Participants in the BDD group received the photographs 
in different random orders, and participants in the OCD and control group were yoked to 
the BDD participants.  Prior to the practice trial, participants received the following 
instructions: 
 
This experiment requires the rating of facial expressions. You will be 
presented with different faces, one at a time. Each face will be presented 
for 15 seconds. Your task is to rate each face in terms of its emotional 
expression. Before the actual experiment, there will be a practice trial. If 
you have any questions, please ask the experimenter. 
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After the emotional recognition task was finished, participants completed the 
BFRT.  Afterwards, the participants filled out the remaining inventories assessing BDD-
symptoms, social anxiety, depression, and verbal IQ.  Finally, participants were paid and 
debriefed about the purpose of the research. 
 
5.4. Results 
5.4.1. Psychometric data 
Mean scores for the questionnaires at the time of experimental testing are 
presented in Table 1.  It also indicates significant differences, as calculated by analyses of 
variance (ANOVAs) and follow-up Bonferroni-corrected t-tests.  
 
5.4.2. Benton Facial Recognition Test 
To exclude the possibility that neuropsychological deficits in facial feature 
processing caused impairment in facial expression recognition, we analyzed whether the 
groups differed in their overall test performance of the Benton Facial Recognition Test.  
As evident from Table 2, there was no difference among the groups, F (2, 59) = .14, p = 
.87. 
 
5.4.3. Facial Expression Ratings 
To investigate group differences in the ability of identifying emotional 
expressions correctly, we submitted the data to oneway ANOVAs and follow-up 
Bonferroni-corrected t-tests.  First, we analyzed whether the groups differed in their 
overall test performance across all facial expression categories; that is, how well they did 
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in identifying facial expressions in general.  As evident from Table 3, we found a 
significant group difference, F (2, 59) = 4.70, p = .01.  Follow-up comparisons indicated 
that BDD participants, compared to controls, performed significantly worse in identifying 
facial expressions correctly, p = .01, effect size r = .43.  There were no significant 
differences between OCD participants and controls, p = .31, effect size r = .20, and 
between BDD participants and OCD participants, p = .49, effect size r = .20.   
Neutral facial expressions. As evident from Table 3, there was a significant 
difference in correctly identifying neutral emotional expressions, F(2, 59) = 5.29, p = 
.008.  Follow-up comparisons indicated that BDD participants correctly identified 
significantly fewer neutral expressions than did controls, p = .006, effect size r = .47.  
However, there was no difference between BDD and OCD participants, p = .40, effect 
size r = .21, and between OCD participants and controls, p = .27, effect size r = .29.  To 
further investigate these errors, we analyzed separately how many neutral expressions 
were misinterpreted as angry, disgusted, happy, sad, surprised, or scared. Oneway 
ANOVAs indicated the following differences: The groups differed significantly in 
misinterpreting neutral expressions as surprised ones, F(2, 60) = 3.35, p = .04.  
Specifically, we found a trend that BDD participants, compared to controls, 
misinterpreted more neutral expressions as surprised ones, p = .09, effect size r = .28.  
Moreover, we found a trend that BDD participants, compared to OCD participants, 
misinterpreted more expressions as surprised, p = .09, effect size r = .28.  We did not find 
a difference between OCD patients and controls, p > .99.  The groups marginally differed 
in misinterpreting neutral expressions as sad ones, F(2, 60) = 3.18, p = .05.  We found a 
trend that BDD participants, compared to controls, misinterpreted more neutral 
expressions as sad ones, p = .07, effect size r = .37.  There was no difference between 
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BDD and OCD participants, p = .17, effect size r = .35, and between OCD participants 
and controls, p > .99.  Oneway ANOVAs revealed no overall differences between the 
groups for neutral expressions that were misinterpreted as angry, disgusted, happy, and 
scared expressions, ps > .05. 
Disgusted facial expressions. As evident from Table 3, a significant group 
difference was obtained for disgusted expressions, F(2, 59) = 4.46, p = .02.  Follow-up 
comparisons indicated that BDD participants correctly classified significantly fewer 
disgusted expressions than did controls, p = .01, effect size r = .41.  However, there was 
no significant difference between BDD and OCD participants, p = .27, effect size r = .23. 
Furthermore, no difference was found between OCD participants and controls, p = .65, 
effect size r = .25. To further analyze to which emotional expressions the disgusted 
expression was incorrectly categorized, we analyzed the incorrect answers separately for 
each category.  That is, we analyzed separately how many disgusted expressions were 
misinterpreted as angry, happy, neutral, sad, surprised, or scared expressions. Oneway 
ANOVAs indicated the following differences: The groups only differed significantly in 
misinterpreting disgusted expressions as angry ones, F(2, 60) = 4.67, p = .013. Follow-up 
comparisons indicated that BDD participants misinterpreted significantly more disgusted 
expressions as angry as did controls, p = .01, effect size r = .43.  No differences were 
found between BDD and OCD participants, p = .29, effect size r = .23, and between OCD 
participants and controls, p = .54, effect size r = .25.  No differences were found between 
the groups in classifying disgusted expressions as happy, neutral, sad, scared, and 
surprised expressions, ps > .05. 
Angry, happy, sad, scared, and surprised facial expressions.  Oneway ANOVAs 
indicated no overall differences between the groups, ps > .05. 
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5.4.4. Overall Facial Recognition Biases 
To further investigate overall recognition biases, we calculated the number of 
mistakes across the categories separately for each facial expression.  For example, we 
calculated how many photographs the participants incorrectly classified as angry.  We 
found a significant group difference with respect to misinterpreting facial expressions as 
angry, F(2, 58) = 6.4, p = .003. Follow-up comparisons indicated that BDD participants 
misinterpreted significantly more faces as angry as did controls, p = .002, effect size r = 
.49 (see Table 3).  Neither the difference between BDD and OCD participants reached 
statistical significance, p = .10, effect size r = .30, nor did the difference between OCD 
participants and controls, p = .52, effect size r = .24.  No further group differences in a 
general tendency to misinterpret facial expressions as disgusted, happy, neutral, sad, 
scared, and surprised were found, ps > .05. 
 
5.4.5. Comorbidity of Depression 
To estimate the effects of depression on facial recognition, we conducted Mann 
Whitney U Tests between the BDD participants who met criteria for comorbid depression 
and those who were not depressed (see Table 4).  Moreover, we computed effect sizes r.  
There was a significant difference between the groups with respect to surprised faces, p = 
.001, showing that nondepressed BDD participants were better in identifying surprised 
expressions than were depressed BDD participants.  However, no further differences 
between the groups with respect to the other face categories were obtained.  As evident 
from Table 4, the low effect sizes further indicate that there are no differences between 
depressed and nondepressed BDD participants.  In sum, it seems unlikely that depression 
had an significant influence on the data, with the exception of surprised faces. 
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5.5. Discussion 
Information-processing biases for threatening facial expressions might play an 
important role why clinically anxious patients, especially those with an excessive fear of 
negative evaluation such as BDD patients, develop or maintain these fears and 
consequently tend to avoid social situations.  That is, given the strong fear of negative 
evaluation and the frequent presence of ideas of reference, individuals with BDD might 
be particularly sensitive to facial expressions.  The purpose of this study was to 
investigate facial recognition ability in BDD patients.  We further intended to explore 
whether these facial recognition characteristics were typical for BDD or could also be 
found in other psychiatric disorders such as OCD.  Based on clinical observations, we 
hypothesized that BDD patients exhibit an interpretive bias for angry facial expressions. 
First, to determine whether difficulties in identifying emotional expressions were 
not caused by neuropsychological deficits rather than interpretive biases, we applied the 
BFRT (Benton et al., 1983) in which participants were presented with general faces not 
displaying an emotion.  We found no difference among the groups indicating that 
differences in identifying emotional expressions are caused by interpretive biases rather 
than general neuropsychological deficits.  
Moreover, we found that, overall, BDD participants performed worst in 
identifying emotional expressions, compared to the other groups. Specifically, the 
analyses revealed that they correctly identified significantly fewer facial expressions than 
did controls.  However, there was no significant difference between BDD and OCD 
patients and between OCD patients and controls, suggesting that BDD patients had the 
most difficulties decoding emotional expressions, followed by OCD patients who did not 
differ in their decoding abilities from controls. 
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Moreover, BDD patients exhibit an interpretive bias for angry expressions, 
whereas we did not find this bias in the OCD patients and controls.  Although BDD 
patients were as accurate as the other groups in correctly identifying angry facial 
expressions, they misinterpreted, overall, significantly more other facial expressions as 
angry than did OCD patients and controls, whereas there was no difference between OCD 
patients and controls.  Although the difference between BDD patients and OCD patients 
fell short of significance, effect size r indicated that this difference might have become 
significant if we had tested more participants.  
Furthermore, BDD patients were worse in identifying disgusted expressions, 
compared to controls.  OCD patients did not differ from controls in their ability to 
identify disgusted expressions, nor did they differ from BDD patients.  This finding is 
inconsistent with previous findings (Sprengelmeyer et al., 1997) that found an impaired 
ability in decoding disgusted expressions in OCD patients.  
Our BDD patients were not better in identifying angry expressions, compared to 
the other groups.  Specifically, when presented with disgusted expressions, BDD patients 
misinterpreted significantly more disgusted expressions as angry, whereas there was no 
difference between OCD patients and controls.  However, the difference between BDD 
patients and OCD patients was also nonsignificant.  Moreover, when presented with 
neutral expressions, BDD patients misinterpreted more facial expressions than did 
controls, whereas there was no difference between BDD patients and OCD patients, and 
between OCD patients and controls.  Follow-up comparisons revealed that there was a 
trend that BDD patients misinterpreted more neutral expressions as surprised than did 
OCD patients and controls.  Again, there was no difference between OCD patients and 
controls.  When presented with sad expressions, we found a trend that BDD patients 
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misinterpreted more neutral expressions as sad than did controls.  Effect size r further 
indicated that this difference might have become significant if we had tested more BDD 
participants.  Moreover, we did not find such a difference between OCD patients and 
controls, and between BDD patients and OCD patients.  
The present study has several limitations.  We failed to include a social phobia 
control group to test for facial recognition impairments among BDD, OCD and social 
phobia patients.  Moreover, as in most studies (e.g., Phillips, McElroy, Hudson, & Pope, 
1995), depression was a common comorbid diagnosis in our BDD patients, and thus 
might have affected the results.  However, follow up analyses including effect sizes 
indicated that it seems unlikely that comorbid depression had an significant influence on 
the overall results, except for surprised emotional expressions in which depressed BDD 
patients performed significantly worse than nondepressed BDD patients.  Specifically, 
depressed BDD patients misinterpreted neutral expressions more often as surprised than 
did nondepressed BDD patients.  However, future research is needed to address the 
influence of depression on facial recognition.  Furthermore, 13 BDD participants and 11 
OCD participants were medicated at the time of testing which might have influenced 
their test performance on general facial recognition and recognition of emotional 
expression. However, recent studies found no difference in neuropsychological 
performance in medicated and unmedicated OCD patients (Mataix-Cols, Alonso, Pifarre, 
Menchon, & Vallejo, 2002; Purcell, Maruff, Kyrios, & Pantelis, 1998; Savage et al., 
2000).  Therefore, it seems unlikely that the results of the current study would have been 
different if we had only tested unmedicated patients.  
Overall, BDD patients have more difficulties interpreting facial expressions 
than OCD patients and controls.  Although BDD patients are as good as OCD patients 
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and controls in identifying angry expressions, they misinterpret, in contrast to these 
groups, other facial expressions as angry.  Therefore, poor insight and ideas of 
reference that are common found in BDD might be partly explained by this 
interpretive bias for angry facial expressions.  That is, even if other people such as 
friends reassure them of the nonexistence of their imagined flaw, they might still be 
convinced of it because of their misinterpretation of other people’s facial expressions, 
which the BDD sufferer might interpret as a negative reaction to their unattractive 
appearance.  As a result, this might confirm distorted beliefs about themselves and 
their body image.   
Social situations are usually somewhat ambiguous. One can never be certain 
what the other person thinks.  Consequently, the way an individual interprets a 
situation is very important and is directly linked to the individual’s feelings.  For 
example, a BDD patient who misinterprets a neutral emotional expression of 
somebody in a negative way (e.g., “that person is angry with me” or “that person must 
have seen my flaw because he looks so surprised”) might consequently feel 
emotionally vulnerable, anxious or negatively evaluated.  However, an individual who 
does not misinterpret a neutral expression in a negative way would not have these 
negative emotions.  Furthermore, these findings are consistent with the findings of 
previous findings (e.g., Buhlmann, Wilhelm et al., 2002) that BDD patients interpret 
ambiguous situations in a negative way.  Therefore, negative interpretive biases and 
misinterpretations of facial expressions might be key factors in the maintenance or 
even etiology of BDD because they might contribute to the development of associated 
features in BDD such as a strong fear of negative evaluation, emotional vulnerability, 
or ideas of reference. 
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5.6. Appendix 
Table 1 
Psychometric Data 
 
 
Variable 
 
BDD Group 
 
OCD Group 
 
Control Group 
  M  SD  M  SD M  SD 
       
BDD-YBOCS 
BDI 
25.8a 
17.1a   
  7.5 
  8.5 
  5.5b 
  9.5b  
  7.1 
  7.8 
3.3b  
2.0c 
  2.7 
  1.9 
FNE 
Age 
Education 
49.4a   
32.7a  
16.4a   
  7.7 
11.3 
  2.7 
43.4a  
31.0a  
16.6a  
  9.4 
10.5 
  2.0 
28.3b 
32.9a 
16.6a  
  6.8 
11.7 
  2.1 
Verbal IQ 
 
59.3a     6.3 60.2a   3.0 62.1a    4.1 
 
Notes. BDD-YBOCS = Body Dysmorphic Disorder Modification of the YBOCS; BDI = 
Beck Depression Inventory; FNE = Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale; Age in years; 
Education = years of education; Verbal IQ = Shipley Institute of Living Scale t-scores.  
Means sharing subscripts do not differ (p > .05, Bonferroni-corrected). 
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Table 2 
General Facial Recognition  
 
 
Variable 
 
BDD Group 
 
OCD Group 
 
Control Group 
 M SD M SD M SD 
       
BFRT 
 
23.7a 2.5 
 
23.5a 
 
2.2 
 
23.3a 
 
2.7 
 
 
Notes. BRFT = Benton Facial Recognition Test.  Means sharing subscripts do not differ 
(p > .05, Bonferroni-corrected). 
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Table 3 
Mean Performance of Facial Expression Recognition  
 
Category BDD Group 
    M                 SD 
OCD Group 
    M                SD 
Control Group 
     M              SD 
 
total score    35.4a 3.2 36.6ab 2.6 38.0b 2.2 
angry 5.6a  .6 5.4a .6   5.5a  .7 
disgusted 4.8a 1.4  5.3ab .9   5.7b  .6 
happy 6.0a   .2 6.0a .22   6.0a  .0 
neutral 4.8a 1.0  5.2ab .7   5.7b  .5 
sad 4.5a 1.2 4.2a 1.1   4.4a 1.4 
scared 4.6a 1.5 5.1a 1.0   5.2a  .9 
surprised 5.2a 1.1 5.5a  .9   5.6a  .7 
bias for angry faces   2.7a* 1.7   1.7ab* 1.3   1.1b 1.1 
 
Notes. Means sharing subscripts do not differ (p > .05, Bonferroni-corrected); angry = 
angry facial expressions; disgusted = disgusted facial expressions; happy = happy facial 
expressions; neutral = neutral facial expressions; sad = sad facial expressions; scared = 
scared facial expressions; surprised = surprised facial expressions; bias for angry faces = 
facial expressions misinterpreted as angry across all emotion categories; * = difference 
between the two groups fell short of statistical significance 
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Table 4 
Effects of Depression on Facial Recognition in the BDD Group 
 
 
Category 
 
Depressed Group 
 
Nondepressed Group 
 M SD M SD  p  r 
 
total score 
angry 
disgusted 
 
34.9 
  5.6 
  5.3 
 
2.3 
0.7 
0.5 
 
35.7 
  5.6 
  4.3 
 
3.8 
0.5 
1.7 
 
.33 
.99 
 
.10 
 
.13 
.00 
 
.37 
happy   6.0 0.0   5.9 0.3 .77 .23 
neutral 
sad 
scared 
surprised 
bias for angry faces 
  4.9 
  4.1 
  4.6 
  4.4 
  2.2 
1.1 
1.3 
1.8 
1.1 
0.7 
  4.7 
  4.8 
  4.6 
  5.7 
  3.0 
1.0 
1.2 
1.4 
0.7 
2.1 
.71 
 
.23 
 
.88 
 
.01 
 
.66 
.09 
.22 
.00 
.58 
.25 
 
Notes. r = effect size correlation; angry = angry facial expressions; disgusted = disgusted 
facial expressions; happy = happy facial expressions; neutral = neutral facial expressions; 
sad = sad facial expressions; scared = scared facial expressions; surprised = surprised 
facial expressions; bias for angry faces = facial expressions misinterpreted as angry 
across all emotion categories. 
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6. General Discussion  
In the current studies, I investigated BDD from a cognitive perspective. 
Specifically, I examined interpretation of verbal stimuli and real-life stimuli such as facial 
expressions.  In the first study, using an Interpretation Questionnaire, I found that BDD 
patients, compared to OCD patients and controls, exhibit a negative interpretive bias not 
only for BDD-related information, but also for social anxiety-related and for general 
information. OCD patients, however, only revealed a negative interpretive bias for 
general information, whereas controls, as expected, did not exhibit any negative 
interpretive bias at all.  Interestingly, further analyses indicated that BDD patients rated 
the likelihood of nonthreatening interpretations as high as they rated the likelihood of 
threatening interpretations.  In other words, it might be that BDD patients, although rating 
the likelihood of a threatening interpretation significantly higher than OCD patients and 
controls, are nevertheless more open for diverse kind of interpretations (e.g., I think she is 
judging the way I look, but maybe she just happens to look in my direction? But isn’t she 
judging the way I look?), whereas healthy individuals might be characterized by an 
interpretive bias for nonthreatening information (e.g., That person definitely just happens 
to look in my direction). 
However, it remains unclear whether the results of the first study were influenced 
by response biases (e.g., experimenter demand effect).  Therefore, in the second study, I 
used a paradigm which controls for these response biases.  I found that, inconsistent with 
the findings of the first study, BDD patients, compared to OCD patients and controls, 
only revealed a negative bias for BDD-related information, whereas OCD patients, 
consistent with the findings of the first study, exhibited a negative bias for general 
information.  However, inconsistent with previous findings, controls revealed a negative 
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bias for social information.  Thus, it might be that healthy individuals, although imposing 
the more threatening meaning on an ambiguous social situation, might nevertheless not 
give so much importance to his or her interpretation, compared to clinical groups.  
Because the results of the first two interpretation studies are only partly consistent, it 
seems reasonable that studies on interpretation using self-report measures might indeed 
be influenced by response biases.  However, the results of these studies must be 
interpreted cautiously because of small sample sizes.  Thus, future research is needed to 
replicate these findings with bigger sample sizes.  Moreover, future studies are needed to 
investigate interpretive biases in BDD, OCD, and social phobia.   
In the third study, I used real-life stimuli such as facial expressions to test for 
interpretive biases. Specifically, I investigated facial recognition and interpretive biases 
for emotional facial expressions in BDD and OCD.  As expected, I found that BDD 
patients, unlike the other groups, misinterpreted facial expressions as angry.  
Furthermore, BDD patients performed significantly worse in decoding disgusted 
and neutral expressions, whereas OCD patients and controls did not exhibit these deficits. 
Consequently, BDD patients might have difficulties interpreting the intentions or feelings 
of other people in a social situation, which, in turn, might lead to increased social anxiety. 
Although research has shown that individuals with psychological disorders are 
characterized by selective processing of threat, the crucial question remains whether there 
is a causal relation between these cognitive biases and the development of psychological 
disorders. If the answer is ‚yes’, it would be essential that clinical psychologists and 
psychiatrists focus more on selective processing of threat shown by their patients. This 
might include the development of more objective assessment procedures such as 
information-processing paradigms instead of self-report measures.  For example, 
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researchers could use information-processing paradigms in addition to self-report 
measures prior to a treatment trial and after the completion of the treatment.  
Several studies on selective attention have already shown that selective processing 
indices represent a sensitive measure of clinical change in therapeutic interventions.  
Mogg and colleagues, for example, found that recovered GAD patients did not show 
selective attention to threat, compared to patients currently diagnosed with GAD (Mogg, 
Mathews, & Eysenck, 1992).  Many other studies also found that selective attention to 
threat declines with treatment (e.g., Foa & McNally, 1986). However, the strongest 
evidence was provided by Mattia et al. (1993) who did not only demonstrate reduced 
threat interference with treatment but also showed that the magnitude of this reduction 
was related to the efficacy of the treatment.  In other words, only those social phobics 
who had responded well to treatment showed reduced threat interference effects.   
So far, less research has examined whether negative interpretation indices might 
be a sensitive measure of clinical change. However, interpretive biases might be 
especially important in understanding the maintenance or maybe even etiology of 
psychological disorders because they might be a contributing cause of anxiety.  For 
example, ambiguous events or social situations that could be perceived as threatening are 
quite common in everyday life. However, if a situation’s interpretation is stored in 
memory as if it was a real event, then a negative interpretive bias could have the same 
consequence as frequent encounters with real threats, which could, in turn, lead to 
increased anxiety (Mathews, 1990). A BDD patient, for example, might interpret 
somebody whispering or laughing behind him in a threatening way („That person is 
making fun of my ugly nose“) and consequently store this event in memory as if one 
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could be certain that the person spoke about the BDD sufferer’s nose in a negative way.  
However, that person might have whispered or laughed for other reasons.   
Thus, negative interpretive biases may be a high risk factor for the development 
or maintenance of psychological disorders.  Consequently, if negative interpretive biases 
might contribute to anxiety, the crucial question is whether they can be modified or 
changed.  Clinical observations with anxious or depressed patients already suggest that 
modifications of these biases are possible.  For example, automatic thoughts and beliefs 
that are directly addressed in cognitive-behavioral therapy often resemble the products of 
negative interpretive biases.  In other words, to the extent that automatic thoughts and 
beliefs can be modified in therapeutic settings, one should be able to modify the 
corresponding interpretive biases as well.   
Mathews et al. (1989), for example, found that recovered GAD patients, 
compared to GAD patients, spelled less ambiguous homophones in their threatening 
form, but did, nevertheless, spell more homophones in their threatening form than did 
controls. Furthermore, McNally and Foa (1987) tested whether agoraphobic patients, 
compared to recovered agoraphobics and controls, are characterized by a negative 
interpretive bias when presented with ambiguous information that was related to their 
specific concerns.  The results revealed that agoraphobic patients tended to interpret 
ambiguous scenarios that were related to their agoraphobic concerns in a more 
threatening way than did recovered agoraphobic patients and controls.  Moreover, 
studying interpretive biases in panic disorder, Westing and Öst (1995) found that the 
reduction of negative interpretive biases were greatest for those patients who had the best 
treatment outcomes.  Taken together, measures of information-processing biases such as 
interpretive biases may serve as an indicator of treatment efficacy.  Thus, studying the 
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underlying mechanisms of these biases is very important to develop cognitive-behavioral 
treatment concepts which directly focus on these mechanisms.   
These findings support one of the basic concepts underlying cognitive therapy, 
namely that individuals with psychological disorders have interpretive biases that cause 
or maintain anxiety.  Furthermore, recent studies on inducing information-processing 
biases in nonclinical populations suggest that these biases are anything but fixed.  In other 
words, they can be learned and be unlearned which, in turn, may have important 
implications for treatment and prevention.   
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8. General Appendix 
8.1. Appendix A: Body Dysmorphic Disorder Modification of the YBOCS  
 (cited with permission of authors) 
 
Name: ______________________ Date: ___________   Subject:    _______ 
 
For each item circle the number identifying the response which best characterizes the 
patient during the past week. 
 
 
1. TIME OCCUPIED BY THOUGHTS  0 = None 
    ABOUT THE BODY DEFECT   1 = Mild (less than 1 hr/day) 
       2 = Moderate (1-3 hrs/day) 
How much of your time is occupied by  3 = Severe (greater than 3 and up to 
THOUGHTS about a defect or flaw in        8 hrs/day) 
your appearance (such as your face,   4 = Extreme (greater than 8 hrs/day) 
nose, hair, skin, breasts, genitals, hands?)         
 
 
2.  INTERFERENCE DUE TO THOUGHTS 0 = None 
     ABOUT THE BODY DEFECT   1 = Mild, slight interference with 
                  social or occupational activities, 
How much do your THOUGHTS about your       but overall performance not  
body defect(s) interfere with your social or        impaired 
work (role) functioning?    2 = Moderate, definite interference  
             with social or occupational 
Is there anything you aren’t doing or can’t        performance, 
do because of them?     3 = Severe, causes substantial 
               but still manageable impairment  
             in social or occupational   
             performance 
       4 = Extreme, incapacitating   
 
 
3.  DISTRESS ASSOCIATED WITH  0 = None 
     THOUGHTS ABOUT THE BODY   1 = Mild, and not too disturbing 
     DEFECT          2 = Moderate, and disturbing  
             but still manageable 
How much distress do your THOUGHTS  3 = Severe, and very disturbing 
about your body defect(s) cause you?  4 = Extreme, and disabling distress 
(Rate „disturbing“ feelings or anxiety that       
seem to be triggered by these thoughts, not 
general anxiety or anxiety associated with 
other symptoms) 
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For each item circle the number identifying the response which best characterizes the 
patient during the past week. 
 
 
4.  RESISTANCE AGAINST THOUGHTS  0 = Makes an effort to always 
     OF BODY DEFECT                      resist, or symptoms so minimal 
                         doesn’t need to actively resist 
How much of an effort do you make to   1 = Tries to resist most of time   
resist these THOUGHTS? How often do   2 = Makes some effort to resist  
you try to disregard them or turn your   3 = Yields to all such thoughts  
attention away from these thoughts as          without attempting to control 
they enter your mind?             them but yields with some  
               reluctance  
(Only rate effort made to resist, NOT success  4 = Completely and willingly yields 
or failure in actually controlling your thoughts.         to all such thoughts 
How much patient resist may or may not  
correlate with ability to control them) 
 
 
5.  DEGREE OF CONTROL OVER   0 = Complete control, or no need for 
     THOUGHTS ABOUT BODY DEFECT                    control because these thoughts  
              are so minimal   
How much control do you have over   1 = Much control, usually able to 
your THOUGHTS about your body         stop or divert these thoughts with 
defect(s)? How successful are you in         some effort and concentration  
stopping or diverting these thoughts?   2 = Moderate control, sometimes  
             able to stop or divert these  
             thoughts 
       3 = Little control, rarely successful  
             in stopping thoughts, can only  
            divert attention with difficulty 
       4 = No control, rarely able to even  
             momentarily divert attention 
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For each item circle the number identifying the response which best characterizes the 
patient during the past week. 
 
 
6.  TIME SPENT IN ACTIVITIES   0 = None 
     RELATED TO BODY DEFECT   1 = Mild (spends less than 1 hr/day) 
       2 = Moderate (1-3 hrs/day) 
How much time do you spend in   3 = Severe (spends more than 3 and  
ACTIVITIES related to your concern over        up to 8 hrs/day)        
your appearance (such as, but not limited  4 = Extreme (spends more than 8  
to, checking mirrors, seeking reassurance,        hrs/day in these activities) 
grooming, comparing with others)? 
 
READ LIST OF ACTIVITIES 
(check all that apply) 
___ Checking mirrors/other surfaces 
___ Grooming activities 
___ Applying makeup 
___ Camouflaging with clothing/other cover 
 (rate time spent selecting/changing clothes, 
 not time wearing them) 
___ Scrutinizing others‘ appearance (comparing) 
___ Questioning others about/discussing your 
 appearance 
___ Picking at your skin 
___ Other  _________________ 
 
 
7.  INTERFERENCE DUE TO ACTIVITIES 0 = None 
     RELATED TO BODY DEFECT   1 = Mild, slight interference with 
               social or occupational activities, 
How much do the above ACTIVITIES        but overall performance not 
interfere with your social or work (role)         impaired 
functioning? Is there anything you don’t  2 = Moderate, definite interference  
do because of them?           with social or occupational  
             performance, but still   
             manageable 
       3 = Severe, causes substantial 
               impairment in social or 
               occupational performance 
       4 = Extreme, incapacitating 
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For each item circle the number identifying the response which best characterizes the 
patient during the past week. 
 
 
8.  DISTRESS ASSOCIATED WITH  0 = None 
  ACTIVITIES RELATED TO BODY  1 = Mild, only slightly anxious if 
  DEFECT            behavior prevented, or only 
             slight anxiety during the behavior 
How would you feel if you were   2 = Moderate, reports that anxiety 
prevented from performing these         would mount but remain 
ACTIVITIES? How anxious would         manageable if behavior is  
you become?                              prevented, or that anxiety  
             increases that anxiety increases  
             but remains manageable during  
             such behaviors 
       3 = Severe, prominent and very  
                                   disturbing increase in anxiety 
              during behavior 
       4 = Extreme, incapacitating  
               anxiety from any intervention  
             aimed at modifying activity, or 
               incapacitating anxiety develops  
            during behavior related to body  
            defect 
 
 
9.  RESISTANCE AGAINST   0 = Makes an effort to always 
     COMPULSIONS           resist, or symptom is so minimal, 
             doesn’t need to actively resist 
How much of an effort do you    1 = Tries to resist most of the time   
make to resist these ACTIVITIES?   2 = Makes some effort to resist  
(How much the patient resists   3 = Yields to almost all of these   
these behaviors may or may not          behaviors without attempting to 
correlate with his/her ability to           control them, but does so with 
control them)             some reluctance 
       4 = Completely and willingly  
               yields to all behaviors  related to  
             body defect 
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For each item circle the number identifying the response which best characterizes the 
patient during the past week. 
 
 
10.  DEGREE OF CONTROL OVER  0 = Complete control, or control is 
    COMPULSIVE BEHAVIOR?          unnecessary because  
              symptoms are mild 
How strong is the drive to perform   1 = Much control, experiences 
these behaviors? How much control          pressure to perform the 
do you have over them?           behavior, but usually able to  
              exercise voluntary control 
              over them 
       2 = Moderate control, strong 
                pressure to perform behavior,  
              can control it only with   
              difficulty 
       3 = Little control, very strong drive  
              to perform behavior, must be  
              carried to completion, can delay  
              only with difficulty 
       4 = No control, drive to perform 
                behavior experienced as 
                completely involuntary and 
                overpowering, rarely able to 
                even momentarily delay 
                activity 
 
 
11.  INSIGHT      0 = Excellent insight, fully rational 
Is it possible that your defect might be  1 = Good insight, readily 
less noticeable or less unattractive than          acknowledges absurdity of 
you think it is? How convinced are you that         thoughts (but doesn’t seem 
(body part) is as unattractive as you think          completely convinced that 
it is? Can anyone convince you that it         there isn’t something besides 
doesn’t look so bad?            anxiety to be concerned about 
       2 = Fair insight, reluctantly admits  
              that thoughts seem unreasonable 
              but wavers 
       3 = Poor insight, maintains that 
              thoughts are not unreasonable 
       4 = Lacks insight, delusional, 
               definitely convinced that   
             concerns are reasonable, 
               unresponsive to contrary 
               evidence 
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For each item circle the number identifying the response which best characterizes the 
patient during the past week. 
 
 
12.  AVOIDANCE     0 = No deliberate avoidance 
       1 = Mild, minimal avoidance 
How you have been avoiding doing   2 = Moderate, some avoidance 
anything, going any place, or being               clearly present 
with anyone because of your thoughts  3 = Severe, much avoidance, 
or behaviors related to your body defects?         avoidance prominent 
       4 = Extreme, very extensive 
(If YES, then ask: How much do you          avoidance, patient avoids 
avoid? Rate degree to which patient          almost all activities 
deliberately tries to avoid things?) 
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8.2. Appendix B: Stimulus Material used in Study 2 
 
Key: 
0xxx practise scenarios 
1xxx nonspecific general scenario 
2xxx social phobic scenario 
3xxx BDD scenario 
x01x...x18x running scenario number 
xxx0 no cue 
xxx1 threatening/disorder-relevant cue 
xxx2 nonthreatening/disorder-irrelevant cue 
xxx3 ambiguous sentence 
xxx4 threatening/disorder-relevant continuation 
xxx5 nonthreatening/disorder-irrelevant continuation 
xxx6 question 
xxx7 correct answer 
(xx) syllable number 
 
0012 invitation (4) 
0013 Lily came home from school with a note for her parents. (13) 
0015 She hung around eager to see how they would react. (13) 
0016 Did Lily wait for her parent's response to the letter? 
0017 Yes. 
 
0020 ????? 
0023    Gail's exhibition attracted a lot of attention. (14) 
0025    Nobody had anticipated that she could create such great art. (17) 
0026 Did everyone anticipate such a great exhibition from Gail? 
0027 No. 
 
0032 height (1) 
0033 The doctor examined little Theresa's growth. (12) 
0034 Her tumor had changed very little since the last visit. (14) 
0036 Did the doctor find any change since the last visit? 
0037 Yes. 
 
1010 ????? 
1011 suture (2) 
1012 fabric (2) 
1013 Ann changed her nightgown after the operation and tore the stitches. (17) 
1014 She bent down to examine the damage to the wound. (13) 
1015 She bent down to examine the damage to the seam. (13) n 
1016 Did Ann ignore the torn stitches? 
1017 No. 
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1020 ????? 
1021 terrorist (3) 
1022 birthday (2) 
1023 The man put the box outside the door and quickly left. (13) 
1024 The bomb went unnoticed for several hours before being found. (17) 
1025 The gift went unnoticed for several hours before being found. (17) p 
1026 Was the box discovered right away? 
1027 No. 
 
1030 ????? 
1031 cavities (3) 
1032 laborer (3) 
1033 The sound of the drill droned on and on. (9) 
1034 The dentist finally stopped working on the hole in the tooth. (15) 
1035 The construction-worker finally stopped making so much noise. (15) 
1036 Did the drilling eventually stop? 
1037 Yes. 
 
1040 ????? 
1041 rotten (2) 
1042 exotic (3) 
1043 The meat Mary ate had an unusual flavor. (12) 
1044 The rancid taste lasted long after the meal had ended. (14) 
1045 The spicy taste lasted long after the meal had ended. (14) n 
1046 Did Mary eat meat? 
1047 Yes. 
 
1050 ????? 
1051 riot (2) 
1052 argue (2) 
1053 The organization/event was attacked by political opponents. (17/14) 
1054 The violence intensified as the day went on. (13) 
1055 The debate intensified as the day went on. (12) n 
1056 Was the event met with opposition? 
1057 Yes. 
 
1060 ????? 
1061 complaint (2) 
1062 compliment (3) 
1063 After dinner at the restaurant, the couple called the chef to the table. (19) 
1064 They wanted to blame him for the terrible meal. (12) 
1065 They wanted to thank him for the delicious meal. (12) p 
1066 Did the couple call the chef over to discuss the meal? 
1067 Yes. 
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1070 ????? 
1071 minus (2) 
1072 plus (1) 
1073 Barbara was surprised by the amount in her bank account. (15) 
1074 She had not expected to be so much in debt. (12) 
1075 She had not expected to have so much money. (12) p 
1076 Did Barbara expect the amount stated in her bank account? 
1077 No. 
 
1080 ????? 
1081 drowning (2) 
1082 playing (2) 
1083 Oksana did not hear her little son calling for her from the lake. (17) 
1084 Otherwise she would have swum out to rescue him. (17) 
1085 Otherwise she would have swum out to splash with him. (17) n 
1086 Was Oksana called by her little son? 
1087 Yes. 
 
1090 ????? 
1091 burning (2) 
1092 tobacco (3) 
1093 The children were removed from the smoky room. (11) 
1094 They returned when the blaze had been extinguished and the room aired out. (16) 
1095 They returned when the cigar had been extinguished and the room aired out. (17) n 
1096 Did the children return to the room immediately? 
1097 No. 
 
1100 ????? 
1101 ignite (2) 
1102 brighten (2) 
1103 It was late night when the building was lit. (10) 
1104 It was not possible to see the fire from a far distance. (16) 
1105 It was not possible to see the lights from a far distance. (15) n 
1106 Was it possible to see that the building was lit from afar? 
1107 No. 
 
1110 ????? 
1111 crash (1) 
1112 skate (1) 
1113 Pat slid fast along the icy pond. (9) 
1114 She fell pretty hard beside her best friend Diane. (11) 
1115 She skated well beside her best friend Diane. (11) p 
1116 Was Pat's friend with her on the pond? 
1117 Yes. 
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1120 ????? 
1121 clash (1) 
1122 detour (2) 
1123 Beth made a wrong turn with her Pontiac. (10) 
1124 The inevitable accident resulted in her the seminar. (20)   
1125 The inevitable delay resulted in her the seminar. (19) n 
1126 Did Beth drive a BMW? 
1127 No. 
 
1130 ????? 
1131 stealing (2) 
1132 withdrawal (3) 
1133 The bank clerk handed the money over to the man. (13) 
1134 The robber put the money in his plastic bag. (12) 
1135 The costumer put the money in his wallet. (12) n 
1136 Did the man put the money in a suitcase? 
1137 No. 
 
1140 ????? 
1141 malignant (3) 
1142 baby (2) 
1143 Carmen was surprised when the doctor informed her about the results. (17) 
1144 She did not expect to have cancer. (9) 
1145 She did not expect to be pregnant. (9) n 
1146 Did Carmen expect the results? 
1147 No. 
 
1150 ????? 
1151 mourning (2) 
1152 Christmas (2) 
1153 It was snowing heavily when the wreath was brought. (12) 
1154 The family watched as it was put on the coffin. (13) 
1155 The family watched as it was attached to the door (13) n 
1156 Did somebody observe how the wreath was placed? 
1157 Yes. 
 
1160 ????? 
1161 repulsion (3) 
1162 attraction (3) 
1163 Brenda found it hard to hide her feelings for Peter. (12) 
1164 She had always hated the way he treated people. (13) 
1165 She had always loved the way he treated people. (12) p 
1166 Did Brenda have difficulties hiding her emotions from Rob? 
1167 Yes. 
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1170 ????? 
1171 surgery (3) 
1172 carpentry (3) 
1173 He decided that the leg was beyond repair. (12) 
1174 After several hours the doctor had to admit defeat. (16) 
1175 After several hours the craftsman had to admit defeat. (16) n 
1176 Was a great effort made to repair the leg? 
1177 Yes. 
 
1180 ????? 
1181 refused (2) 
1182 accepted (3) 
1183 Joan received a call from her bank regarding her credit application. (18) 
1184 The bank denied her application. (9)  
1185 The bank approved her application. (9) p 
1186 Did the bank want further information from Joan? 
1187 No. 
 
2010 ????? 
2011 shame (1) 
2012 rage (1) 
2013 Kristin felt herself flush when her male colleague spoke to her. (14) 
2014 Her reaction embarrassed her. (8) 
2015 His words infuriated her. (8) n 
2016 Did Kristin have a strong emotional reaction to her male colleague? 
2017 Yes. 
 
2020 ????? 
2021 embarrassment (4) 
2022 enthusiasm (4) 
2023 Sandra felt her heart beat rapidly when her attractive neighbor invited her for 
dinner. (23) 
2024 She was afraid she would make a big fool of herself. (13) 
2025 She was very happy about the invitation. (13) p 
2026 Was Sandra indifferent about the invitation of her neighbor? 
2027 No. 
 
2030 ????? 
2031 frightened (2) 
2032 admired (3) 
2033 When Vera stood up to deliver the poem all her classmates looked at her. (19) 
2034 Their reaction made her so nervous that she stuttered. (13) 
2035 Their reaction made her so proud that she was inspired. (14) 
2036 Was Vera influenced by the attention of her classmates? 
2037 Yes. 
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2040 ????? 
2041 fear (1) 
2042 cold (1) 
2043 At the barbecue Amy's hands trembled so much she almost spilled her drink. (18) 
2044 She was afraid of the unfamiliar people at the party. (16) 
2045 She had forgotten her jacket back home and was freezing now. (15) n 
2046 Did Amy spoil her dress with a stain? 
2047 No. 
 
2050 ????? 
2051 stare (1) 
2052 flirt (1) 
2053 In the elevator Dorothy was alone with an attractive young man. (20) 
2054 He observed her and saw how nervous she was. (11) 
2055 He smiled approvingly and winked at her. (10) p 
2056 Did the young man pay any attention to Dorothy? 
2057 Yes. 
 
2060 ????? 
2061 lecture (2) 
2062 virus (2) 
2063 Facing the audience, Sabrina's legs were so shaky she had to sit down. (19) 
2064 She was sure to screw up her presentation. (11) 
2065 She was certain she had fallen ill. (10) n 
2066 Was Sabrina too weak to stand up because she had not eaten all day? 
2067 No. 
 
2070 ????? 
2071 unwelcome (3) 
2072 outfit (2) 
2073 When Miriam appeared at the party the guests fell silent. (15) 
2074 Miriam feared they were not happy to see her. (12) 
2075 Miriam enjoyed the awe her dress inspired. (12) 
2076 Did Miriam's appearance at the party stay unnoticed? 
2077 No. 
 
2080 ????? 
2081 stammer (2) 
2082 err (1) 
2083 A stranger addressed Alexandra on the street. (12) 
2084 She was ashamed she stuttered when replying. (11)  
2085 She really wondered who he mistook her for. (11) 
2086 Did Alexandra meet an old friend on the street? 
2087 No. 
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2090 ????? 
2091 stupid (2) 
2092 funny (2) 
2093 Rebecca's speech made everyone in class giggle. (12) 
2094 Her choice of words reflected her dullness. (10) 
2095 Her choice of words reflected her great wit. (10) p 
2096 Were Rebecca's classmates amused by her speech? 
2097 Yes. 
 
2100 ????? 
2101 incompetent (4) 
2102 exceptional (4) 
2103 Susan only guessed what her colleagues thought of her work. (13) 
2104 Their criticisms were never made within her earshot. (14) 
2105 Their honest praises were never made within her earshot. (14) p 
2106 Did Susan have to guess the opinion of her colleagues? 
2107 Yes. 
 
2110 ????? 
2111 ridicule (3) 
2112 entertain (3) 
2113 Holly's travel stories made the class laugh. (10) 
2114 She made a lot of silly mistakes in her discription of Italy. (18) 
2115 She made a lot of silly jokes in her discription of Italy. (17) p 
2116 Did Holly's travel stories cause great amuesement? 
2117 Yes. 
 
2120 ????? 
2121 shy (1) 
2122 fun (1) 
2123 Linda's expectations of the party were correct. (13) 
2124 She was too nervous to start a conversation. (12) 
2125 She was happy to start a conversation. (11) p 
2126 Did Linda find her expectations confirmed? 
3127 Yes. 
 
2130 ????? 
2131 upset (2) 
2132 glad (1) 
2133 When Debbie entered the classroom late, everyone looked at her. (15) 
2134 The class was reproachful at her tardiness. (11)  
2135 The class was relieved at her arrival. (10) 
2136 Did the class respond to Debbie's late entrance?  
2137 Yes. 
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2140 ????? 
2141 dull (1) 
2142 busy (2) 
2143 Eric called Lucia to cancel the date they had for the evening. (17) 
2144 He did not want to go out with her because she was so boring. (16) 
2145 He really wanted to go out with her but his boss needed him. (16)  
2146 Did Eric call Lucia to confirm their date? 
2147 Yes. 
 
2150 ????? 
2151 failure (2) 
2152 success (2) 
2153 Tonya was awaiting the results of her finals. (13) 
2154 She feared that she had flanked her exams. (9) 
2155 She knew that she had passed her exams. (9) p 
2156 Had Tonya been told her examination results? 
2157 No. 
 
2160 ????? 
2161 blamed (1) 
2162 praised (1) 
2163 Her boss called Frances into his office. (10) 
2164 He wanted to criticize her for a job she had done yesterday. (17) 
2165 He wanted to congratulate her for a job she had done yesterday. (18) p 
2166 Did Frances receive a raise from her boss? 
2167 No. 
 
2170 ????? 
2171 afraid (3) 
2172 dishes (2) 
2173 Bobbie had wet hands when her guests arrived. (10) 
2174 She was sweating anxiously about their arrival. (13) 
2175 She had just rinsed some plates before their arrival. (12) n 
2176 Did Bobbie launder her clothes before the guests appeared? 
2177 No. 
 
2180 ????? 
2181 belittled (3) 
2182 interested (4) 
2183 When Rachel entered the restaurant a guest looked at her intensely. (17) 
2184 His gaze revealed how uninteresting he found her. (12) 
2185 His gaze revealed how interesting he found her. (11) p 
2186 Was Rachel stared at when she entered the restaurant? 
2187 Yes. 
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3010 ????? 
3011 disgust (2) 
3012 affection (3) 
3013 Bob was watching Susan from a distance. (10) 
3014 He had never liked the way she looked. (9) 
3015 He had always liked the way she looked. (10) 
3016 Was Bob indifferent towards Susan? 
3017 No. 
 
3020 ?????  
3021 defect (2) 
3022 joke (1) 
3023 Some people behind Jane were laughing. (9) 
3024 They had noticed how awful she looked.  (9) 
3025 One of them had mad a funny remark. (10) 
3026 Did anybody laugh? 
3027 Yes. 
 
3030 ????? 
3031 hideous (3) 
3032 pretty (2) 
3033 Mary realized that others took special notice of her. (14) 
3034 She felt very uncomfortable because of her appearance. (16) 
3035 She felt very self-confident because of her appearance. (16) 
3036 Did Mary get special attention? 
3037 Yes. 
 
3040 ????? 
3041 sad (1) 
3042 proud (1) 
3043 Standing in front of the mirror, Nancy examined her appearance. (18) 
3044 She felt despairing about her new hair style. (11) 
3045 She felt very good about her new hair style. (11) 
3046 Did Nancy stand in front of a reflecting window? 
3047 No. 
 
3050 ????? 
3051 misshapen (3) 
3052 theater (3) 
3053 Watched by the crowd, Andrea covered her face with her hands. (14) 
3054 She was afraid that other people saw her flaw. (12) 
3055 She was an excellent actress who knew her business. (13) 
3056 Did anyone talk to Andrea? 
3057 No. 
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3060 ????? 
3061 acne (2) 
3062 invitation (4) 
3063 Before leaving the house, Lisa checked her makeup again. (14) 
3064 She was sure that everybody would stare at her skin. (13) 
3065 She wanted to make a good impression on her date. (13) 
3066 Did Lisa leave the house? 
3067 Yes. 
 
3070 ????? 
3071 asymmetry (4) 
3072 competition (4) 
3073 Mike used to compare himself with others. (10) 
3074 He thought other men looked much better in short pants. (12) 
3075 He was pretty sure he had a good chance to get this job. (12) 
3076 Did Mike compare himself with other people? 
3077 Yes. 
 
3080 ????? 
3081 homely (2) 
3082 heat (1) 
3083 Betty felt really uncomfortable lying on the beach. (14) 
3084 She worried others would take special notice of her. (13) 
3085 There was no shade and the sun was burning her. (11) 
3086 Did Betty feel really good at the beach? 
3087  No. 
 
3090 ????? 
3091 deformed (2) 
3092 taste (1) 
3093 Sitting together at dinner, Linda asked for reassurance. (16) 
3094 She was afraid what she looked like tonight. (10) 
3095 She was afraid her meal might be too salty. (11) 
3096 Did Linda feel good in this situation? 
3097 No. 
 
3100 ????? 
3101 disfigured (3) 
3102 chlorine (2) 
3103 Jennifer avoided swimming in public pools. (12) 
3104 Being in such a bad shape, she did not dare to expose herself in public. (19) 
3105 Coming into contact with these chemicals, her eyes used to get irritated. (20) 
3106 Did Jennifer go swimming? 
3107 No. 
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3110 ????? 
3111 misshapen (2) 
3112 studying (3) 
3113 Kristin had not dated anybody for 6 months. (13) 
3114 Preparing for her final exams, she did not have any time to go out. (19) 
3115 Comparing herself to other women, she found herself really ugly. (18) 
3116 Had Kristin dated anybody? 
3117 No. 
 
3120 ????? 
3121 wrinkle (2) 
3122 stewardess (3) 
3123 Cheryl spent a lot of money for cosmetics. (12) 
3124 She was afraid that she could look hideous. (11) 
3125 It was very important in her job to look good. (11) 
3126 Did Cheryl spend less money for cosmetics? 
3127 No. 
 
3130 ????? 
3131 repulsion (3) 
3132 dating (2) 
3133 Paula spent a lot of time grooming. (9) 
3134 She was really unhappy with her appearance. (13) 
3135 She wanted to look beautiful for her boyfriend. (12) 
3136 Did Paula spend a lot of time grooming? 
3137 Yes. 
 
3140 ????? 
3141 blemish (2) 
3142 dermatosis (4) 
3143 Mary had consulted a dermatologist several times. (16) 
3144 She felt very upset about her appearance. (13) 
3145 It was really hard to get rid of the measles. (12) 
3146 Had Mary seen the doctor more than once? 
3147 Yes. 
 
3150 ????? 
3151 flaw (1) 
3152 bright (1) 
3153 Rosemary felt more comfortable sitting in the dark part of the room. (18) 
3154 She thought her defect would be less visible there. (12) 
3155 The sun light falling through the window had dazzled her. (13) 
3156 Did Rosemary feel less comfortable sitting there? 
3157 No. 
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3160 ????? 
3161 scar (1) 
3162 job (1) 
3163 Marianne applied makeup many times a day. (12) 
3164 She spent lots of time using makeup to cover her red scar. (15) 
3165 She was really happy that she found work as a beautician. (15) 
3166 Did Marianne apply makeup a lot? 
3167 Yes. 
 
3170 ????? 
3171 ugly (2) 
3172 model (2) 
3173 When Linda walked down the street, everybody was staring at her. (16) 
3174 She felt upset since she was disfigured. (10) 
3175 She was confident of her perfect body. (11) 
3176 Was everybody staring at her? 
3177 Yes. 
 
3180 ????? 
3181 disease (2) 
3182 appearance (4) 
3183 Jeremy had undergone several surgeries. (13) 
3184 After this refractory illness, it took him a long time to feel better. (19) 
3185 He was more satisfied with the shape of his nose than he was before. (17) 
3186 Had Jeremy undergone more than one surgery? 
3187 Yes. 
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